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DREAMS AND TELEPATHY[1]

BY
SIGM. FREUD
VIENNA

At the present time, when such a great interest is felt in what are called 'occult' phenomena, very definite anticipations will doubtless be aroused by the announcement of a paper with this title. I will therefore hasten to explain that there is no ground for any such anticipations. You will learn nothing from this lecture of mine about the riddle of telepathy; indeed, you will not even gather whether I do or do not believe in the existence of 'telepathy'. On this occasion I have set myself the very modest task of examining the relation of telepathic occurrences, whatever may be their origin, to dreams: more exactly, to our theory of dreams. You will know that the connection between dreams and telepathy is commonly held to be a very intimate one; I shall propound the view that the two have little to do with each other, and that if the existence of telepathic dreams were established there would be no need to alter in any way our conception of dreams.

The material on which the present communication is based is very slight. In the first place I must express my regret that I could make no use of my own dreams as I did when I wrote the 'Traumdeutung' (1900). But I have never had a 'telepathic' dream. Not that I have been entirely without dreams that conveyed an impression of a certain definite occurrence taking place at some distant place, leaving it to the dreamer to decide whether the occurrence is taking place at that moment or will do so at some

[1] Paper read before the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society. Translated by C. J. M. Hubback.

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later time. In waking life too I have often become aware of presentiments of distant events. But these indications, foretellings, and forebodings have none of them been fulfilled: there proved to be no external reality corresponding to them, and they had therefore to be regarded as purely subjective anticipations.

For example, I once dreamt during the war that one of my sons then serving at the front had fallen. This was not directly stated in the dream, but was expressed in an unmistakable manner by means of the well-known death-symbolism of which an account was first given by W. Stekel. (Let us not omit here to fulfil the duty, often felt as inconvenient, of making literary acknowledgements!) I saw the young soldier standing on a landing-stage, between land and water, as it were; he looked to me very pale; I spoke to him but he did not answer. There were other unmistakable indications. He was not wearing military uniform, but a ‚ski-ing costume' that he had worn when a serious ski-ing accident had happened to him several years before the war. He stood on something raised like a footstool with a chest in front of him; a situation always closely associated in my mind with the idea of 'falling', through a memory of my own childhood. As a child of little more than two years old I had myself climbed on such a footstool to get something out of a chest—probably something good to eat—whereupon I fell and gave myself a blow, of which I can even now show the scar. My son, however, whom the dream pronounced to be dead, came home from the war unscathed.

Only a short time ago, I had another dream announcing misfortune; it was, I think, just before I decided on putting together these few remarks. This time there was not much attempt at disguise: I saw my two nieces who live in England; they were dressed in black and said to me 'We buried her on Thursday'. I knew the reference was to the death of their mother, now eighty-seven years of age, the widow of my eldest brother.

A time of disagreeable anticipation followed; there would of course be nothing surprising in so aged a woman suddenly passing away, yet it would be very unpleasant for the dream to coincide exactly with the occurrence. The next letter from England, however, dissipated this fear. For the benefit of those who are concerned for the wish-fulfilment theory of dreams I may interpolate a reassurance by saying that there was no difficulty in detecting

by analysis the unconscious motives that might be presumed to exist in these death-dreams just as in others.

Do not now urge the objection that what I have just related is valueless because negative experiences prove as little here as they do in less occult matters. I am well aware of that and have not adduced these instances with any intention whatever of proving anything or of surreptitiously influencing you in any particular way. My sole purpose was to justify the limitations of my own material.

Another fact certainly seems to me of more significance, namely, that during my twenty-seven years of work as an analyst I have never been in the position to observe a truly telepathic dream in any of my patients. The people among whom my practice lay certainly formed a good collection of very neurotic and 'highly sensitive' temperaments; many of them have related to me most remarkable incidents in their previous life on which they based a belief in mysterious occult influences. Events such as accidents or illnesses of near relatives, in particular the death of one of the parents, have often enough happened during the treatment and interrupted it; but not on one single occasion did these occurrences, eminently suitable as they were, afford me the opportunity of registering a single telepathic dream, although the treatment extended over six months or a year or more. It may be of interest to some one to attempt an explanation of this fact, limiting as it does again the material at my disposal. You will see that any such explanation would not affect the subject of this paper.

Nor does it embarrass me to be asked why I have made no use of the abundant supply of telepathic dreams that have been published. I should not have had far to seek, since the publications of the English as well as of the American Society for Psychical Research are accessible to me as a member of both societies. In all these communications no attempt is ever made to subject such dreams to analytic investigation, which would be our first interest in such cases.[2] Moreover, you will soon perceive that for the purposes of this paper one single dream will serve well enough.

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[2] In two writings of W. Stekel (Der Telepathische Traum, no date, and Die Sprache des Traumes, Zweite Auflage, 1922) there are at least attempts to apply the analytic technique to alleged telepathic dreams. The author expresses his belief in the reality of telepathy.

My material thus consists simply and solely of two communications which have reached me from correspondents in Germany. They are not personally known to me, but they give their names and addresses: I have not the least ground for presuming any intention to mislead on the part of the writers.

I

With the first I had already been in correspondence; he had been good enough to send me, as many of my readers do, observations of every-day occurrences and the like. He is obviously an educated and highly intelligent man; this time he expressly places his material at my disposal if I care to turn it 'to literary account'.

His letter runs as follows:

'I consider the following dream of sufficient interest to give you some material for your researches.

'I must first state the following facts. My daughter, who is married and lives in Berlin, was expecting her first confinement in the middle of December of this year. I intended to go to Berlin about that time with my (second) wife, my daughter's step-mother. During the night of November 16—17 I dreamt, with a vividness and clearness I have never before experienced, that my wife had given birth to twins. I saw quite plainly the two healthy infants with their chubby faces lying in their cot side by side; I was not sure of their sex: one with fair hair had distinctly my features and something of my wife's, the other with chestnut-brown hair clearly resembled her with a look of me. I said to my wife, who has red-gold hair, "probably 'your' child's chestnut hair will also go red later on". My wife gave them the breast. In the dream she had also made some jam in a wash-basin and the two children crept about on all fours in the basin and licked up the contents. So much for the dream. Four or five times I had half awaked from it, asked myself if it were true that we had twins, but did not come to the conclusion with any certainty that it was only a dream. The dream lasted till I woke, and after that it was some little time before I felt quite clear as to the true state of affairs. At breakfast I told my wife the dream, which much amused her. She said "Surely Ilse (my daughter) won't have twins?" I answered "I should hardly think so, as there have never been twins either

in my family or in G.'s" (her husband). On November the 18th at ten o'clock in the morning I received a telegram from my son-in-law handed in the afternoon before, telling me of the birth of twins, boy and girl. The birth thus took place at the time when I was dreaming that my wife had twins. The confinement occurred four weeks earlier than had been expected by my daughter and her husband.

'But there is a further circumstance: the next night I dreamt that my dead wife, my daughter's own mother, had undertaken the care of forty-eight new-born infants. When the first dozen were being brought in, I protested. At that point the dream ended.

'My dead wife was very fond of children. She often talked about it, saying she would like a whole troop round her, the more the better, and that she would do very well if she had charge of a Kindergarten and would be quite happy so. The noise children make was music to her. On one occasion she invited in a whole troop of children from the streets and regaled them with chocolates and cakes in the courtyard of our villa. My daughter must have thought at once of her mother after her confinement, especially because of the surprise of its coming on prematurely, the arrival of twins, and their difference in sex. She knew her mother would have greeted the event with the liveliest joy and sympathy. "Only think what mother would say, if she were by me now!" This thought must undoubtedly have gone through her mind. And then I dream of my dead wife, of whom I very seldom dream, and had neither spoken of nor thought of since the first dream.

'Do you think the coincidence between dream and event in both cases accidental? My daughter is much attached to me and was most certainly thinking of me during the labour, particularly because we had often exchanged letters during the pregnancy and I had constantly given her advice.'

It is easy to guess what my answer to this letter was. I was sorry to find that my correspondent's interest in analysis had been so completely killed by that in telepathy; I therefore avoided his direct question, and, remarking that the dream contained a good deal besides its connection with the birth of the twins, I asked him to let me know what information or incidents could give me a clue to the meaning of the dream.

Thereupon I received the following second letter which certainly did not give me what I wanted:

'I have not been able to answer your kind letter of the 24th until to-day. I shall be only too pleased to tell you "without omission or reserve" all the associations that occur to me. Unfortunately there is not much, more would come out in talking.

Well then—my wife and I do not wish for any more children. We very rarely have sexual intercourse, at any rate at the time of the dream there was certainly no "danger". My daughter's confinement, which was expected about the middle of December, was naturally a frequent subject of conversation between us. My daughter had been examined and skiagraphed in the summer, and the doctor making the examination had made sure that the child would be a boy. My wife said at the time "I should laugh if after all it were a girl". At the time she also thought to herself it would be better if it were an H. rather than a G. (my son-in-law's family name); my daughter is handsomer and has a better figure than my son-in-law, although he has been a naval officer. I have made some study of the question of heredity, and am in the habit of looking at small children to see whom they resemble. One more thing! We have a small dog which sits with us at table in the evening to have his food and licks the plates and dishes. All this material appears in the dream.

'I am fond of small children and have often said that I should like to have the bringing up of a child once more, now that I should have so much more understanding, interest and time to devote to it, but with my wife I should not wish it, as she does not possess the necessary qualities for rearing a child judiciously. The dream makes me a present of two children—I am not sure of the sex. I see them even at this moment lying in the bed and I recognise the features, the one more like myself, the other like my wife, but each with minor traits from the other side. My wife has auburn hair, one of the children chestnut (red) brown. I say "yes, it will later on be red too". Both the children crawl round a large wash-basin in which my wife has been stirring jam and lick it all over (dream). The origin of this detail is easily explicable, just as is the dream as a whole; it would not be difficult to understand or interpret it, if it had not coincided with the unexpectedly early arrival of my grandchildren (three weeks too soon), a coincidence of time almost to the hour (I cannot exactly say when the dream began; my grandchildren were born at nine p.m. and a quarter past; I went to bed at about eleven and dreamed during the night).

Our knowledge too that the child would be a boy adds to the difficulty, though possibly the doubt whether this had been fully established might account for the appearance of twins in the dream. Still, all the same, there is the coincidence of the dream with the unexpected and premature appearance of my daughter's twins.

'It is not the first time that distant events have become known to me before I received the actual news. To give one instance among many. In October I had a visit from my three brothers. We had not all seen one another together for thirty years (naturally one had seen another oftener), once only at my father's funeral and once at my mother's. Both deaths were expected, and I had had no "presentiments" in either case. But, when about twenty-five years ago my youngest brother died quite suddenly and unexpectedly at the age of nine, as the postman handed me the postcard with the news of his death, before I even glanced at it, the thought came to me at once "That is to say that your brother is dead". He was the only one left at home, a strong healthy lad, while we four elder brothers were already fully fledged and had left the parents' house. At the time of their visit to me the talk by chance came round to this experience of mine, and, as if on the word of command, all three brothers came out with the declaration that exactly the same thing had happened to them. Whether exactly in the same way I cannot say; at all events each one said that he had felt perfectly certain of the death in advance before the quite unexpected news had been communicated, following closely as it did on the presentiment. We are all from the mother's side of a sensitive disposition, though tall, strong men, but not one of us is in the least inclined towards spiritism or occultism; on the contrary, we disclaim adherence to either. My brothers are all three University men, two are schoolmasters, one a surveyor, all rather pedants than visionaries. That is all I can tell you in regard to the dream. If you can turn it to account in any of your writings, I am delighted to place it at your disposal'.

I am afraid that you will behave like the writer of these letters. You, too, will be primarily interested in the question whether this dream can really be regarded as a telepathic notification of the unexpected birth of the twin children, and you will not be disposed to submit this dream like any other to analysis. I foresee that it will always be so when psycho-analysis and occultism encounter each other. The former has, so to speak, all our instinctive

prepossessions against it; the latter is met half-way by powerful and mysterious sympathies. I am not, however, going to take up the position that I am nothing but a psycho-analyst, that the problems of occultism do not concern me: you would rightly judge that to be only an evasion of the problem. On the contrary, I maintain that it would be a great satisfaction to me if I could convince myself and others on unimpeachable evidence of the existence of telepathic processes, but I also consider that the data about this dream are altogether inadequate to justify any such pronouncement. You will observe that it does not once occur to this intelligent man, deeply interested as he is in the problem of his dream, to tell us when he had last seen his daughter or what news he had lately had from her; he writes in the first letter that the birth was a month too soon, in the second, however, the month has become three weeks only, and in neither do we gain the information whether the birth was really premature, or whether, as so often happens, those concerned were out in their reckoning. But we should have to consider these and other details of the occurrence if we are to weigh the probability of the dreamer making unconscious estimates and guesses. I felt too that it would be of no use even if I succeeded in getting answers to such questions. In the course of arriving at the information new doubts would constantly arise which could only be set at rest if one had the man in front of one and could revive all the relevant memories, which he has perhaps dismissed as unessential. He is certainly right in what he says at the beginning of his second letter, more would come out if he were able to talk to me.

Consider another and similar case, in which the disturbing interest of occultism has no part. You must often have been in the position to compare the anamnesia and the information about the illness given during the first sitting by any neurotic with what you have gained from him after some months of psycho-analysis. Apart from the inevitable abbreviations of the first communication, how many essentials were left out or suppressed, how many displacements made in the relation the various facts bear to one another, how much that was incorrect or untrue was related to you that first time! You will not call me hyper-critical if I refuse in the circumstances to make any pronouncement whether the dream in question is a telepathic fact or a particularly subtle achievement on the part of the dreamer's unconscious or whether it is simply to be taken as

a striking coincidence. Our curiosity must be allayed with the hope of some later opportunity for detailed oral examination of the dreamer. But you cannot say that this outcome of our investigation has disappointed you, for I prepared you for it; I said you would hear nothing which would throw any light on the problem of telepathy.

If we now pass on to the analytic treatment of this dream, we are obliged again to admit that we are not satisfied. The material that the dreamer associates with the manifest content of the dream is insufficient to make any analysis possible. The dream, for example, goes into great detail over the likeness of the children to the parents, discusses the colour of their hair and the probable change of colour at a later age, and as an explanation of this much spun-out detail we only have the dry piece of information from the dreamer that he has always been interested in questions of likeness and heredity; we are certainly accustomed to push the matter rather further! But at *one* point the dream does admit of an analytic interpretation, and just at this point analysis, otherwise having no connection with occultism, comes to the aid of telepathy in a remarkable way. It is only on account of this single point that I am asking for your attention to this dream at all.

Rightly viewed, this dream has no right whatever to be called 'telepathic'. It does not inform the dreamer of anything that is taking place elsewhere—apart from what is otherwise known to him. What on the other hand the dream does relate is something quite different from the event reported in the telegram the second day after the night of the dream. Dream and actual occurrence diverge at a particularly important point, and only agree, apart from the coincidence of time, in another very interesting element. In the dream the dreamer's *wife* has twins. The occurrence, however, is that his *daughter* has given birth to twins in her distant home. The dreamer does not overlook this difference, he does not seem to know any way of getting over it and, as according to his own account he has no leaning towards the occult, he only asks quite tentatively whether the coincidence between dream and occurrence on the point of the twin-birth can be more than an accident. The psycho-analytic interpretation of dreams, however, does away with this difference between the dream and the event, and gives to both the same content. If we consult the association-material to this dream, it proves to us, in spite of its sparseness,

that an inner bond of feeling exists between this father and daughter, a bond of feeling which is so usual and so natural that we ought to cease to be ashamed of it, one that in daily life merely finds expression as a tender interest and only in dreams is drawn to final conclusions. The father knows that his daughter clings to him, he is convinced that she often thought of him during the labour, in his heart I think he grudges her to the son-in-law, about whom in one letter he makes a few disparaging remarks. On the occasion of her confinement (whether expected or communicated by telepathy) the unconscious though repressed wish becomes active: 'she ought rather to be my (second) wife'; it is this wish that has distorted the dream-thoughts and is the cause of the difference between the manifest dream-content and the event. We are entitled to replace the second wife in the dream by the daughter. If we possessed more associations with the dream, we could undoubtedly verify and deepen this interpretation.

And now I have reached the point I wish to put before you. We have endeavoured to maintain the strictest impartiality and have allowed two conceptions of the dream to rank as equally probable and equally unproved. According to the first the dream is a reaction to the telepathic message: 'your daughter has just brought twins into the world'. According to the second an unconscious chain of thought underlies the dream, which may be reproduced somewhat as follows: 'to-day is undoubtedly the day the confinement will take place if the young people in Berlin are out in their reckoning by a month, as I strongly suspect. And if my (first) wife were still alive, she certainly would not be content with one grandchild! To please her there would have to be at least twins.' If this second view is right, no new problems arise. It is simply a dream like any other. The (preconscious) dream thoughts as outlined above are reinforced by the (unconscious) wish, that no other than the daughter should have been the second wife of the dreamer, and thus the manifest dream as described to us arises.

If you prefer to assume that a telepathic message about the daughter's confinement reached the sleeper, further questions arise of the relation of such a message to the dream and of its influence on the formation of the dream. The answer is not far to seek and is not at all ambiguous. The telepathic message has been treated as a portion of the material that goes to the formation of a dream, like any other external or internal stimulus, like a disturbing noise

in the street or an insistent organic sensation in the sleeper's own body. In our example it is evident how the message, with the help of a lurking repressed wish, becomes remodelled into a wish-fulfilment: it is unfortunately less easy to show that it blends with other material that becomes active at the same time so as to make a dream. The telepathic message—if we are justified in recognizing its existence—can thus make no alteration in the structure of the dream; telepathy has nothing to do with the essential nature of dreams. And that I may avoid the impression that I am trying to conceal a vague notion behind an abstract and fine-sounding word, I am willing to repeat: the essential nature of dreams consists in the peculiar process of the 'dream-work' whereby the pre-conscious thoughts (residue from the previous day) are worked over into the manifest dream-content by means of an unconscious wish-activity. The problem of telepathy concerns dreams as little as the problem of anxiety.

I am hoping that you will grant this, but that you will raise the objection that there are, nevertheless, other telepathic dreams, in which there is no difference between the event and the dream, and in which there is nothing else to be found but the undisguised reproduction of the event. I have no knowledge of such dreams from my own experience, but I know they have often been reported. If we now assume that we have such an undisguised and unadulterated telepathic dream to deal with, another question arises. Ought we to call such a telepathic experience a 'dream' at all? You will certainly do so as long as you keep to popular usage, in which everything that takes place in mental life during sleep is called a dream. You, too, perhaps say, 'I tossed about in my dream', and you are not conscious of anything incorrect when you say, 'I shed tears in my dream' or 'I felt apprehensive in my dream'. But notice that in all these cases you are using 'dream' and 'sleep' and 'state of being asleep' interchangeably, as if there were no distinction between them. I think it would be in the interests of scientific accuracy to keep 'dream' and 'state of sleep' more distinctly separate. Why should we provide a counterpart to the confusion conjured up by Maeder who, by refusing to distinguish between the dream-work and the latent dream thoughts, has discovered a new function for dreams? Supposing then we are brought face to face with such a pure telepathic 'dream', let us rather call it a telepathic experience in a state of sleep.

A dream without condensation, distortion, dramatization, most of all without wish-fulfilment, surely hardly deserves the name. You will remind me that there are other mental products in sleep to which the name of 'dream' is properly refused. Actual experiences of the day are known to be simply repeated in sleep; reproductions of traumatic scenes in 'dreams' have led us only lately to revise the theory of dreams. There are dreams which by certain special qualities are to be distinguished from the usual type, which are properly speaking nothing but night-phantasies, not having undergone additions or alterations of any kind and otherwise similar to the well-known day-dreams. It would be awkward, certainly, to exclude these imaginings from the realm of 'dreams'. But still they all come from within, are products of our mental life, whereas the very conception of the purely 'telepathic dream' lies in its being a perception of something external, in relation to which mental life remains passive and receptive.

II

The second case I intend to bring before your notice belongs actually to quite another type. This is not a telepathic dream, but a dream that has recurred from childhood onwards in a person who has had many telepathic experiences. Her letter, which I reproduce here, contains much that is remarkable, about which we cannot pronounce any judgement. Some part of it is of interest in connection with the problem of the relation of telepathy to dreams.

1. '... My doctor, Herr Dr. N. advises me to give you an account of a dream that has haunted me for about thirty or thirty-two years. I am following his advice, and perhaps the dream may possess interest for you in some scientific respect. Since, in your opinion, such dreams are to be traced to an experience of a sexual nature in the first years of childhood, I reproduce some reminiscences of childhood, that is, experiences which even now make an impression on me and were of so marked a character as to have determined my religion for me.

'May I beg of you to send me word in what way you explain this dream and whether it is not possible to banish it from my life, for it haunts me like a ghost, and the circumstances that always accompany it—I always fall out of bed, and have inflicted on

myself not inconsiderable injuries—make it particularly disagreeable and distressing'.

2. 'I am thirty-seven years old, very strong and in good physical health, but in childhood I had, besides measles and scarlet fever, an attack of inflammation of the kidneys. In my fifth year I had a very severe inflammation of the eyes, which left double vision. One image slants towards the other and the edges of the image are blurred, as the scars from the ulcers affect the clearness. In the specialist's opinion there is nothing more to be done to the eyes and no chance of improvement. The left side of my face is somewhat awry, from having screwed up my left eye to see better. By dint of practice and determination I can do the finest needlework, and similarly, when a six-year-old child, I broke myself of squinting sideways by practising in front of a looking-glass, so that now there is no external sign of the defect in vision.

'In my earliest years I was always lonely, kept apart from other children, and had visions (clairvoyance and clairaudience); I was not able to distinguish these from reality, and was often in consequence in embarrassing positions, with the result that I am a very reserved and shy person. Since as a quite small child I already knew far more than I could have learnt, I simply did not understand children of my own age. I am myself the eldest of a family of twelve.

'From six to ten years old I attended the elementary school and up to sixteen the high-school of the Ursuline Nuns in B. At ten years old I had taken in as much French in four weeks, in eight lessons, as other children learn in two years. I had only to repeat it and it was just as if I had already learnt it and only forgotten it. I have never had any need to learn French, in contradistinction to English, which certainly gave me no trouble but was not known to me beforehand. The same thing happened to me with Latin as with French and I have never properly learnt it, only knowing it from ecclesiastical Latin, which is however quite familiar to me. If I read a French book to-day, then I immediately begin thinking in French, whereas this never happens to me with English, although I have more command of English.—My parents are peasant people who for generations have never spoken any languages except German and Polish.

'*Visions:* Sometimes reality vanishes for some moments and I see something quite different. In my house, for example, I often

see an old couple and a child; the house is then differently furnished. In hospital a friend once came into my room at about four in the morning; I was awake, had the lamp burning, and was sitting at my table reading, as I suffer much from sleeplessness. This apparition of her always means a trying time for me—as also on this occasion.

'In 1914 my brother was on active service; I was not with my parents in B., but in C. It was ten in the morning on August the 22nd when I heard my brother's voice calling 'Mother, mother'. It came again ten minutes later, but I saw nothing. On August the 24th I came home, found my mother greatly oppressed, and in answer to my questions she said that the boy had appeared on August the 22nd. She had been in the garden in the morning, when she had heard him call 'Mother, mother'. I tried to comfort her and said nothing about myself. Three weeks after there came a card from my brother, written on August the 22nd between nine and ten in the morning; shortly after that he died.

'On September the 27th, 1921, while in the hospital, I received a message of some kind. There were violent knockings two or three times repeated on the bed of the patient who shared my room. We were both awake; I asked if she had knocked; she had not heard anything at all. Eight weeks later I heard that one of my friends had died in the night of the 26th to 27th.

'Now something which may be a hallucination, a matter of opinion! I have a friend who married a widower with five children; I got to know the husband only through my friend. Nearly every time that I have been to see her, I have seen a lady going in and out of the house. It was natural to suppose that this was the husband's first wife. I asked at some convenient opportunity for a portrait of her, but could not identify the apparition with the photograph. Seven years later I saw a picture with the features of the lady belonging to one of the children. It was after all the first wife. In the first picture she looked in much better health: she had just been through a feeding-up treatment and that alters the appearance of a consumptive patient.—These are only a few examples out of many.

'*The dream:* I see a tongue of land surrounded by water. The waves are driven to and fro by the surf. On this piece of land stands a palm-tree, bent somewhat towards the water. A woman has her arm wound round the stem of the palm and is bending low

towards the water, where a man is trying to reach the shore. At last she lies down on the ground, holds tightly to the palm-tree with her left hand and stretches out her right hand as far as she can towards the man in the water, but without reaching him. At that point I fall out of bed and wake. I was about fifteen or sixteen years old when I realised that this woman was myself, and from that time I not only went through all the woman's apprehensions for the man but I stood there many a time as a third who was not taking part and only looked on. I dreamed this dream too in separate scenes. As the interest in men awoke in me (eighteen to twenty years old), I tried to see the man's face; it was never possible. The foam hid everything but the neck and the back of the head. I have twice been engaged to be married, but the head and build were not those of either of the two men.—Once, when I was lying in hospital under the influence of paraldehyde, I saw the man's face, which I now always see in this dream. It was that of the doctor under whose care I was. I like him as a doctor but there was nothing more between us.

'*Memories:* Six to nine months old. I was in a perambulator. Quite close to me were two horses; one, a chestnut, is looking at me very hard and in a way full of meaning. This is the most vivid experience; I had the feeling that it was a human being.

'*One year old.* Father and I in the town-park, where a park-keeper is putting a little bird into my hand. Its eyes look into mine. I feel "That is a live creature like yourself".

'*Animals being slaughtered.* When I heard the pigs screaming I always called for help and cried out "You are killing a person" (four years old). I have always avoided eating meat. Pork always makes me sick. I came to eat meat during the war, but only against my will; now I have given it up again.

'*Five years old.* My mother was confined and I heard her cry out. I had the feeling, "There is a human being or an animal in the greatest distress", just as I had over the pig-killing.

'I was quite indifferent as a child to sexual matters; at ten years old I had as yet no conception of offences against chastity. Menstruation came on at the age of twelve. The woman first awaked in me at six and twenty, after I had given birth to a child; up to that time (six months) I constantly had violent vomiting after intercourse. This also came on whenever I was at all oppressed in mood.

'I have extraordinarily keen powers of observation, and quite exceptionally sharp hearing, also a very keen sense of smell. I can pick out by smell people I know from among a crowd with my eyes bandaged.

'I do not regard my abnormal powers of sight and hearing as pathological, but ascribe them to finer perceptions and greater quickness of thought; but I have only spoken of it to my pastor and doctor—very unwillingly to the latter, as I was afraid he would tell me that what I regarded as *plus*-qualities were *minus*-qualities, and also because from being misunderstood in childhood I am very reserved and shy'.

The dream which the writer of the letter asks us to interpret is not hard to understand. It is a dream of saving from water, a typical birth-dream. The language of symbolism, as you are aware, knows no grammar; it is an extreme case of a language of infinitives, and even the active and passive are represented by one and the same image. If in a dream a woman pulls (or wishes to pull) a man out of the water, that may mean she wishes to be his mother (takes him for her son as Pharoah's daughter did with Moses), or equally she wishes him to make her into a mother, to have a son by him, a son who shall be as like him as a copy. The tree-trunk to which the woman clings is easily recognised as a phallic symbol, even though it is not standing straight up, but inclined towards the surface of the water—in the dream the word is 'bent'.

The on-rush and recoil of the surf brought to the mind of another dreamer who was relating a similar dream the comparison with the intermittent pains of labour, and when, knowing that she had not yet borne a child, I asked her how she knew of this characteristic of labour, she said that one imagined labour as a kind of colic, a quite unimpeachable description physiologically. She gave the association 'Waves of the Sea and Waves of Passion'.[3] How our dreamer at so early an age can have arrived at the finer details of the symbolism: tongue of land, palm-tree, I am naturally unable to say. We must not however overlook the fact that, when people maintain that they have for years been haunted by the same dream, it often turns out that the manifest content is not throughout quite the same. Only the kernel of the dream has recurred each time; the details of the content are changed or additions are made to them.

[3] ['Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen', the title of a play by Grillparzer. Ed.]

At the end of this dream, which is evidently charged with anxiety, the dreamer falls out of bed. This is a fresh representation of child-birth; analytic investigation of the fear of heights, of the dread of an impulse to throw oneself out of the window, has doubtless led you all to the same conclusion.

Who then is the man, by whom the dreamer wishes to have a child, or of whose very image she would like to be the mother? She has often tried to see his face, but the dream never allows of it; the man has to remain a mystery. We know from countless analyses what this veiling means, and the conclusion we should base on analogy is verified by another statement of the dreamer's. Under the influence of paraldehyde she once recognized the face of the man in the dream as that of the hospital physician who was treating her, and who meant nothing more to her conscious emotional life. The original thus never divulged its identity, but this impression of it in 'transference' establishes the conclusion that earlier it must have always been the father. Ferenczi is undoubtedly perfectly right in pointing out that these 'dreams of the unsuspecting' are valuable sources of information confirming the conjectures of analysis. Our dreamer was the eldest of twelve children; how often must she have gone through the pangs of jealousy and disappointment when not she, but her mother, obtained from her father the longed-for child!

Our dreamer has quite correctly supposed that her first memories of childhood would be of value in the interpretation of her early and recurrent dream. In the first scene, in the first year of her life, as she sits in her perambulator she sees two horses close to her, one looking hard at her in a significant way. This she describes as her most vivid experience; she had the feeling that it was a human being. This is a judgement with which we can do nothing but agree, assuming as we do that the two horses represent, in this case as so often, man and wife, father and mother. It is, as it were, a flash of infantile totemism. If we could, we should ask the writer whether the *brown* horse who looks at her in so human a way could not be recognised by its colouring as her father. The second recollection is associatively connected with the first through the same 'understanding' gaze. 'Taking the little bird in her hand' reminds the analyst, who by the way has prejudices of his own at times, of a feature in the dream in which the woman's hand is again in contact with another phallic symbol.

The next two memories belong together; they make still slighter demands on the interpreter. The mother crying out during her confinement reminded the daughter directly of the pigs screaming when they are killed and put her into the same frenzy of pity. We may also conjecture, however, that this is a violent reaction against a death-wish directed at the mother.

With these indications of tenderness for the father, of contact with his genitals, and of the death-wish against the mother, the outline of the female Oedipus complex is sketched. The ignorance of sexual matters retained so long and the frigidity at a later period bear out these suppositions. The writer of the letter has been virtually—and for a time no doubt actually—an hysterical neurotic. The life-force has, for her own happiness, carried her along with it, has awakened in her the sexual feelings of a woman and brought her the joys of motherhood, and the capacity to work, but a portion of her libido still clings to its point of fixation in childhood; she still dreams that dream that flings her out of bed and punishes her for her incestuous object-choice by 'not inconsiderable injuries'.

And now a strange doctor's explanation, given in a letter, is to effect something that all the most important experiences of later life have failed to do. Probably a regular analysis continued for a considerable time might have some success. As things were, I was obliged to content myself with writing to her that I was convinced she was suffering from the after-effects of a strong emotional tie binding her to her father and from a corresponding identification with her mother, but that I did not myself expect that this explanation would help her at all. Spontaneous cures of neurosis usually leave scars behind, and these smart from time to time. We are very proud of our art if we achieve a cure through psycho-analysis, yet even so we cannot always prevent the formation of a painful scar in the process.

The little series of reminiscences must engage our attention for a while longer. I have on one occasion stated that such scenes of childhood are 'screen-memories' selected at a later period, put together, and thereby not infrequently falsified. This subsequent elaboration serves a purpose that is easy to guess. In our case one can practically hear the ego of the writer glorifying or soothing itself throughout the whole series of recollections. 'I was from a tiny thing a particularly large-hearted and compassionate child.

I learnt quite early that the animals have souls as we have, and could not endure cruelty to animals. The sins of the flesh were far from me and I preserved my chastity till late.' With declarations such as these she loudly contradicts the inferences that we have to make about her early childhood on the basis of our analytical experience, namely, that she had an abundance of premature sexual emotions and violent feelings of hatred for her mother and her younger brothers and sisters. (Beside the genital significance assigned to it, the little bird may also have that of a child-symbol, like all small animals; her memory also accentuates in a very insistent way that this tiny creature had the same right to exist as she herself.) The short series of recollections in fact furnishes a very nice example of a mental structure with a two-fold aspect. Viewed superficially, we may find in it the expression of an abstract idea, here, as usually, with an ethical reference. In H. Silberer's nomenclature the structure has an *anagogic* content; on deeper investigation it reveals itself as a chain of phenomena belonging to the region of the repressed life of the instincts—it displays its *psycho-analytic* content. As you know, Silberer, who was among the first to issue a warning to us on no account to lose sight of the nobler side of the human soul, has put forward the view that all or nearly all dreams permit such a two-fold interpretation, a purer, anagogic one, beside the ordinary, psycho-analytic one. This is, however, unfortunately not so; on the contrary, an over-interpretation of this kind is rarely possible; there has been no valuable example of such a dream-analysis with a double meaning published up to the present time within my knowledge. But something of the kind can often be observed within the series of associations that our patients produce during analytic treatment. The successive ideas are linked on the one hand by an obvious and coherent association, while on the other hand you become aware of an underlying theme which is kept secret and at the same time plays a part in all these ideas. The contrast between the two themes that dominate the same series of ideas is not always one between the lofty anagogic and the common psycho-analytic, but is rather that between shocking and decent or neutral ideas—a fact that easily explains how such a chain of associations with a two-fold determination arises. In our present example it is of course not accidental that the anagogic and the psycho-analytic interpretations stand in such a sharp contrast to each other; both

relate to the same material, and the later tendency is the same as that seen in the reaction-formations erected against the instinctive forces.

Now why did we make such a special search for the psychoanalytic interpretation instead of contenting ourselves with the more accessible anagogic one? The answer to this is linked up with many other problems: with the existence of neurosis itself and the explanations it inevitably demands, the fact that virtue does not reward a man with the joy and strength in life that is expected from it, as though it brought with it too much from its original source (this dreamer too had not been well rewarded for her virtue), and there are various other reasons that I need not discuss before this audience.

So far, however, in this case we have completely neglected the question of telepathy, the other point of interest in it for us; it is time to return to it. In a sense we have here an easier task than in the case of Herr G. With a person who so easily and so early in life succumbed before reality and replaced it by the world of phantasy, the temptation is irresistible to connect her telepathic experiences and 'visions' with her neurosis and to derive them from it, although here too we should not allow ourselves to be deceived as to the cogency of our own arguments. We shall merely replace what is unknown and unintelligible by possibilities that are at least comprehensible.

On August the 22nd, 1914, at ten o'clock in the morning, our correspondent experienced a telepathic impression that her brother who was at the time on active service was calling: 'Mother, Mother!'; the phenomenon was purely acoustic, it was repeated shortly after, but nothing was seen. Two days later she sees her mother and finds her much depressed because the young man had announced himself to her by repeatedly calling 'Mother, Mother!' She immediately recalls the same telepathic message, which she had experienced at the same time, and as a matter of fact some weeks later it was established that the young soldier had died on that day at the hour stated.

It cannot be proved, but also cannot be disproved, that instead of this what happened was the following: the mother told her one day that the son had sent this telepathic message; whereupon the conviction at once arose in her mind that she had had the same experience at the same time. Such delusory memories arise in the

mind with the force of an obsession, a force derived from real sources—they have, however, substituted material for psychical reality. The strength of the delusory memory lies in its being an excellent way of expressing the sister's tendency to identify herself with the mother. 'You are anxious about the boy, but I am really his mother, and his cry was meant for me; I had this telepathic message.' The sister would naturally firmly decline to consider our attempt at explanation and would hold to her belief in the authenticity of the experience. She simply cannot do otherwise; as long as the reality of the unconscious basis of it in her own mind is concealed from her she is obliged to believe in the reality of her pathological logic. Every such delusion derives its strength and its unassailable character from its source in unconscious psychical reality. I note in passing that it is not incumbent on us here to explain the mother's experience or to investigate its authenticity.

The dead brother is however not only the imaginary child of our correspondent; he represents also a rival regarded with hatred even at the time of his birth. By far the greater number of all telepathic presentiments relate to death or the possibility of death: when patients under analysis keep telling us of the frequency and infallibility of their gloomy forebodings, we can with equal regularity show them that they are fostering particularly strong death-wishes in their unconscious against their nearest relations and have therefore long suppressed them. The patient whose history I related in 1909 ('Notes on a Case of Obsessional Neurosis') was an example to the point; he was even called a 'corpse-bird' by his relations. But when the kindly and highly intelligent man—who has since himself perished in the war—began to make progress towards recovery he himself gave me considerable assistance in clearing up his own psychological conjuring tricks. In the same way the account given in our first correspondent's letter of how he and his three brothers had received the news of their youngest brother's death as a thing they had long been inwardly aware of appears to need no other explanation. The elder brothers would all have been equally convinced of the superfluousness of the youngest arrival.

Another of our dreamer's 'visions' will probably become more intelligible in the light of analytical knowledge! Women friends have obviously a considerable significance in her emotional life. News of the death of one of them is conveyed to her shortly after the event by knocking at night on the bed of a room-mate in the

hospital. Another friend had many years before married a widower with several (five) children. On the occasion of her visits to their house she regularly saw the apparition of a lady, whom she felt constrained to suppose to be the dead first wife; this did not at first permit of confirmation, and only became a matter of certainty with her seven years later on the discovery of a fresh photograph of the dead woman. This achievement in the way of a vision has the same inner dependence on the family-complex already recognised in our correspondent as her presentiment of the brother's death. By identifying herself with her friend she could in her person achieve her own wish-fulfilment; for all eldest daughters of a numerous family build up in their unconscious the phantasy of becoming the father's second wife by the death of the mother. If the mother is ill or dies, the eldest daughter takes her place as a matter of course in relation to the younger brothers and sisters, and may even in respect to the father take over some part of the functions of the wife. The unconscious wish fills in the other part.

I am now almost at the end of what I wish to tell you. I might however add the observation that the cases of telepathic messages or occurrences which have been discussed here are clearly connected with emotions belonging to the sphere of the Oedipus complex. This may sound startling; I do not intend to publish it as a great discovery, however. I would rather revert to the result we arrived at through investigating the dream I considered first. Telepathy has no relation to the essential nature of dreams; it cannot deepen in any way what we already understand of them by analysis. On the other hand, psycho-analysis may do something to advance the study of telepathy, in so far as, by the help of its interpretations, many of the puzzling characteristics of telepathic phenomena may be rendered more intelligible to us; or other, still doubtful phenomena be for the first time definitely ascertained to be of a telepathic nature.

There remains one element of the apparently intimate connection between telepathy and dreams to be considered: namely, the incontestable fact that sleep creates favourable conditions for telepathy. Sleep is not, it is true, indispensable to the accomplishment of the process—whether it originates in messages or in an unconscious activity of some kind. If you are not already aware of this, you will learn it from the instance given by our second correspondent, of the message coming from the young man

between nine and ten in the morning. We must add, however, that no one has a right to take exception to telepathic occurrences on the ground that the event and the presentiment (or message) do not exactly coincide in astronomical time. It is perfectly conceivable that a telepathic message might arrive contemporaneously with the event and yet only penetrate to consciousness the following night during sleep (or even in waking life only after a while, during some pause in the usual mental activity). We are, as you know, of opinion that dream-formation itself does not necessarily wait for the onset of sleep to begin. Often the latent dream-thoughts may have been lying ready during the whole day, till at night they find the contact with the unconscious wish that shapes them into a dream. But if the phenomenon of telepathy is only an activity of the unconscious mind, then no fresh problem lies before us. The laws of unconscious mental life may then be taken for granted as applying to telepathy.

Have I given you the impression that I am secretly inclined to support the reality of telepathy in the occult sense? If so, I should very much regret that it is so difficult to avoid giving such an impression. In reality, however, I was anxious to be strictly impartial. I have every reason to be so, for I have no opinion; I know nothing about it.

ANALYSIS OF AN OBSESSIONAL NEUROSIS IN A CHILD

BY

EUGENIA SOKOLNICKA

WARSAW AND PARIS

In April 1919 a doctor sent a boy aged ten and a half years to me for analysis. The child was small for his age and very thin; he suffered from numerous obsessional symptoms. He was unable to touch anything himself so that his mother had to dress him and feed him. If anyone, above all his mother, touched anything with one hand the object touched had to be put back again in its former place, the same action carried out with the other hand, and then finally with both hands. He was particularly sensitive if anyone placed one object *beside* another one. He himself simply would not touch anything at all; if, however, this happened by chance then his mother had to carry out the ceremonial. In consequence of this, every action was bound up with so many ceremonies that it often took several hours to carry them out; his mother asked me to reserve an hour in the afternoon for her as she could not get the boy dressed and ready till half past twelve. The child was literally starved, because while eating he spat out every mouthful once or several times into his mother's hand because it was not put into his mouth 'properly'. Both he and his mother had to take up a certain position before eating; if one foot was in advance of the other a ceremonial had to take place until both feet were perfectly in line. If anything happened contrary to his compulsion he literally writhed with pain. At such times he would often seem to lose consciousness, then he would fall into a rage, throw himself on his mother, tear her clothes off, twist her hands as hard as ever he could, and often bite her (on her first visit to me she showed me a scar on her cheek where he had bitten her); this would end in a fit of convulsive sobbing and he would fall exhausted into a chair. These attacks of loss of consciousness had led one of the best-known neurologists in Warsaw to diagnose the case as one of epilepsy. When the boy was told after one of these attacks what

he had done to his mother he would burst into tears and beg forgiveness. When conscious normally he was an obedient, good child, in fact, too good. Apart from the compulsive symptoms, he constantly suffered from severe headaches, and also complained that 'there was a stone in his chest which rubbed against him'; he was constantly jerking himself because the stone irritated him, and was never quiet for a moment. Before his illness he had attended a state school in Minsk, where he had learned very well and appeared gifted. I am quite unable to give any description of the degree of his inhibition of thinking; for the most part he could not think at all because of his headaches.

The illness broke out while he was living in Minsk under the Bolshevik government, when the population and particularly the Jews (his family among them), went through terrible experiences. His grandfather had fled before the entry of the Bolsheviks and had been fined 100.000 roubles in consequence, so that the boy's father had also fled from the Bolshevik town in order to escape the persecutions; his grandmother had been arrested but was soon allowed to go free again. Several drastic searches through the house had been made; in short, everyone was constantly trembling for their life and this had had a shattering effect on the sensitive child.

His mother told me that the first sign of the illness manifested itself by the child constantly lifting up his feet one after the other in the street and looking at the soles. (During the analysis new obsessive acts constantly came to light. I am unable to say whether they all arose as 'transitory' symptoms, or whether his mother had forgotten to mention them at the beginning.) He and his mother were literally martyrs to the illness; his mother had to go through all his compulsive ceremonials as well as himself, therefore really suffered as he did from the illness; and in this way he obtained almost exclusive possession of her. It struck the parents very much that, whereas formerly he had loved his father and been loved in return, since the illness he would not let his father kiss him, neither would he go out with him nor remain alone with him in the house. On the other hand he would not allow his mother to leave him for a moment.

The treatment, which lasted altogether six weeks, was not a psycho-analysis in the strict sense of the word. The patient dreamed very little, during the first two or three weeks not at all, and later

only rarely and fragmentarily; in these six weeks he had only a few well-formed dreams such as regularly appear during the treatment in other cases. At the beginning of the treatment I aimed exclusively at overcoming the extremely reserved and difficult character of the boy and his inhibition of thinking, in order to enable me to establish some sort of contact with him. My influence was therefore partly analytical and partly pedagogical, but was based throughout on analytical knowledge.

I was particularly struck by two details of his obsessive acts. First, why it affected him so much if anyone placed one object upon another, and why the space had to be clear in front of any object which had to be moved; secondly, why everything had to be touched by both hands at once, or else the movement had to be corrected by a complete ceremonial when the object was touched by mistake with one hand only. I asked him to tell me whatever ideas came to him about it, and whether he knew anything about the origin of this peculiar compulsion. He told me that before he became ill he once wanted to climb through a window on to the balcony that ran round the house, but his little sister's nurse told him he must not do it; if he did God would punish him by stopping him growing. But he did it all the same. 'Why do you want there to be a clear space in front of the thing?' 'If there isn't one the thing won't grow, and the hand that does it will get shorter. The thing must be put back by the same hand, taken away again and put back by the other hand, and then again by both hands, and then everything will be all right again'. 'Do you believe that things grow, then?' 'No, not now, but I did once'.

(It was clear to me from this that we were concerned with the breaking of a prohibition and the prevention of punishment by God. I soon learned how very firmly fixed was the child's belief in his own omnipotence, and how the whole illness and also his recovery lay in his and not in my power.)

'Very well, but what makes you force your mother to do that too; she will not grow any more?' I do not remember his actual words, but they were to the effect that it was to prevent an illness in his mother.

Soon after the treatment began, I think after about a week, I came upon an unexpected obstacle, namely, a secret which the child could not possibly betray, a regular taboo. It was interesting how he emphasized that if anyone at all knew it then it would no

longer be a secret and *everybody* might know it. Even his mother to whom he told everything might not know it. He must not speak of this subject at all, or why he mustn't tell it to anyone, not even if his health depended on it. All my direct and indirect labours in this direction were fruitless for several days; so I finally left it alone and turned my attention to other things. Up to now nothing had been said about anything sexual; he had asked no questions relating to this although I had assured him that he might ask me *anything* and I would answer *all* his questions. I thought that I might discover the secret by this path. Soon after this the boy told me that the servant had got married and had left in consequence. 'What does "getting married" mean? Do you know?' 'No, I mustn't know that, I am too little'. 'Who told you that?' 'I know it myself'. I explained to him how untrue that was; it meant that he had a certain amount of knowledge already, but certainly not the real knowledge. But that sort of untrue knowledge in people makes things seem nasty which are not nasty in themselves and cannot be nasty, because nothing in nature is nasty. In restricting his own knowledge in this way he restricted his knowledge about everything else in the world; on account of this he could not learn and by trying not to think he gave himself these headaches. I suggested to him that we should turn this nasty subject to a scientific one, and that he should learn what other children of his age know. The explanation of sexual things lasted several days; I began with illustrations from the propagation of flowers and prompted him to draw his own conclusions. Then I returned gradually and unnoticeably to the secret, and said I had helped him as much as I could but now I did not know what was troubling him any more. It must be the secret, and there must be some reason why it should have to be kept so secret. He must help me now so that I can help him further (he felt himself somewhat easier at that time); therefore he must trust me with 'the secret'. He did not want to promise that he would tell it me next day; the child's honesty and love of truth was so great that he never promised anything without being quite sure of keeping his word; he insisted that he must think it over till next day. At last he told me the following secret: he had a friend in Minsk called Monja who said that he possessed an armoured motor car for use against the Bolsheviks. In it there was everything necessary for defeating the enemy and for escaping; the car was connected by electricity with Monja's house, and would

appear as soon as there was danger. A new version of 'Table, table, lay yourself' from the fairy tales, equipped with all the most modern inventions! Monja intended to save the lives of his own and the little patient's family from the Bolsheviks by means of the car.

So after all it was nothing sexual; on the other hand, it was a kind of magic into which no one must be initiated, otherwise it would lose its power. His friend was the great man in all this, the powerful magician. I might add that the word 'magician' had a magical effect on my patient; he was fascinated by it as though he had been waiting a long time for this word. In the interpretation of dreams (which later he took part in eagerly with me) he was always very pleased if there was any opportunity to see himself instead as the magician.

He now talked incessantly about Monja. Monja knew a great deal that he didn't know; he had initiated him (in his way) into sexual secrets, for instance, he had learnt that children come into the world 'by the man lying on the woman'. Monja was physically the stronger, he was also impudent and naughty to his parents and was often in disgrace and beaten by them; in this respect also therefore he was superior to the timid obedient child who had been much pampered by his parents, until the time when he had acquired a desire to be impudent and naughty which he could only succeed in by the way of losing consciousness. Monja had also set fire to the child's imagination in the sadistic direction; he told him all the best-known detective stories—he was very well-read in this subject—and also about terrible surgical operations performed with big knives mounted on springs. After the explanation about sex the boy often asked me about operations during child-birth, forceps, etc. Once he said, 'I know a man who always has to hold his head upright and look at the sky; does that come from his being pulled out of his mother's body with forceps?'

I will now endeavour to describe how the symptoms gradually disappeared in the six weeks of treatment. One symptom replaced another and new ones were always appearing. Many of the symptoms were simplified editions of those that had disappeared; for example, if anyone knocked against a piece of furniture with one side of his body he had to touch that object with the other side, or, if his foot kicked his mother's shoe when out for a walk he immediately went round to her other side to do the same thing there. For a

long time he had made movements with both hands round about his nose; his mother told me that he had copied this from an insane person whom he had seen in Minsk. This person also occurred in his dreams. For some time he would not allow anyone to come near his mother's bed, in which he slept with her, because one side of the bed was close against the wall. If anyone did touch the bed he climbed right across it. At the end he added to each affirmative remark a negation; for example, give me some tea, don't give me any tea; I will, I will not; I understand, I don't understand, etc.

Unfortunately I possess very few notes of this case; the first refer to a dream which occurred a month after the treatment was begun. As far as I can remember the patient had dreamed very little up to this time, and an analysis of the dreams was very difficult to carry out. I have only noted three dreams altogether. I have to depend more on general impressions and memories and on the pedagogic means I employed than on psycho-analytic material. The symptom about touching things properly disappeared soon after the conversation in which he betrayed its origin. On this occasion I tried to explain to him the significance of the stone in his chest which oppressed him; it was his uneasy conscience, a figurative representation of the expression 'my heart is like a stone'. This symptom also disappeared before long. It was only during the latter part of the treatment that I succeeded in weaning him of the attacks of loss of consciousness. I had soon noticed that these states were very superficial, and that they represented the only means—apart from the symptoms, and much more simply than these—of transgressing parental prohibitions. It was simply naughtiness disguised by a loss of consciousness, i.e. his revenge on his mother who was so 'naughty' as to create children with his father. I pointed out to him how remarkable it was that he who was otherwise such a good boy only had these states of losing consciousness when he did what other children usually do when they are naughty, for instance, grinding his teeth, biting his mother, tearing her clothes, etc. Then I asked his mother in his presence to tell him every time everything that he did in his unconscious condition, in spite of his tears. 'If you want to be naughty be so consciously and storm at your mother', I said jokingly, 'I promise that you will become good again when you are well'. Then I endeavoured to prove to him that these states were almost pure simulations. I once intentionally provoked one of these states, and when he tried to throw himself on his mother

I caught hold of his hands forcibly and put him down in a chair. He cried out as if possessed 'Mama, Mama', but I still kept hold of his hands and said, 'You are not conscious and yet you call Mama; how do you know Mama is not with you?' Then I joked with him and tickled his nose and he defended himself. After we had become friends again and he was quite convinced that I was honestly trying to make him well and had already cured him of many things, I asked him to make a sacrifice. I explained to him that he really had two illnesses: one a genuine one which had to be treated medically, and the other an imagined one caused by his parents making everything too easy for a sick child, because they were afraid of his tears and his losing consciousness, so that they gratified all his unreasonable wishes in order to prevent these states. But this method was harmful to a child; it learns in that way to obtain profit and privileges from the illness. This second, not genuine illness is even dangerous because one cannot cure the first until the patient will give up the advantages of being ill. When one is healthy much greater pleasures can be obtained than those which have to be bought with so much torture. The intelligent child understood and believed me. I proposed that we should go immediately to his mother (who always waited in the next room for him) and that he should ask her not to gratify any of his wishes even if he lost consciousness and stormed at her when she refused. He was to renounce the privileges of the illness. It was quite touching to observe how he struggled with himself and finally agreed. Losing consciousness disappeared soon after.

In a similar manner I brought about a discontinuance of the obsessive acts which had to be shared with his mother. At the beginning of the illness his mother was only rarely forced to go through his compulsive ceremonials too, but this gradually increased until it became almost constant. Shortly before the end of the treatment I simply forbade that his mother should acquiesce in this respect, and told them that she did it because she was afraid to oppose him and therefore, as he knew, had done much to encourage his illness. He could perform his obsessive acts alone and these we shall know how to cure, but I did not want to treat his mother, so he must leave her in peace. My firmness, together with the interest and sympathy which it was a proof of, in contrast to the parents' compliance, triumphed again this time.

I will now quote the three dreams I noted, since they are characteristic of the illness.

The first dream proves once again the real nature of the vaunted innocence of children, and how they actually take in everything in spite of the strongest prohibitions. *'Three girls were sitting in a perambulator with white veils over their heads. A man drove some boys away'.* During the analysis of the dream he added, *'The perambulator went by itself'.*

Associations. One of the *girls* was like a waitress in a restaurant which he had to pass on coming to see me. Waitresses are 'bad women', they are beastly.

His mother once told his father how she had met a young man in the street, walking along with three girls; he was the son of one of her acquaintances and a ne'er-do-well. His father said, 'The dirty beast'. He knew what his father thought, the young man does 'it' with the girls.

Veils are worn at weddings. When coming to see me on Ascension Day he had seen a little girl going to a procession, dressed in white and wearing a white veil; the man who was with her was like the one who drove the boys away in the dream.

The day before he had also dreamed of a *perambulator,* and said he had asked his mother to buy one so that he could take his little sister out in it during the summer holidays. He also said the perambulator in the dream had only three wheels, and that there are some like that which have one in front and two behind.

The dream is fairly clear. Two facts can be derived from the three in one in the perambulator. (1) The three girls are the women the 'dirty beast' lived with. (2) All three are dressed in white like the little girl in the procession, and also like a bride at her wedding, symbolizing innocence. We conclude therefore that it concerns scorn of 'innocence'. The central point of the condensation is the perambulator, which reminds him of his little sister who was borne by his mother; the mother is the 'dirty beast', that is, the waitress whom he sees on coming to me. The scorn therefore refers to the innocence of his mother, to the secret of the bridal dress. The man who resembles the one who was taking the girl to the procession is none other than he who goes with the 'innocent' 'beastly' girls, i.e. his father, who hinders him from sexual intercourse with his mother, i.e. 'drives away the boys'. The dream indicates rage against the parents who have procreated his little sister.

The details of the three wheels and 'going by itself' of the perambulator (? = onanism) were not elucidated.

The second dream which occurred about ten days before the termination of the treatment was as follows: '*Someone had touched papa's hand and it had become shrivelled up and paralysed. No, not papa's, somebody's; yes, it was papa's. I do not know whether it was papa's or somebody else's. Then I, mama, papa, and my little sister were drawn up in line* (describes exactly how) *and a man touched both my hands and they became shrivelled up and paralysed. Papa said to this man in Hebrew, "There he is again". I called out in great pain, "How unhappy I am!" and fell down into a chair*'. He awoke in such a fright that he roused his mother and would not let her go to sleep again. Then he added, '*It seems to me I thought something else. Someone, perhaps it was grandfather, wished to cheat a man of some power; the gas, telephone, 100.000, this was the power.*'

During the analysis he said vaguely that in the dream papa too had been cured by touching.

Associations. He began by saying that he already knew he had been a magician again in the dream.

The man who touched both his hands wore a fur-lined coat like one he wanted for the coming winter; the man's cap was like his school cap. The man was definitely himself. His grandfather had once said jokingly, 'A boy as big as he could now help his parents'. He now makes himself out to be really grown-up in the dream. The man also resembled an official who was connected with a school-friend's parents; this man was arrested by the Bolsheviks and condemned to a year's imprisonment but escaped. The Bolsheviks had fined my patient's absent grandfather 100.000 roubles; then they had arrested his grandmother, but immediately set her free again. His father had had to flee because he would have been persecuted in place of his father. His father once used *the same words* as in the dream to his mother when the boy continually placed himself in a position where he prevented his father from writing.

There was an *insane woman* who went about in Minsk. It was said that if she touched or spat on anyone's hand he would become ill, just as he and his father in the dream. He had always been very much afraid of her, but the other children teased her.

'I am so unhappy', he often said when he was very much tortured by the illness. In the dream he also could not utter the

words properly, just like a dumb person in Minsk who could cry out and yet could not pronounce anything.

He had never seen the person who touched his father. On the other hand he knew how his father was cured, also by contact. When the children returned from Minsk with their mother his father was very much troubled at the account of his illness, and now his father was pleased at his getting better.

I only interpreted the dream in a general way to the patient. It was he, as he had at once correctly guessed, who performed the magic. But how did he do it, and what magic? The 'somebody' and the 'man' is he himself; this he understood clearly from the associations. As this man he carried out two acts. First, he practised magic on his father and made him ill at the same time, and in this rôle he represents himself as an adult. He also identified his father and his grandfather, since both were threatened by the Bolsheviks (the arrested officials). Secondly, he practised magic on himself, with very little distortion; he is the naughty boy who intentionally makes his father angry by preventing him from writing. In this rôle he is superior to his father; in reality too his father's health depends upon him, as he explained to me. He can carry out magic ceremonials as he does in his illness, which his father cannot do. It is as though he were angry with his father, as though among other things he were ill in order to torment his father. But why the rage, why is he so furious, since he is the powerful one? In the dream he has just reversed the real order of things; at one time his father was the strong man, the great magician who possessed the secret sexual power (in the penis) with which we are already acquainted. He had made his son furious on account of this, as we also know already. In my very few notes I have not noted whether I spoke of onanism at this point, but it is highly probable, since during the treatment it came out that he had masturbated before the illness in Minsk, but gave it up on his mother threatening him that it would make him ill. This was already the second period of masturbation as far as I can recollect. The first period was when he was about four years old and at that time his mother had told him he must always keep his hands outside the bedclothes. How much I clearly explained to him about the fear of castration and whether this explanation was in connection with the dream, which would have been an excellent opportunity, I do not remember, which proves that little was said about it. He repeated the same

reversal in regard to the grandfather who wishes to cheat 'somebody' of a great power (gas, telephone, 100.000); *he* had wished to cheat the strong grown-up man out of it. It was not he but his grandfather who possessed the 100.000 roubles; but what he cheated someone of is very suspicious. It is only adults who possess real sexual power; his magic (onanism) which originated in his thirst for revenge, in his wicked wishes against his father and grandfather, has made him unhappy, stunted him like the insane person, and made him simply ill, like the dumb man.

During the interpretation of the dream and especially the second part he became more and more restless and continually lost consciousness, or he kept repeating 'Yes—no', also that he wanted to go to the country and asked when I would let him, etc.

I will just add a couple of remarks since this dream is very characteristic of the patient's obsessive acts. It more than anything is concerned with the fear of castration. He had perhaps heard threats of castration from his father and grandfather, since they had all lived together in Minsk and also before the war. Or else it merely concerned his father and the fragment which refers to his grandfather, who wishes to cheat him out of his power, is only an allusion which would be necessary at the beginning of the dream. Why does he actually practice magic on his father, i.e. wish to make him ill? He makes a displacement here: 'Perhaps the grandfather was the one'. He does everything better than his father: he invents the magic whereby he does everything himself (onanism), and then the ceremonial which alludes to the paralysis of the hands. However, he receives two new penes in place of the possibly castrated one. (In the dream he practises magic on only one of his father's hands, but on both of his own. The hand is merely a symbol of the penis. And so many things, two hands, both sides of the body, he utilises in all his compulsive ceremonials.) This seems to be only a repetition of the details in the first dream: one wheel, two wheels, self-propulsion.

The question still arises: What is the origin of the great terror in the dream which prevents him from sleeping and makes him keep his mother awake? Does it originate in material slumbering deeply in the unconscious? No, it comes from the approaching recognition of the mechanism of the illness itself which makes itself an outlet in the dream. The whole thing was not genuine magic on his part but a miscarried cheating which made him unhappy.

Two days later he dreamed: *Papa has marched into Minsk and received four months furlough. Mama and he ran continually up and down stairs. A number of women were drawn up in the room where the men were inspected.*

Associations. His father had marched into Minsk, but was discharged on account of chronic catarrh.

More than three months *furlough* was never given in the Russian army; but he thought perhaps he had been given four months furlough.

The *drawn-up women* were women and mothers who were waiting for their inspected husbands and sons.

Interpretation. I explained to him what the four months furlough signifies. As the maximum was three months furlough, his father would have been at the front by the fourth month. What happens at the front? More or less clearly he answered that someone might be killed at the front. His mother was not among the women who were waiting for their husbands, since she was going up and down stairs with him. I explained to him the symbol of 'going up stairs'. He did not reply but the next moment began to tell me all the detective stories which Monja had told him, of Sherlock Holmes, Arsène Lupin and Pinkerton, and what an impression the tales had made on him, and how Monja's mother scolded her boy for it, and how Monja had sewn two velvet masks for them like those worn by bandits in one of the stories.

On the next day his mother told me that the boy had been frightfully nervous the whole day, and complained that I had tried to persuade him that he wanted to kill his father or that he wished his father was killed. He added emphatically (when with me) 'I shall never be convinced that I think that'. Thus he drew conclusions from things that I had only hinted at.

As I have already said, new obsessive actions were constantly replacing those that disappeared during the treatment. Whether they were transitorily produced or only revived, they were definitely characteristic of the different stages of the cure. They became more and more simple; the obsessive symptoms were only apparently complicated throughout, fundamentally they were quite unitary. Their starting-point was the 'transgression' (stepping over) of a prohibition (climbing through the window instead of going through the door), which originally concerned

onanism. The thing common to all the obsessive acts was, (1) *Touching;* a magic act or an enchantment, which makes possible the transgression of the prohibition (= onanism, as a substitute for sexual intercourse). (2) *The ceremonial;* a magic disenchantment, which prevented the consequence of the touching (= castration and illness, as a result of onanism).

It is interesting to note that the last obsession manifested itself as the constant negation of something he had said (will, will not, table, not a table, etc.). This seems to be the most extreme expression of the simplified version of it, the kernel of the ambivalence itself. A couple of days before the termination of the treatment, i.e. before he went away for his summer holiday, I asked him to explain to me why he added this 'no' to everything he said. He explained, 'If, for instance, mama forgets to give me some tea I say "mama, give me some tea", and then add "don't give me any tea". It is as though I had said nothing, and yet mama knows she should give me some tea'. Is not this explanation a beautiful contribution to the psychology of the origin of his obsessive acts?

One day before his departure, after a quite touching farewell, I asked him to promise me to dress himself in the country, and so to touch everything. He would not promise this, since to the honourable little fellow a promise signified a genuine word of honour, he only said he would do his best to carry out my wish. His mother came to see me a few weeks later and said his efforts had been completely successful. She also said that my authority was so great that he could be got to do anything by using my name, a result which must be ascribed first and foremost to the process of laying bare the structure of his disease, which in fact took place without any trace of shame. His mother said that in other respects the boy was doing very well; sometimes traces of the past illness could be observed, otherwise there was nothing to report. He was generally very happy, was becoming more and more of a rogue and looked very well. A few weeks later the mother called again to see me with the boy, but I was on my holidays. They also called to see the doctor who had sent him to me, and he found the boy quite well. The treatment was to have been continued after the summer holidays; I am even now not certain of the cure being a complete and permanent one. I have not seen him since, however, which indicates that he is going on satisfactorily, for there is no doubt that the parents—who were Jews of little education—would other-

wise have been afraid I had not done my utmost and would have insisted on the treatment being continued.

I have often asked myself how the rapid disappearance of the patient's apparently very serious condition is to be explained, and I have come to the following conclusions. In spite of the child's strong constitutional disposition to it, the obsessional neurosis had not had sufficient time to form itself into a well-established system; first because the patient was so young, and secondly because he so soon came for treatment—six months after its development. Everything else in the illness except the obsessional neurosis was simply naughtiness which had hidden itself in a cowardly manner behind the hysterical components which always accompany the obsessional neuroses to a greater or less degree.

The success of the treatment, which was due more to pedagogic-psychological methods, aided by the insight afforded by psycho-analytical knowledge, than to a methodical analysis, enables me to understand the means by which other psycho-therapeutists outside psycho-analysis attain similar results. The chief factor in every successful mental and pedagogic cure is always the transference, even when used by doctors and educators either unsystematically or unconsciously. Psycho-analysis has made it possible, by means of the systematisation of the transference, and of free association, to bring into consciousness the repressed material. If to these curative agents we add the pedagogic struggle with the secondary advantage through illness we have not only enriched the equipment of psycho-analytic therapy, but have probably turned everything that was found to be of use in other mental curative methods to account for our purposes.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STEPPING OVER*

BY

GÉZA RÓHEIM

BUDAPEST

The analysis of the case reported by Dr. Sokolnicka is in my opinion of quite special interest, since the starting-point of the individual neurosis, the trauma, consists in a popular belief. In the first place this case again demonstrates the essential identity of the individual and the collective form of repression of primal impulses, and secondly, it suggests the hope that individual analysis and social anthropology may in this case be employed to elucidate each other.

The outbreak of the phobia was occasioned by the statement of the nurse: 'A child must not be lifted through a window because then it will not grow any more'. In Mecklenburg there is a saying: 'One must not pass a child through a window, or it will stop growing'; and also: 'A person who is still growing must not step in or out through a window, unless he returns by the same way'.

If anyone passes a child to another person through an opening which is so low that a grown person cannot stand in it, as through a window or a trap-door, the child must be passed back through this same opening or it will not subsequently attain full growth.[1] In Holstein, Mecklenburg, Silesia, East Prussia and Thuringia, babes at the breast must not be handed through a window, and if a child is lifted through a window, it must be passed back through the same window or it will not grow (East Prussia, Wetterau, Brandenburg, Baden, Swabia), or it will become a thief (Baden, Silesia). Further, it must always be carried into a room feet foremost (Silesia).[2]

But yet another phobia of the child described by Dr. Sokolnicka reminds us strikingly of the fear of being lifted through the window: if someone handed him any article with the right hand and in so

* Translated by C. P. O.

[1] K. Bartsch: Sagen, Märchen und Gebräuche aus Mecklenburg, 1880, Bd. II, S. 51.

[2] Wuttke: Der deutsche Volksaberglaube, 1900, S. 391.

doing passed it over another article, he insisted that the person should take it back with the left hand and then, grasping it with both hands, give it to him: unless this were done, the articles would not grow. It is exactly like the popular belief: one must not step over a child because the child will not grow, or if such a calamity has inadvertently taken place one must undo the spell through stepping back over it in the reverse direction.[3] Both these prohibitions are frequently enumerated alongside each other among our data and this parallelism is surely no matter of chance; the writer scents the same unconscious meaning for both prohibitions: 'A child which is handed in through a window, does not grow bigger. The same applies if one steps or jumps over a child—in so doing one lays a spell upon his growth and in order to undo the spell one must pass back over him'.[4] 'One must not call little children toads, must not step or jump over them, or they will not grow any more, unless one passes in the contrary direction over them. Further, a little child must not be allowed to crawl between anyone's legs, or through a window, or under the shafts of a waggon: or if he does, he must at least crawl back again. A babe at the breast must not be handed through a window: moreover, it must not be carried into a room except feet first, otherwise it will go out of the room to its death.'[5] So when we find that windows or the legs of a living person have an identical significance in popular belief, we naturally suspect that the house in this case represents a woman, the window represents the vagina, and passing through or lifting over represents coitus. For we know from analysis that a fear that an object will not grow is a castration-fear; growing thus represents erection. In the last phase of the illness, the boy had the habit of saying 'yes', 'no' to everything: the same ambivalence also finds expression in the crossing over and back and passing over and back of popular belief. What he really wishes *is* to be passed through the window, for then he, or in other words, his penis, must

[3] For examples see Róheim: Psycho-Analysis és Ethnologia, *Ethnographia*, 1918, p. 64, 213. Also J. G. Frazer: 'Not to step over persons and things' in 'Taboo and the Perils of the Soul', Golden Bough, 3rd Edition, 1911, p. 422.

[4] Fr. Schönwerth: Aus der Oberpfalz, Sitten und Sagen, 1857, Bd. I, S. 181.

[5] P. Dreschler: Sitten, Bräuche und Volksglaube in Schlesien, 1903, Bd. I, S. 212.

grow; the same applies to the objects, which all belong to penis-symbolism, only that both in folk-lore and in neurosis the wish can come to expression only in a form influenced by repression.

The interpretation of stepping over as coitus can also be demonstrated purely from folk-lore, and through this the psycho-analytic interpretation seems doubly assured.

An Anglo-Saxon prescription directs that a woman who has miscarried shall go to the barrow of a dead man and step thrice over it, thus conjuring away the effects of the miscarriage.[6] While here we see how still-birth can be connected with stepping over (i.e. having intercourse with) a dead man, by the reversal of the cause and effect relation, in other cases we find a repression-form of the same unconscious content. For instance, in South Africa, stepping over another person is regarded as highly improper.[7] In order to accelerate a birth (in the county of Békés, Hungary) the husband, after undressing himself stark naked, steps over his wife three times and gives her something to drink out of his mouth. In the counties of Pest, Heves and Szolnok (Hungary) the same occurs, except that the husband also touches the abdomen of the woman in labour carefully with his foot. If this is of no avail, the man cuts off some of his pubic hair, to which he sets light so that the smoke comes in contact with the vagina of the woman. If delivery still fails to occur, he then has intercourse with the woman in labour.[8] Under the pressure of increased psychic tension (the delay in parturition) we see a progress from symbolism to reality and the libido ousting repression step by step. First there is the act of stepping over, then the pubic hair of the two persons is brought into contact, with smoke as an intermediary, and lastly, coitus.

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[6] E. S. Hartland: The Legend of Perseus, 1894, Vol. I, p. 165, quoting O. Cockayne: Leechdoms, Wortcunning and Starcraft of Early England, 1866, Vol. III, p. 66.

[7] J. Macdonald: Manners, Customs, Superstitions and Religions of South African Tribes, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute,* Vol. XX, pp. 119, 130, 140. Stepping over equivalent to contact or coition with woman; castration fear occurs as a consequence.

[8] Temesvary: Volksgebräuche und Aberglaube in der Geburtshilfe und der Pflege der Neugeborenen in Ungarn, 1900, S. 50, 54. The drinking from the mouth signifies a displacement from below of the ejaculation of semen.

Among the Baganda, when the first fish is offered as a sacrifice to the god Mukasa, the remainder is consumed by the fisherman and his wife (fish signifying embryo!), after which the man jumps over the woman. In order to assure a successful issue in war, the chieftain has intercourse with his wife and then jumps over her. 'In every case when jumping over a wife or stepping over her legs is mentioned, it is regarded by the Baganda as equivalent to, or instead of, having sexual intercourse with her'.[9] In the light of the Baganda data we can understand the meaning of the Bakongo custom which prescribes that a widow must sit on the ground and stretch out her legs while the brother of the deceased husband steps over them. After this she is 'purified', i.e. rid of the dead man's ghost, and will be free to marry when the time of her widowhood is completed.[10] If the act of stepping over signifies coitus, it is evident that this ceremony is a survival of the levirate.[11] She has to be wedded at least symbolically to her husband's brother before she can be passed on to another man.

A significance similar to that of windows is also to be ascribed to thresholds.[12] The significance of stepping on to a threshold and jumping over it is a double one but nevertheless homogeneous. On the one hand the act indicates a hostile intention against the owner of the house. For example, in Göcsej, a saying runs: 'whoever treads on the threshold treads on the owner and thereby hastens his death.'[13] On the other hand when the husband lifts the bride over the threshold[14] we have one of those frequent cases in which

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[9] J. Roscoe: The Baganda, 1911, pp. 357, 395; also see the same pp. 17, 53, 55, 57, 63, 144, 206, 363, 378, 428, 459.

[10] J. H. Weeks: Among the Primitive Bakongo, 1914, p. 273.

[11] cf. J. G. Frazer: Folk-lore in the old Testament, 1919, Vol. II, p. 263. See below on jumping over as a marriage ceremony.

[12] See Theodor Reik: Die Türhüter, *Imago,* 1919, Bd. V, especially S. 349, Anm. 1.

[13] F. Gönczi: Göczej, 1914, S. 340. Zu den Schwellenriten. Also see van Gonneh: Les Rites de Passage, 1909. I shall not enter further into the functional meaning of these rites here, as this has already been done by others (compare in this connection Felszeghy's paper on 'Janus' read before the Hungarian Psycho-Analytical Society).

[14] cf. J. G. Frazer: Folklore in the Old Testament, 1919, Vol. III, pp. 1-18. W. Crooke: The Lifting of the Bride, *Folk-Lore,* 1902, Vol. XIII:, Samter: Geburt, Hochzeit und Tod, 1911, S. 136-46.

a ceremonial act appears as an imitative introduction of the realistic one which follows, i.e. coitus: first there is a compromise between libido and repression (symbol) and then the unrepressed form of action.[15]

If the threshold represents the vagina, it becomes evident why dead (and particularly, still-born) children, whom the family desire to be re-born and to thrive, are buried under the threshold.[16] In Dharwar the bride steps on the Ashma, the supernatural stone, in which the spirit of an ancestor resides, so that the latter's soul may be reincarnated in her.[17] In Fife they say that a child will have a hare-lip if a woman steps over the place where a hare has been lying:[18] that is, stepping over is equivalent to intercourse with the hare, whereby the hare impregnates the woman and is re-born of her in the form of a child.[19] The Jewish bride and groom step over a stone in accord with the precept of the Targum Onkelos 'so that they may multiply like the fish of the sea'.[20]

The anxiety of Yorkshire mothers that their daughters should not stride over a broom, as well as the unconscious intention of boys who try to make them do this, is of course connected with the belief that, 'if a girl strides over a besom handle she will be

[15] cf. Róheim: Spiegelzauber, 1919, S. 136, Anm. 3. Perhaps the hostile intention against the owner dominates in treading on the threshold, whereas coitus is indicated by jumping over. Taken together the two indicate both the aggressive and the erotic trend in the infantile Oedipus complex.

[16] J. G. Frazer: Folk-Lore in the Old Testament. Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor, 1907, p. 172. Also note the custom of burying the after-birth or placenta (the double of the child) under the threshold so that the children of the family will thrive. R. T. Kaindl: Haus und Hof bei den Huzulen. *Mitteilungen der Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien,* 1896, Bd. XXVI, S. 182.

[17] W. Crooke: 'The Lifting of the Bride'. *Folk-Lore,* 1902, Vol. XIII, p. 236. Compare Dreschler: Sitte, Brauch und Volksglauben in Schlesien, 1903, Bd. I, S. 264.

[18] Crooke: l. c., p. 237.

[19] In this belief the doctrine of re-incarnation reveals itself as a wish-fulfilment in the sense of the Oedipus-complex. I shall shortly amplify this idea in a work on Totemism in Australia.

[20] W. Crooke: l. c., p. 238. Compare E. Westermarck: Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco, 1914, pp. 293, 299. Also Samter: Geburt, Hochzeit und Tod, 1911, S. 136.

a mother before she is a wife'. If an unmarried woman has a child people say 'She jumped o'er t'besom' or 'She jumped o'er t'besom before she went to t'church'.[21] According to Serbians, Bulgarians and Greeks, a corpse will be re-animated as a vampire if a cat jumps over it; coitus with the dead leading to a ghastly form of life.[22]

Thus in all these instances 'stepping over' manifestly signifies intercourse, but we must not forget that another element is contained in the custom about 'passing through a window'. This concerns not only stepping over, but also pulling through. Now these customs in regard to pulling through have already been recognised by Liebrecht and Zachariae as magic repetitions of birth.[23]

The well-known bifurcated trees *(Zwieselbäume)* through which sick children are drawn have a similar significance. Such healing powers are however not by any means attributed to every forked tree; it is necessary that at the point of junction of the limbs the tree should have a formation resembling the female genitals. There is a tree in Lützow with just such a contour: above the junction there is a bulging which looks exactly like an abdomen with hips and navel. The whole aspect therefore resembles the lower part of the body of a woman who is spreading open her legs; the curative power lies in this resemblance: whoever crawls through the legs of a woman is re-born. For this reason women push sickly children through their own legs at night or let them crawl through.[24]

[21] S. O. Addy: Household Tales with other traditional Remains, 1895, p. 102. A besom is laid across the path by which the new maid-servant has to come to the house (p. 13) as an augury of her industrious habits, but originally probably with the intention that she should step over it.

[22] W. R. S. Ralston: The Songs of the Russian People, 1872, p. 412. G. F. Abbott: Macedonian Folklore, 1903, pp. 219, 220. F. S. Krauss: Slavische Volksforschungen, 1908, S. 125, 126.

[23] See Liebrecht: Zur Volkskunde, 1879, S. 379; Zachariae: 'Scheingeburt', *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Volkskunde,* 1910, Bd. XX, S. 153.

[24] K. Bartsch: Sagen, Märchen und Gebräuche aus Mecklenburg, 1879, Bd. I, S. 418. The fact that it is also prohibited to call a child a toad (in connection with the prohibition of crawling through, see above), may arise because the toad is a symbol for the uterus. See R. Andree: Votive und Weihegaben des katholischen Volkes in Süddeutschland, 1904, S. 130. The pregnant woman is drawn through a hoop. Ploss-Bartels: Das Weib, 1908, Bd. I, S. 311. She is led over the threshold three times

Having found above that the acts of crawling through someone's legs or through the window are regarded in Silesia as equivalent, we can arrive from this standpoint at another meaning of the custom and of the individual phobia. When a child is passed through a window it is, symbolically speaking, passed back into the womb, that is, it returns by the same route that it passed at birth and therefore cannot grow, because an embryo cannot grow beyond a certain size. This would also constitute the explanation for another prohibition which is frequently mentioned in the same breath by investigators: a child may only be carried feet first into a room, else it will go straight to its death. Of course a child comes into the world head first; inasmuch as death is conceived as a return to the womb, the child would die if it were carried in the room head first. It is not difficult to guess how the two meanings can be reconciled.

To return to Sokolnicka's case. The boy's fear of castration did not refer to sexuality in general, but first and foremost to coitus with his mother. Therefore being lifted through the window does not in this instance signify any indifferent sexual intercourse, but the incestuous one, in which he would actually pass through the very genital organ which he had already come through at birth. The reason why the rite (and also the taboo) comprises the two meanings of birth and of intercourse is probably to be found in the fact that in its deepest nucleus it symbolizes the *incestuous* sexual act.[25]

(Ploss-Bartels, op. cit., S. 310) or she steps over the feet of her husband who lies on the floor or over the 'dishlo' (a rod connecting the shafts which enclose the middle horse in a *troica*).

[25] See S. Freud: 'Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose', Sammlung kleiner Schriften. Vierte Folge, 1918, S. 625.

COMMUNICATIONS

NOTES ON DR. ABRAHAM'S ARTICLE ON THE FEMALE CASTRATION COMPLEX

BY

ERNEST JONES

LONDON

Every psycho-analyst will be able to bring illustrative evidence in confirmation of Dr. Abraham's valuable and instructive paper.[1] To comment adequately on it would demand a monograph in itself. It is perhaps worth while, however, to publish a couple of notes taken from material that passed through my hand at the time of reading the paper.

1. The girl associates the wish for a penis with the wish for a gift from the father (first penis, later child). The following unfortunate combination of circumstances reinforced a strong castration complex in a woman patient. There was only one other child, an elder brother of whom she was both jealous and envious. He had a congenitally deformed foot and the father took the greatest pains to get this right. He took him regularly to a famous surgeon in London, where the boy had among other treatment no fewer than eleven operations, and at home he used to massage the boy's leg twice a day, to the neglect of the girl. They were ultimately successful with the leg, but the girl felt that every effort was made to give the boy a good member and none at all to remedy her predicament. That the foot is a common unconscious symbol for the penis has been extensively established.

The girl played with dolls until she was three, when a baby was born in her best friend's house, after which she became masculine, took no more interest in dolls or babies and absolutely refused to bear a child even when happily married.

[1] See this Journal, 1922, Vol. III, p. 1.

2. Depreciation of the male organ as a defence against envy. A woman dreamt that a certain man had a dead second face on the side of his head and thought 'Poor fellow, why doesn't he have something done to diminish the deformity?' The association was to a useless squinting eye of a boy friend, which looked outwards to the side of his head. In childhood he had proudly exhibited his penis before her, and she had responded with the thought that 'he was making a fuss about nothing'.

3. Castration fears connected with deflowering a virgin. As Freud has pointed out in his 'Tabu der Virginität', the savage custom of getting someone other than the husband to perform the first act of coitus is due to the fear of arousing the woman's resentment at being made finally into a woman, with the consequent desire in her to punish the doer by castrating him. Abraham illustrates this reaction from neurotic cases. In the Voiage and Travaile of Sir John Maundeville (p. 285), which dates from the fourteenth century, the author describes an island in the Far East where this custom holds, 'for thei of the Contree holden it so gret a thing and so perilous, for to have the Maydenhode of a woman, that hun semethe that thei that haven first the Maydenhode, puttethe him in aventure of his Lif.' The inhabitants explained the custom as an inheritance from ancient times when 'men hadden ben dede for deflourynge of Maydenes, that hadden Serpentes in hire Bodyes, that stongen men upon hire Yerdes, that they dyeden anon.' The belief is evidently of the talion order, that a man who injured a woman by deflowering her with his 'yard' (middle English for penis) would suffer in the same part at the hands of her 'serpent'.

THREE DREAMS

BY

S. HERBERT

MANCHESTER

A Magical Dream Wish

Mrs.H., who had written her first book, received one afternoon a very complimentary letter from a high authority on the subject, and was very elated about it. The same afternoon her younger girl N. became ill, which rather disturbed the joyful feeling of the house. The next morning after breakfast, being asked for the letter, she could not find it anywhere. She had taken it to bed with her; and all she remembered was that she had put it in the morning into her dress pocket together with other papers. After some search it suddenly struck her that she might have thrown the letter into the fire accidentally with some other papers; though she could not conceive how she could have been so careless with a letter she valued so much. Anyhow, a search in the hearth led to the discovery of the charred remains of the letter, so that there was to her chagrin no further doubt of what she had done. My own suggestion was that this could not have been a mere accident. The letter was too precious to Mrs.H. to be destroyed thus by her—even carelessly.

The attempt of analysing the incident was by no means an easy one. In the course of the analysis Mrs.H. reported the following dream which she had had the night preceding the burning of the letter: 'The treasured letter she had received dropped into the marmalade (which was on the tea table) and turned somehow into crumbs (of bread and butter).' The analysis of this dream brought the following explanation: N., the younger daughter, had been feeling ill soon after the letter had been received, and would only have bread and butter with marmalade for tea. In the dream that followed in the night the letter changed into crumbs, as if N. had eaten it. Mrs.H., on finding that her child took ill the very afternoon she had received the letter, had had the thought: 'Fate does not allow unalloyed joy.' That was a common feeling of her's about life

in general, but especially so in her own case. N. by partaking of the letter in the dream somehow incorporated it in herself. The letter was thus made to act in a way as a magical charm. At the same time it was a sort of vicarious sacrificial offering to fate in order to ward off the illness of the child. The burning of the letter on the next morning surely had not been an accident. It was an unconscious offering to the gods on the part of the mother for her child.

It hardly needs pointing out that this dream presents a striking parallelism with primitive belief. We need only refer to the partaking of love potions, of special dietaries, etc. which are supposed to act as magical charms. The story of a patient who literally 'took' a prescription and got well from it, is based upon the same idea. The notion of vicarious sacrifical offerings among primitive peoples is too well-known to need further elaboration.

Truly a dream like the one recounted shows deep kinship with the primitive past in a most convincing manner. It may not be unnecessary to point out that the lady in question is in no way given to superstitious or mystical leanings. She is extremely rational; certainly exceptionally so for a woman.

A Reminiscent Dream

Mrs. K. dreamt that she was cycling by the side of a tramcar, and her teeth were caught by the brass bar on top of the car as it moved along. She was dragged along by the moving car, which caused her agonizing pain in her mouth. Suddenly she heard a voice say: 'How many more?'; and another voice replied: 'Two more.'

What is interesting about the dream (which was not analysed) is the fact that it repeats in substance an occurrence that happened to the lady three days earlier under narcosis.

The lady in question had all her teeth drawn under chloroform. She seemed to recover a little, when the anaesthetist asked: 'How many more?'; whereupon the operator replied: 'Two more.'

What is more remarkable still is that the lady herself did not know of this conversation at the time, nor did she remember anything of it or of the extraction. But after the dream it appeared to her as if she had heard that conversation somewhere.

Truly an éclatant proof of the continuity of the unconscious!

A Prophetic Dream

Mr. J., a railway man, had an accident on the railway in which his ribs were very severely bruised, without however leaving any permanent after-effects. More than two years later he developed pleurisy which became purulent. In spite of many explorations the focus could not be found and the case lingered on for some weeks. A friend urged the patient, who was in hospital, to tell the doctor that he had been hurt some years ago, but the patient pooh-poohed the idea as irrelevant. The same afternoon, after the friend had left, the patient fell into a doze from which he awoke with a terrific scream. On being questioned by the nurse what was the matter with him, he related that he had just had a dream in which the accident of over two years ago was re-enacted by him. He pointed out the place where he had been hurt at that time.

Operation in that spot was undertaken, and more than a pint of pus was found, which up to then had escaped detection. The patient made from then an uninterrupted recovery.

A GRAMMATICAL ERROR

BY

DOUGLAS BRYAN

LONDON

A patient during analysis mentioned that a friend had been talking to him about a visit to a dissecting room. I said to the patient, 'Would you like to visit one?'. He replied, 'No, but if it was necessary I could do so'. I asked him why he would dislike it. He said it was because of the dead decomposing bodies, the messiness and smell. He then added voluntarily, 'I will be the same *once*', and immediately went on to talk of something else. I stopped him and drew his attention to the previous phrase 'I will be the same *once*'. He said, 'Of course I meant to say, I will be the same *someday*'. On asking him why he had made this grammatical error he said that it was due to his mixing up German and English. If the phrase had been spoken in German the word *einmal* (which means once) would have been used for someday. This explanation is obviously a rationalisation as English is his language which he speaks quite grammatically, and his German was only obtained through his living in Germany several years.

This error in speech is interesting in that it definitely shows unconscious anal birth ideas. His associations to dead bodies in the dissecting room led immediately to faeces, and previously the analysis had brought to light many ideas in which faeces, children and birth were closely associated. 'I will be the same *once*' is a condensation of two ideas. I was a decomposing, messy, smelling body (= faeces) *once* (i. e. before birth), and I shall be a decomposing, messy, smelling body *someday* (i. e. after death).

ABSTRACTS

General

A. A. Brill. The Empathic Index and Personality. *Medical Record,* January 24, 1920.

By the term 'empathic index' the author understands the answer a person gives to his question: What personage from history or legend do you admire most, or whom would you consider your ideal? The answer, he says, definitely shows the trend of the person's adjustment to the world.

The mechanism of the 'empathic index' he bases on the process of identification.

The author's view that the transference mechanism is only a finer form of identification and depends altogether on it is not in accordance with the psycho-analytic theory of transference.

The author's final remark that 'one can truly say, "Tell me your empathic index and I will tell you who you are"' is far too sweeping. This 'empathic index' can only give at the most a hint in a certain direction and no more. Dr. Brill apparently lays far too much stress on its value. D. B.

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W. M. Wheeler. On Instincts. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology,* 1920-21, Vol. XV, p. 295.

The author in this interesting and in parts humourously written article first of all gives a brief survey of the literature on Instincts from the theological, the mechanistic or physiological, and the psychological or anthropomorphic points of view. He then says that the methods of investigating instincts may be treated under three heads, the experimental, the historical and the psychopathic. He goes on to show how the experimental method supplemented by the historical can be applied in the interpretation of behaviour in three typical insect instincts, namely, the spraying instinct of the Formica rufer, the balloon-making instinct of the Empidid flies and the spinning instinct of the caterpillars of moths and butterflies. He considers that the third method, the psychopathic, is the one that promises important results.

His remarks on psycho-analysis and psycho-analysts are worth quoting somewhat fully as coming from an entomologist. He says, 'Now I believe that the psycho-analysts are getting down to brass tacks. They have discovered that the psychologist's game which seems to consist in sitting down together or with the philosophers and seeing who can hallucinate fastest or most subtly and clothe the results in the best English, is not helping us very much in solving the terribly insistent problems of life. They have had the courage to dig up the subconscious, that hotbed of all the egotism, greed, lust, pugnacity, cowardice, sloth, hate, and envy which every single one of us carries about as his inheritance from the animal world. These are all ethically and aesthetically very unpleasant phenomena but they are just as real and fundamental as our entrails, blood and reproductive organs. In this matter, I am glad to admit, the theologians, with their doctrine of total depravity, seem to me to be nearer the truth than the psychologists. I should say, however, that our depravity is only about 85 to 90%.'

'To me one of the most striking indications that the psycho-analysts are on the right road is the fact that many of their theories have such a broad biological basis that they can be applied, *exceptis excipiendis,* to a group of animals so remote from man as the insects'. 'There are even cases of repression and sublimation as in the workers of social insects, and did time permit I could cite examples of multiple personality or of infantilisms, i.e. larval traits which survive or reappear in the adults of many species.'

'The great fact remains that the work of the psychiatrists [psycho-analysts?] is beginning to have its effect even on such hidebound institutions as ethics, religion, education and jurisprudence, and that the knowledge that is being gained of the working of our subconscious must eventually profoundly affect animal no less than human psychology, since the subconscious *is* the animal mind.' **D. B.**

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Helene Deutsch. Zur Psychologie des Mißtrauens. (Contribution to the Psychology of Suspiciousness.) *Imago,* 1921, Vol. VII, p. 71.

Suspiciousness, so the author remarks, arises under the most varied circumstances in individuals and whole races. What unconscious motives has it and which repressing tendencies are responsible for it? Through the analysis of several cases these questions are answered in the sense that the feeling of constant apprehension which accompanies suspiciousness arises from a feeling of disturbed libido, a conflict, most often, between the wish for incest and its severe prohibition. The fact that suspiciousness is seen in deaf people so often is commented on. Obviously, Dr. Deutsch

remarks, we need all our senses to watch over the hostile feelings of our fellow creatures. The difficulty in controlling the sadism of which we all have our share and our ambivalency is responsible for the feeling of suspiciousness.

KATHERINE JONES.

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Stanley Hall. A Synthetic Genetic Study of Fear. *American Journal of Psychology,* Vol. XXV, April and July 1914, pp. 149, 321.

These two papers, 124 pages long, appear to be instalments of a monograph not yet concluded, although this is not explicitly stated. As, however, nothing further has been published since July 1914 a summary will be given of the two chapters in question, criticism of the whole being reserved for a future occasion.

The subject is introduced with the following sentences: 'Fear is the anticipation of pain. For those forms of life capable of fear this anticipation is not prevision but only a highly generalised fore-feeling, itself unpleasant, that a yet more painful state impends. The will to live, the *élan vital,* is more or less checked in its momentum or narrowed in its range by some kind of intimation that it may be still further held up. This protensive or futuristic attitude or orientation toward a pejoristic state is the specific *quale* of the psychic condition called fear. Psychogenetically it is a primitive *Anlage* of futurity and it is the most stimulating and vivid of all its forms of presentation. In fear the future dominates the present and gives it a new significance in addition to its own, and but for fear pain could do little of its prodigious educative work in the animal world. Fear is thus the chief paradigm of psychic prolepsis as well as the chief spur of psychic evolution.... If fear had not been felt it could not be anticipated, hence the condition precedent of fear is some kind of registration and some degree of revival of these vestiges. Thus fear involves the past as we have seen it does the future.... If Bergson's *durée réelle* or pure duration or time freed from spatialization which the intellect tends to give it, has any existence, it is in the pure psychic state of fear. If pleasure-pain is the result of the first day's work of creative psychic evolution, fear is that of the second.... If there be a vital principle fear must be one of its very close allies as one of the chief springs of mind. Thus if any psychic component is not a mere epiphenomenon, but has an entity of its own, it is this. In fact fear is intensely dynamogenic and also inhibitive.... Without known danger life would be tame, insipid, asthenic.' He regards hope rather than desire as the counterpart of fear: 'Whether we call fear an instinct, feeling, emotion, or sentiment, we must call hope the same, for each is the affective converse or complement of the other,

without which it can neither be understood or explained, so that a broader knowledge of fear will have to wait upon future studies of hope, which is at the same time the light of life and also the *terra incognita* of psychology.'

As in his other writings, Hall is here especially concerned with the genetic and biological aspects. He says, for instance, 'Fear can only be understood genetically. Its reinforcements and physiological expressions are full of atavistic rudiments, for we inherit not so much the effects of specific objects feared as the physical and psychic diathesis of fear'. He proceeds, in fact, by first making a long study of mental development in general, dealing especially with the question of the primary mental element. Rejecting the claims of sentiency, awareness, choice, and memory for honour, he decides in favour of affectivity, stated in terms of the pleasure-pain principle. As to the question of the inheritance of fear he says: 'The anxiety diathesis is one of the most inheritable of traits, while fears of special objects are so only to a very slight degree.' No direct evidence is given in favour of this conclusion, however. He recurs to the theme of the influence of phylogenetic experiences in determining present fears and the forms of these; 'We fear with not only all that we, but with all that the race has feared'.

Then follows an account of Adler's hypothesis of compensation of inferior organs, one which Hall holds to be 'the most important key' for both abnormal and normal psychology. 'Freud is wrong in interpreting this most generic form of fear (*Minderwertigkeitsgefühl*) as rooted in sex, worries concerning which are only one of the more specific, if common and most typical, forms of its expression. Sex anxieties are themselves only symbols of this deeper sense of abatement of the will to live, to be powerful, to illustrate in our own personality the whole estate of man, to glow with the humanistic totalising motive to be citizens of all times and spectators of all events.' He nowhere shews any sign of having grasped the psycho-analytical theory of *Angst*, referring to it only as worries about sexual matters. For him, neurotic fear means the breaking down of the compensation of inferiority, the failure to 'realise the life-wish of self-maximization'. 'The *summum genus* of fear is a sense of the inability to cope with life, a dread of being vanquished and becoming not victors in its battle, a sense of limitation and of inferiority in our power to achieve the fullest success and happiness, a feeling that our hereditary momentum was originally insufficient or is in danger of being reduced.'

A list of 132 specific phobias is given, with their Greek names, from antlo- and apeiro-phobia to nelo- and nephelo-phobia (fears of floods, infinity, glass, and clouds, respectively), and then ten important types of fears are selected for special, detailed consideration. A few words will be said about each of these.

1. Fear of shock. By this Hall means essentially psychic trauma, though he takes the occasion to discuss the effects of physical shock on the nervous system (Crile's experiments, etc.) as well. There is a detailed description of the symptoms of shock, terror, being taken unawares, etc. Hall points out the ambivalence of fear and courage, dealing with this from a biological standpoint. Through fear man learns to avoid disaster, and through courting danger he acquires greater mastery over natural forces. 'As life has evolved on the psychic plane, the preservation of life against all great and sudden injuries is less by the vegetative power of recuperation and more in the cerebral function of pre-perceiving and so preventing shock. Instead of the power of regenerating mutilated tissue or even lost limbs and sense organs by the *vis reparatrix* of re-growth, men, especially those well endowed with brain and mind, depend increasingly for survival upon their keenness of perception and their foreknowledge of coming harm, which enables them to escape it.' Speaking of the effects of intense emotion he says: 'Reason always fears emotion and is shocked by its outbreaks, and well it may be, for they mark the incursions of the race into the narrow life of the individual. When they break out riotously in the individual or in the mob they may in a moment wreak a havoc that nothing can make good. Hence it is our own emotional possibilities rather than the moral law, as Kant thought, before which we stand in supremest awe. Their sublimation, directly or indirectly, is almost the whole work of culture. In this sense the fear of self is the beginning of wisdom. Every supernatural object or personality is the creation of these feelings. All of them we fear but only secondarily, for the fear in which they all root is that of self.' Incidentally we may note that Hall has an exaggerated as well as antiquated notion of the part played by psychic trauma in psychopathology. He views it only from the static side, in Morton Prince's way, and treats of its effects as one would of the effect of a blow on to a non-reacting material. 'Freudians think shock is the only cause of hysteria [!].... Modern psychiatry is coming to assign to shock the chief rôle in nearly all psychoses and neuroses. On this view an intense, sudden, painful experience, especially if the significance of it can be dimly felt but not understood, may persist long and latently unassimilated by the central consciousness and without fusion with it, almost as if it were a foreign body in the psychic system. Such an experience may become the nucleus of a complex which without being recognised may grow into a dominant factor in the victim's life and become a parasitic or secondary personality.... A child who sees a sex act; a girl whose trusted and respected lover suddenly makes indecent advances; even the sudden but belated knowledge of how babies come to exist, if it comes in a coarse way;—these illustrate Freudian shocks as they manifest

themselves at once or long afterwards by obsessions, complexes, motor, digestive or other symptoms.'

2. Pavor nocturnus. This leads to a discussion of sleep, Hall laying stress on the regressive nature of this (towards lower phylogenetic levels). He connects pavor itself with the night dangers to which our prehuman ancestors were exposed, and to their accompanying dreads. He regrets that physicians have made no psychological study of the subject.

3. Geotaxic Fears. Under this heading Hall includes, without clearly distinguishing between them, the fear of heights, astasia-abasia, interest in climbing, in rapid movement, and in being tossed up and down. He finds that fears connected with heights are remarkably common in children, that they mostly disappear later on, being rare after the age of thirty, and that they are three times as common in girls as in boys. He lays stress on the great positive pleasure most children experience in climbing, in being high up, and in being swung or tossed. Sensations of flying are discussed in the same connection. As phylogenetic sources he suggests the importance of the arboreal stage in prehuman existence for most of these phenomena, but reaches further back still to acquatic (fish) life for others. 'The facts seem to suggest that hovering is to be distinguished from falling sensations, which are later, the former being vestiges of acquatic, the latter of arboreal life. Of course the older of these experiences is to some extent reproduced in the foetal state with nearly equal fluid pressure on all sides, to which embryonal stage psycho-analysts (Ferenczi and others) have of late had recourse.' He has some illuminating comments on the inverse resemblance between astasia-abasia and the exact order in which a child learns to walk, describing this symptom as 'unlearning to stand and walk'. Further, 'the locomotor efforts of patients with abasia-phobia, with their stooping and straddling, waving of arms, clutching of hands constant incipient falling and recovery, the anxious fore-looking for the next few steps, the selection of a goal and the staggering toward it, and especially the impulse to grasp everything supportive in their way, are highly suggestive of tree-life. The same is true of agoraphobia symptoms.'

4. Fears of losing horizontal orientation. The necessity of orientation, the confusion between right and left, the obsession of knowing exacting the points of the compass, the fear of being lost, and even nostalgia, as well as other allied fears, are brought into relation with the primitive dread of being lost in forest life in prehuman times.

5. Fears of closeness. The discussion ranges far beyond the fear of suffocation, etc., and many interesting facts are related, such as the case of a woman who can only wear a loose ring and gets into a panic if it sticks at all on being taken off; Sully Prudhomme found it oppressive to live on a confined sphere and wished the world were flat and continuous

with the stars and sky. Hall connects agoraphobia with the prehuman necessity to be near trees for safety, and claustrophobia with the dangers of cave life in subsequent epochs. He considers that many sublimated interests, e. g. passion for liberty and hatred of constricting tyranny, arise from this group of fears, and says of vertigo, for instance, 'it is the genetic basis of man's impulsion to find his own place in the universe, to know himself and his world, to evolve a system of theory as well as of conduct and behaviour that fits him to fill his place in nature.'

6. Fears of sticks, missiles, points, edges, string. These are all connected with the vast importance such matters played in the earliest development of mankind, in relation to aggression and to danger. The following general remark is of interest: 'If phobias are thus survivals and revivals of traces in us of the salient points of long ancestral experience, we cannot understand the one without the other, and may sometimes reason both ways. We may infer from strong and in the individual inadequately motivated impulses something as to what experience the race must have passed through. Conversely, when the latter is known, we may confidently expect if not predict outcrops of similar phenomena in childhood and in neurotics.' No sexual association of any of these phenomena is mentioned except in the case of piercing with a point, and then to be dismissed with the words 'The fact that very many children long before puberty [!] have fear of points, and the fact that the chief pain done to man and his history was by non-sexual piercings, shew the limitation of this interpretation'.

7. Fear of snakes. This fear is much commoner with girls. It is related, as well as the numerous myths of overcoming serpents and dragons, to the great dangers from snakes experienced by prehuman, and especially arboreal, man. Sexuality is not even mentioned in this connection.

8. Fear of cats. The prominent elements in this are the animal's stealthiness, its power of taking great leaps, its nocturnal habits, and the fear of claws and teeth. Many interesting examples are narrated. Hall does not think that the phobia can be accounted for by painful personal experiences, and draws for an explanation on the fact that the feline race was man's most potent enemy in primitive times. 'The ailurophobe is contending with inherited more than with acquired dread, for he is to some extent reviving the old fear of big cats which he wrongly interprets, from lack of psycho-analysis of himself, as fear of house-cats. These latter are the manifest as opposed to the latent objects of his fears.' It is hard to see how psycho-analysis could reveal this, if it were true; besides, the theory does not account for the much commoner occurrence of ailurophilia.

9. Ereuthophobia and its kin. Most of the more severe cases of this are found in men. A long discussion of flushing and blushing is given,

especially in relation to man's sensitiveness to the opinion of his fellows. The emotions underlying blushes are always connected with fear. This is the only fear in which Hall finds it necessary to discuss a possible sexual origin, and the superficial arguments with which he dismisses this are characteristic of his whole attitude. 'Some think that the blush was once extended over the whole surface of the body and is a relic of general sex erethism that has drifted away from its origin, but why, then is blushing unpleasant to so many?' The two other arguments are that 'each sex may blush before members of its own sex', and that 'sex theorists disagree as to whether sex-flushing means desire or dread'. It is remarkable that anyone who has read some psycho-analytical literature cannot find the obvious answer to such questions. Hall's own view is as follows: 'Man's dearest wish is esteem, fame, and to maximize himself generally in his human milieu, and his greatest dread is disgrace, social outlawry, and general hate. Flushing is a factor of two variables, first, the degree of keenness of consciousness of things to be concealed, and second, a sense that they have been betrayed.'

10. Pathophobias. Hall begins with the alimentary pathophobias, to which most of the section is devoted. Raising the question of how it is that neuropathic disorders can so closely resemble organic ones, e. g. pyloric stenosis, he says that this is because of past ancestral experiences of such disorders. He discusses the danger of the interference of consciousness in the action of automatic and instinctive bodily processes. 'Necessary and effective as psycho-analysis shews this process of consciencization often to be for re-education, it suggests again the momentous conclusion that consciousness itself is essentially a therapeutic and remedial agency with potencies hitherto undreamed of in this direction because wrongly conceived of. But we must not forget that consciousness always brings dangers also hitherto unknown in its train, for it has strange powers to inhibit and to hypertrophy almost every organic, motor, and sensory activity. Hence it is that there is always a resistance born of fear in going below the threshold to explore the unconscious, and this resistance has many manifestations all the way from the instinct that prompts patients to be reserved to physicians up to the refusal of many psychologists to admit even the reality of unconscious psychic processes.' Hall overlooks here the difference between self-conscious and pre-conscious activities, the latter being the stage at which psycho-analysis leaves most bodily functions —from breathing to walking—that may have been the object of conscious attention during the clinical analysis.

Taken all in all, the three most prominent features about Hall's detailed work are (1) his emphasis on the phylogenetic aspects of

clinical phobias, and the relation of these to specific predispositions, (2) the vast amount of material, chiefly in children, at his disposal, (3) his opposition to admitting that sexuality may play a part in the genesis of any single phobia, or of fear in general.

E. J.

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W. R. Bousfield and P. Bousfield. Determinism in Relation to Psycho-Analysis. *Psyche,* 1921, Vol. II, p. 110.

The object of this paper is to express the authors' dislike for what they imagine to be certain materialistic implications in psycho-analysis. Starting from the extraordinarily wild premise that 'The notion that the world and its inhabitants have been evolved from such a nebula without any intelligent moulding agency has become scientifically unthinkable', they oppose the notion of an ethereal or spiritual body which may interpenetrate the material body and survive to the conclusions of the Freudian school, which is supposed to 'base its theory on a purely materialistic view of human nature'; we learn, further, that this school 'has disposed of spirit and find mind a mere function of matter'. We are not aware of any psycho-analyst who has committed himself to any such philosophy.

Their criticism of 'How Freud deals parenthetically, in off-hand way, with the subject of telepathy' (p. 117) is based on a passage in an American translation of one of his books which is a pure interpolation on the part of the translator and does not occur in Freud's own writings.

But the real gravemen of their charge against psycho-analysts, to which most of the article is devoted, is the belief of the latter in psychical determinism. To this they trace any sorts of immoral consequences in practical treatment. Apparently it has not occurred to the authors that determinism is no special invention or property of psycho-analysts, but is common to all scientific men; science is possible only in so far as what roughly may be called the uniformity of cause and effect is assumed and becomes impossible where this ceases.

They imply that the technique of treatment would be widely different if one granted that the patient had a free will, i.e. one uninfluenced by any causative forces. But it seems to us that one would be in very much the same position in so far as one could operate, as now, only on the mental agencies that can be influenced, i.e. are not 'free'. Obviously if one succeeded in making an appeal to a patient's 'power of choice between good and evil', as the authors imply, this power of choice would be one that could be influenced, i.e. would not be 'free will'.

E. J.

*

Stanley Hall. The Freudian Methods applied to Anger. *American Journal of Psychology,* July 1915, p. 438.

This paper was read in May at a meeting of the American Psychopathological Association. The point of it is that the Freudian mechanisms also apply to other matters than those of sex, e.g. anger. Hall says he has vainly tried to interest normal psychologists in psycho-analysis, and he seems to sympathise with the reason they give, viz. that 'these patients and their doctors alike are sex-intoxicated, and that the Freudian psychology applies only to perverts and erotomaniacs or other abnormal cases. To ascribe all this aversion on their part to social and ethical repression is shallow, for the real causes are both manifold and deeper. They are part of a complicated protest of normality, found in all and even in the resistances of subjects of analysis, which is really a factor basal for self-control, of the varying good sides of which Freudians tell us nothing. The fact is that there are other things in the human psyche than sex and its ramifications. Hunger, despite Jung, fear, despite Sadger, and anger, despite Freud, are just as primary, aboriginal and independent as sex, and we fly in the face of fact and psychic experience to derive them all from sex'.

The analogies he sees in the case of anger are as follows: (1) Anger is the most dynamogenic of all the emotions. Further, 'few if any impulsions of man, certainly not sex, have suffered more intense, prolonged or manifold repression'. (2) Anger has many forms of *Verschiebung.* (3) It has countless forms of sublimation. (4) It has its dreams and reveries. 'So weird and dramatic are these scenes often that to some minds we must call anger and hate the chief springs of the imagination'.

In the middle of the paper is an apparently irrelevant passage in which it is stated that 'the Ichtrieb is basal, and the fondest and most comprehensive of all motives is that to excel others, not merely to survive, but to win a larger place in the sun'. Perhaps to be correlated with this is the introductory sentence in which Hall protests against Freud's 'most impolitic and almost vituperative condemnation' of Adler. E. J.

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Sylvia Bliss. The Origin of Laughter. *American Journal of Psychology,* April 1915, p. 236.

In a footnote to this article the authoress writes: 'The writer has learned that the argument in this article is similar in some respects to that used by Freud in his treatise on wit. Her investigation was independent of that of the latter'. It is hardly likely, however, that it

was quite uninfluenced, even indirectly, by the wide-spread knowledge of Freud's theory of repression.

In a word, the authoress' theory is that laughter is an expression of the pleasurable release of repressed, unconscious emotions. Her argument is as follows: 'In the evolution of humanity those instincts that are inimical to the progress of civilisation are theoretically transformed into qualities and acts less at variance with social and ethical laws, but in reality the substitution is far from perfect and entire. Man is not yet completely evolved; he is but partly adjusted to a civilised environment, and a portion of his nature lags far behind at a primitive, savage level. The human being, from childhood up, must curb, repress, skulk, hide, control. From the mother's "no, no" to the thundering "Thou shalt not" from Mount Sinai there is a constant denial of instinct. So accustomed are we to regard this as pure benefit that we are blind to the accompanying disservice. Nature confined is not entirely quiescent. With all the outlets, transformations and substitutions which physical and mental activities afford there still remains a large residue of repressed primal instinct which results in discordant and tense conditions in the subconscious life.' 'Laughter is the result of suddenly released repression, the physical sign of subconscious satisfaction. Our primitive man saw, it may be, another do the thing reprobated by the tribe and his own nascent conscience. The sight relieved the tension occasioned by his own repressed wish to do the self-same thing—and he laughed; the laughter sprang from unconscious sympathy with the reactionary act'. 'The secret of laughter is in a return to nature. Civilisation and culture are late additions and we are living to a great extent in artificial conditions. Even common sense is an effort. Psychology makes plain the fact that our present mental equipment has been slowly and painfully acquired, and a certain strain in maintaining that high altitude is inevitable. This tension is relieved by nonsense and by the portrayal in humorous anecdotes and on the stage of evasions of convention and infractions of the prevailing code of manners and of morals'. The smile of the subject entering the hypnotic state is explained by reference to Jastrow's description of the hypnotic consciousness as 'a release from the restraining influences of fear, hesitation, and the ideals of reason and propriety.' The theory is illustrated by a number of examples, and the article concludes with the words: 'Perceiving the function of laughter-provoking agencies we shall be slow to condemn even the broadest and coarsest humour, for this, furnishing an indirect outlet for suppressed instincts, may be more beneficial than we know'.

E. J.

*

W. H. R. Rivers. The Instinct of Acquisition. *Psyche,* 1921, Vol. II, p. 100.

Rivers discusses here the question whether the concept of property has an instinctive basis. He does not think that it is necessary to postulate a distinct instinct for the impulse to acquire, and so confines himself to that of retaining wealth. Consideration of animal life and of his studies in Melanesia lead him to the conclusion that the instinct of acquisition is a primary and individual one, though it has been modified in various ways by social tradition; whether these modifications also constitute an instinct cannot as yet be decided. The most striking feature of the paper is the total absence of any reference to all the work that has been done in the past fifteen years on the psychogenesis of the two impulses in question; the word 'anal-erotism' is nowhere mentioned.

E. J.

*

Theodore Schroeder. The Psychologic Aspect of Free-Association. *The American Journal of Psychology,* 1919, Vol. XXX, p. 260.

This is a defence of Freud's theory of free association. The article is mainly polemic, but presents also some valuable personal material of an analytical kind. E. J.

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A. A. Roback. The Freudian Doctrine of Lapses and its Failings. *The American Journal of Psychology,* 1919, Vol. XXX, p. 274.

A long polemic against Freud's theory of lapses in every-day life. The author criticises a number of examples published in the psycho-analytical literature and attempts to show that they can be explained otherwise on purely phonetic grounds, as was done in the days before Freud's work. He says that in the psycho-analysis of such lapses 'emphasis is laid on irrelevant details, while essential facts are ignored'. This is reversing the situation with a vengeance. I take this opportunity of putting an end to a controversy which seems to have been raging among American writers about two supposed lapses of my own: Mr. Roback's explanation about the word 'calligraphy' is correct, while that about the word 'broschure' is wrong. E. J.

Clinical

K. Abraham. Zur Prognose psychoanalytischer Behandlungen in vorgeschrittenem Lebensalter. *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse,* 1920. Band VI, S. 113.

Abraham here relates his experience of analysis in elderly patients. Although the prognosis in general is much less favourable after the age

of fifty he finds that some cases react excellently and discusses the meaning of the fact. It turned out that the favourable cases were those in which the neurosis had become manifest in adult years after a normal life had been lived for some time, whereas the results were poor with those patients who had suffered from childhood on. His conclusions may be summed up in his apophthegm that from the point of view of prognosis the age of the neurosis is more important than the age of the neurotic. E. J.

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Adolph Stern. The Etiology of Neurotic Symptoms in a Child of Eight. *New York Medical Journal,* May, 22, 1920.

Some very interesting deductions can be drawn from the analysis of this little patient. Among them were the demonstration of the existence in a child of eight of unconscious and precouscious mental processes, which in the adult are usually unconscious. Also like in the findings in the adult neurotic, so in the case of our little patient, those processes were motivating forces of neurotic symptoms, and also factors in the production of character traits. The roots of the neurosis were traceable to the parent complex in its various manifestations. The ambivalent emotions of love and hate, of sadism and masochism, are very evident, especially in reference to the parents, though they are not absent in reference to others in the immediate environment. The infantile sexual curiosity, so regularly found repressed in the adult, is nicely demonstrated in this patient, also for the most part repressed and the source of conflict and symptom formation.

That which in the adult manifests itself as a sense of inferiority can be traced in this patient to two sources, both leading to the narcissistic component. One is that which to the patient indicates that there has been a loss of love for him on the part of the parents, following the birth of a baby brother; and also as belonging to this category, the oft repeated remark of the father that the patient's younger brother is braver and stronger than the patient. The other root of the inferiority feeling arises from the comparison by the patient of the size of his own (small) genitals with that of his father; entering into this category is the frequently repeated threat of the father to cut off the patent's penis if he continued to play with it.

From a technical point of view it is of interest that a transference was very readily established and maintained. A positive transference was present from the start, followed by a well defined negative one, not excessive in character. This is to some extent different from my usual experience with children, in whom the establishing of a transference takes much time. The nature of the transference in no way differed from that in an adult neurotic.

The question of heredity is referred to, because of the neurotic make-up of the patient's father, and the fact that the later suffered from tabes dorsalis. The author thinks that some of the factors commonly referred to as hereditary may well be environmental in character, in that they influence the child at a very young age, in fact in very early infancy, at a time when children are supposedly not susceptible to neurotic manifestations on the part of the adult. The author believes that in this field lies some hope for prophylaxis in mental disease. Another avenue of approach to prophylaxis in the mental field, lies perhaps in giving accurate and correct instruction to children in fundamental things, like sex, at the time they ask questions, and making the information fit the ability of the child to understand what is told him. What is told him, should be true.

AUTHOR'S ABSTRACT.

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Millais Culpin. The Present Position of Psychotherapy. *Lancet,* September 24th, 1921.

Dr. Culpin's article does not justify its title. We should have expected to find some definite pronouncement on the present position of psychotherapy from a lecturer on psychoneuroses, but the only information in this respect may be summed up in words used by the writer, 'Taking a general view of recent development we find a great increase of interest in the mental processes underlying certain disorders'. It seems a rather unnecessary expenditure of energy to write an article of five columns to tell the readers of the *Lancet* this obvious fact. However, apart from this general defect in the article there are one or two points worth noting in it.

The author tells us that practically all the physical disabilities seen in cases of shell-shock had been described by Hector Gavin in his book 'Feigned and fictitious Diseases in Soldiers and Sailors' which appeared in 1843. This is interesting information for those medical men who like to look upon shell-shock as a new and never-before-known syndrome. Psycho-analysts have never been blind to the fact that practically all the symptoms seen in the war neuroses were manifest in neurotics in civil life long before the war, and they have constantly stated and demonstrated this fact.

Further he points out that H. W. Page and the late Furneaux Jordan in 1891 definitely established the emotional origin of 'railway spine' which was then looked upon as due to gross organic changes, just as at the present time certain observers would like to regard all cases of shell-shock. The emotional factor in shell-shock psycho-analysts have always maintained and emphasised as a fundamental cause of the symptoms.

The general trend of the article points to the fact that the author considers the war neuroses are to be explained essentially on the basis of the psycho-analytical theory, and their treatment has to be carried out along this line. His 'brief summary' of the 'theory of the unconscious' leaves much to be desired, yet the advocacy of the psycho-analytical principles in one of the leading medical journals, however tentative it may be, is, we feel, a step in the right direction.

It might be pointed out to the author that a cure by psycho-analysis is not 'sought by reviving memories excluded from consciousness and by teaching the patient to face his troubles', but by breaking down the resistances that prevent unconscious ideas, etc. from directly reaching consciousness, and thus enabling the patient to solve his conflicts and so bring about a cure. D. B.

*

W. McDougall. Four Cases of 'Regression' in Soldiers. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology,* 1920, Vol. XV, p. 136.

The writer points out that he is using the word 'regression' in a purely descriptive sense and does not mean to imply any theory of the process or condition. He details the histories and symptoms of four soldiers, who having suffered some trauma in the war had 'regressed' to an infantile stage of development. He suggests that this 'regression' is to be regarded as a biological rather than a specifically psychological process, and may be looked upon as the ultimate or extreme consequence of the instinctive shrinking of fear. He goes on to say, 'Fear is the great inhibitor, which determines shrinking, both bodily and mental, from all fear-exciting things and ultimately perhaps from all things. If the fear be sufficiently intense and sustained or renewed, we may imagine this inhibitory shrinking effect carried so far as to paralyse all the higher functions; and we may suppose that the vital or nervous energy, being withdrawn from those levels of the nervous system concerned in these higher functions, then revitalises older, more primitive, infantile levels of function, finding its outlet through nervous channels organized and active in infancy, but long disused.' It seems from this the author would have been more correct to have regarded the 'regression' as a purely physiological process, for he evidently wishes to conceive the word 'shrinking' in its sense of actual loss or getting materially less, than in its more figurative sense of withdrawal, in which sense it has been and is always used when applied to fear. If this concept of 'regression' in these cases were the correct one, it does not seem that the author need have any feeling of shame (page 156) in not restoring the patients to the normal condition by any form of treatment; for it is difficult to see how any form of treatment could be satisfactorily applied under such conditions.

It would be of interest to the Freudians if the author (page 136) had given a specific instance where they say they use the words 'sex' and 'sexual' in a different sense from that which centuries of usage has attached to them. If the author is unable to do this then such a statement is the last thing one would have expected from a man of his standing and attainments. As a matter of fact the Freudians have always used the words 'sex' and 'sexual' in the sense that centuries of usage has attached to them, but on the other hand they have also enlarged the concept, and include the lesser in the greater. D. B.

*

K. M. Bowman. Analysis of a Case of War Neurosis. *Psychoanalytic Review,* 1920, Vol. VII, p. 317.

This is a detailed report of an analytic study of a case seen at Maghull, England, in 1918, which he cured by psychotherapy. The author insists on the connection between the present condition of such patients and the experiences of their early life which went to determine their character. Those working at such subjects should certainly read the article in the original. E. J.

*

Mary K. Isham. A Case of Mixed Neurosis with some Paraphrenic Features. *Medical Record,* June 12, 1920.

The paper contains some abstracts from the analysis of the case of a Russian Jew, 30, violinist and composer, who lived apart from his wife because he was afraid he might injure his only child, a baby boy aged fifteen months. He could not bear to hear it cry, yet he was worried when it was quiet and he would pinch and poke it to see if it would cry.

He used to meet his wife periodically and, although she was usually fairly punctual, he was constantly asking during the analysis 'Why does my wife come late?' The solution of this problem lay in the sexual meaning of the word 'come', for the patient was the subject of *ejaculatio praecox* and adjustment of the sexual life relieved him of his worry about his wife's punctuality.

He feared that masturbation in early life had rendered him impotent and it was because his son symbolized his own (castrated) phallus that he stimulated him to cry, thus satisfying himself that the child was not deficient, otherwise that he himself was not impotent.

W. H. B. STODDART.

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Laignel-Lavastine et Vinchou. A propos d'une Observation de Psychanalyse. *Gazette des hopitaux civils et militaires,* 1920, No 73, p. 1256.

Ces auteurs nous racontent l'histoire d'un vieille fille devenue tiqueuse à la suite d'une déception sentimentale. Quoique la malade nie tout rapport de cause à effet entre ces deux faits, l'analyse de ses rêves semble cependant montrer que ce rapport existe. Après avoir rapporté ces faits ils donnent quelques appréciations sur la psa., que nous croyons utile de citer ici:

'L'école de Freud nous reprocherait certainement de nous être contentés de la seule observation, d'avoir réduit au minimum nos interprétations personnelles et de n'avoir pas poussé plus loin la recherche de l'histoire des tics et de leur origine. C'est qu'en France, avertis par l'aventure de l'hystérie, nous avons appris à nous méfier de l'intervention trop intime du médecin, surtout dans cette catégorie de troubles mentaux. Certaines malades nous ont aussi réclamé d'elles-même l'épreuve de la psa., racontant sans aucune pudeur des rêves érotiques, ou le médecin jouait une large part... Pourtant tel qu'il est, cet essai de psa. est interessant et montre bien toute l'importance de l'école de Freud. D'autres observations sont peut-être moins riches en symboles, mais aboutissent au même point, c'est-à-dire à prouver le rôle considérable de l'instinct sexuel dans l'évolution des psychoses. Mais est-ce vraiment la cause déterminante de celle-ci?'

Ici Laignel-Lavastine arrive aux conclusions opposées de Flournoy. Pour lui le rôle prépondérant dans l'étiologie des maladies mentales se réduit à une prédisposition constitutionelle.

R. DE SAUSSURE.

*

C. P. Oberndorf. Traumatic Hysteria. *New York Medical Journal,* November 10, 1917.

The points in this article are summed up in the author's recapitulation.

1. Traumatic neurosis is not primarily dependent upon litigation.

2. All hysterias are dependent to a great extent upon traumata, psychical rather than physical. The mental mechanism in litigious cases probably parallels the non-litigious ones.

3. The constitutional make-up of the patient, more specifically his unconscious mental equipment, is the most important factor determining the development of hysteria.

4. All hysterics are unconsciously attempting to achieve something through their illness and until that aim is brought clearly into consciousness or some substitute for it is provided them there is little hope for permanent cure.

D. B.

*

Cornélius. Psychologie et Thérapeutique des Obsessions. *Journal des Praticiens,* 13. novembre 1920.

Nous ne faisons que citer en passant cet article du Dr. Cornélius dans lequel il indique ses préférences pour les théories de Jung, et sa crainte des théories de Freud d'une façon très brève. Nous aurons l'occasion de revenir aux idées de cet auteur à propos d'un de ses articles qui est on cours de publication dans les *Archives Internationales de Neurologie.*

R. DE SAUSSURE.

*

W. Stekel. A severe Case of Hyperemesis Gravidarium. *Psyche and Eros,* 1920, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 172.

A short report of a severe case of vomiting during pregnancy. After some interrogation the patient was cured by means of hypnotism. Stekel insists that many such cases are of a psychogenic nature.

E. J.

*

M. Prince. Miss Beauchamp. The Theory of the Psychogenesis of Multiple Personality. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology,* 1920, Vol. XV, p. 67.

The author has written a further article on the Beauchamp case of which he had previously published a study in 1908. His theory of the psychogenesis of multiple personality as evidenced by the case of Miss Beauchamp does not add much to what has already been published on the academic investigation of these cases. A kind of psychological analysis was carried out on the subject but no psycho-analysis, therefore the findings are of no material interest to psycho-analysts.

D. B.

*

William Boven. Etudes sur les conditions du développement au sein des Familles, de la schizophrénie et de la folie maniaque. *Archives suisses de Neurologie et de Psychiatrie,* Tome VIII, fasc. I 1921, p. 89-116.

Tandisque la plupart des auteurs qui se sont occupés d'hérédité de maladies mentales ne se sont attachés qu'à décrire les cas pathologiques des familles d'aliénés, le Dr. Boven a eu le grand mérite d'aller dans les demeures des aliénés, pour étudier le caractère des parents de chaque malade. Son enquête porte donc sur les tendances psychologiques héritées, aussi bien que sur les cas morbides d'une famille.

R. DE SAUSSURE.

*

Mary K. Isham. The Paraphrenic's Inaccessibility. *Psychoanalytic Review,* 1920, Vol. VII, p. 246.

The author gives short reports of several cases of paraphrenia in illustration of the inaccessibility so characteristic of the condition.

E. J.

*

L. Dooley. A Psychoanalytic Study of Manic Depressive Psychoses. *Psychoanalytic Review,* 1921, Vol. VIII, pp. 38 and 114.

A detailed study of five severe cases of manic-depressive insanity. The therapeutic results were neither encouraging nor discouraging. In no case did the analysis proceed to the depths. The author proffers much material concerning unconscious mechanisms and conflicts, but her conclusions are of a very general order. Nothing distinctive of this psychosis is isolated. Apparently at the time of writing the author had not seen Freud's work on melancholia.

E. J.

Dreams

Oskar Pfister. Experimental Dreams Concerning Theoretical Subjects. *Psyche and Eros,* 1921, Vol. II, Nos. 1 and 2, pp. 1 and 90.

Pfister here extends Schrötter's work on the experimental production of dreams, supplementing it with an analysis of the dreams so produced.

E. J.

*

E. R. Thompson. An Inquiry into some Questions connected with Imagery in Dreams. *British Journal of Psychology,* October 1914, p. 300.

This is a study of some specific dream problems suggested by Freud's Traumdeutung. 190 dreams of five subjects were available. The problems were as follows: (1) Does compensation of imagery occur in dreams, or is the imagery characteristic of the individual's waking life the most prominent in his dreams? No evidence for compensation was found. Thompson further makes the statement that there is a correlation between waking and dream imagery in a given person; this is contradictory to the results obtained by other workers, Calkins, Hacker, Weed, etc., who find that visual imagery is the most prominent in dreams in all cases. (2) Is there a relation between the type of imagery and the rate at which a dream becomes forgotten? Thompson finds that the type of imagery most characteristic of waking life has

the strongest perseverative tendency when it occurs in dreams. (There is a flaw in the argument here, for the author in this experiment employed only subjects of the visual type, without therefore controls. Reviewer.) (3) The central motif in a dream was found to be presented in the form of imagery most characteristic of both waking and dream life. Psycho-analysis is said to have been employed to determine which was the central motif. (4) Sensory stimuli during sleep never cause the dream, but may be woven into its structure in exactly the way described by Freud, being distorted for the purpose of the dream tendency. (5) Condensations occur more frequently in visual than in auditory imagery, and in the latter case more frequently with words than with sounds. (6) Critical thought and reasoning occur in dreams sometimes, and then shew all the clearness and logical consistency of waking thought. Thompson gives nine examples of this, but judges exclusively from the manifest content, so that his conclusion is of no interest.

E. J.

*

J. P. Lowson. The Interpretation of Dreams. *Psyche,* 1921, Vol. II, p. 4.

A short and elementary description of Freud's theory with some illustrative examples. E. J.

*

Auguste Lemaître. Le Symbolisme dans les Rèves des Adolescents, suivi de Remarques sur l'Inversion Précoce. Ed. du Forum, Paris, 40 pages.

L'auteur, qui est professeur au collége de Genève, et connu par son livre sur la psychologie de l'adolescent, nous donne quelques rêves de garçons, dont le symbolisme est généralement assez transparent, mais dont l'analyse est manifestement insuffisante. Il en résulte que les conclusions que l'auteur veut tirer de ces rêves sont très sujettes à caution. Dans la seconde partie du livre l'auteur nous donne beaucoup de confessions d'homosexuels et ce document ne manque pas d'interêt.

R. DE SAUSSURE.

*

Bellamy. The Analysis of a Nightmare. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology,* April 1915, Vol. X, p. 11.

A very poor study of a complicated anxiety dream. As it was the author's own dream, foolishly published, it would be unkind to enlighten him and the world about the partial interpretation that is possible from reading it. E. J.

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J. Marcinowski. A detailed Dream Analysis. *Psyche and Eros,* 1920, Vol. I, p. 140.

An analysis shewing how extraordinarily complicated the determinants of a single dream may be. An interesting diagram is appended in which all the associations are represented with their various connections.

E. J.

Sexual Life

K. Abraham. Zur narzisstischen Bewertung der Exkretionsvorgänge in Traum und Neurose. *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse,* 1920, Band VI, S. 64.

The primitive over-estimation of the excretory products typical of the unconscious (and child's) mind extends also to the excretory acts themselves. Some dreams are here related illustrating the significance attached to such acts, particularly in relation to the impulse of creation and destruction.

E. J.

*

Honorio F. Delgado. Der Liebeszauber der Augen. *Imago,* 1921, Band VII, p. 127.

In a short article entitled 'The love charm of the eye', Dr. Delgado of Lima discusses, in a rather superficial way, the reason why the eye is for most men the most attractive part of a woman's face. He comes to the conclusion that it is the mother's eye, the image of which is revived in every other woman's eye. The reason why the mother's eye is attractive to the child is that it is the most outstanding feature of her face and conveys much expression. One cannot help thinking of Rank's short papers on the same matter which appeared some years ago in the same paper and show so much more insight into the psychological process.

KATHERINE JONES.

*

Havelock Ellis. The Doctrine of Erogenous Zones. *Medical Review of Reviews,* April 1920, p. 171.

In this article the author traces the origin of the term 'Erogenous Zones'. He states that this phenomenon has been known in the general sense and without reference to sexual feelings from the earliest days when exact medical observation began to be made. It was termed 'sympathy'. Charcot recognised these 'erogenous zones' but called them hysterogenous zones, and did not bring them into relation with sexual phenomena.

Ernest Chambard in 1881 seems to have been the first to bring erogenous zones, or as he termed them centres-érogènes, into relation with sexual phenomena. Féré in 1883 pointed out the analogy of erogenous zones to hysterogenous zones, and also stated that the former could occur in the normal state. He evidently based his ideas on Chambard's centres-érogènes but altered the term to zones érogènes.

The first reference to zones érogènes in English was in the translation of Binet's and Féré's 'Animal Magnetism' in 1887 and appeared as erogenic zones. It then appeared in the Oxford Dictionary in 1891 with the meaning 'that gives rise to sexual desire'. It added that the word is from the French érogènique, which is a misstatement—the word used in French being always érogène.

The author considers that he was the next person to use it in English in the third volume of his Studies 1903, and he adopted the term erogenous zones.

Bloch supplied the next comprehensive account of the matter in his 'Beiträge zur Aetiologie der Psychopathia Sexualis', Part II, p. 192, and extended the term of erogenous zones to all the senses.

Freud in his 'Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie', 1905 was the first to adopt and make wide use of the doctrine of erogenous zones, and it is to him, says the author, that we must largely attribute the general current acceptance of the idea of the name of erogenous zones.

D. B.

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Ph. Chasselin et P. Châtelin. Délire érotique avec Perversion sexuelle. *Annales Médico-Psychologiques,* Février 1921, p. 132.

Les auteurs racontent le cas d'une jeune fille de 30 ans éprise d'une de ses amies qui avait 10 ans de plus qu'elle. Ils publient des lettres de cette malade qui montrent nettement qu'il s'agit ici d'un réél amour homosexuel, bien que ces deux femmes n'eurent jamais de relations de ce genre entre elles. Malheureusement les auteurs n'ont pas éssayé de faire la psychogénèse de cette affection.

R. DE SAUSSURE.

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D. H. Bonus. Over-Valuation of the Sexual as a Determinant in the Etiology of the Psychoneuroses. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology,* 1920, Vol. XV, p. 259.

This article is the report of a case in which the sexual played a predominant part. Although the author talks about the analysis of the case, it must not be inferred he means a psycho-analysis. All he

apparently did was to carry out a short psychological analysis which appears to have been sufficient to remove the patient's symptoms. His interpretation of certain dreams leaves much to be desired. D. B.

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W. Stekel. A Contribution to the Psychology of Exhibitionism. *Psyche and Eros,* 1920, Vol. I, p. 1.

Stekel here gives illustrative cases in support of his well-known view that the perversion of exhibitionism is connected with narcissism and infantilism. E. J.

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Capgras. Autobiographie d'un Pervers Erotique. *L'Encéphale,* 1921, No. 7, p. 367.

The author records the case of a man with a life-long conscious incestuous fixation, so strong that onanism was invariably associated with phantasies about his sister and undisguised sexual dreams were always about her. In letters to her he gloated over the time when they slept in the same room (1861-74) and admired her charms. He confessed to her that in 1878 (when he was 24) he pierced a hole in the partition between their rooms in order to adore her naked body.

A year later he became alarmed at this passion for his sister and fled, taking a situation distant from Paris, where they had hitherto lived, and he did not see her again until he was 49. During these 24 years he resisted his incestual desires, realizing them in imagination only and abandoning himself to sensual reveries in which his sister was the sole object. On rare occasions he sought sexual relief with other women, but could only achieve an orgasm by picturing the face and body of his sister and pronouncing her Christian name. From 1895 to 1901 he wrote her many love letters of a grossly sexual character, even asking her to send him a pair of drawers she had worn. He asked the measurements of her chest, hips and thighs so that he might have a mannequin made to her measurements to love and adore. He appears to have achieved this object.

In a letter of 1901 he made a proposal of incestuous congress with his sister. This she declined but, in 1903, supposing that he was restored to the normal, allowed him to stay at her house. They had not seen each other for more than 20 years and he stayed one night, but fled from temptation the following morning, explaining in a subsequent letter that, although their bodies had grown old, 'mes rêves intimes pour toi etaient restés jeunes'. In 1905 he became impotent, but still loved his sister in dreams.

In 1913, suffering from arterial and auditory sclerosis; auditory

hallucinations began in the left ear—the voice of his sister—'a hell and a paradise in one', but he was not insane.

The patient was 59 years of age when war broke out. He lived in the invaded area of France and nothing has since been heard of him.

There was never any attempt at psycho-analysis.

W. H. B. STODDART.

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B. S. Talmey. Notes on Sex-Aberrations. *Psyche and Eros,* 1920, Vol. I, p. 156.

Anamneses of a number of cases of sexual perversion.

E. J.

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F. W. Meagher. An Unusual Foreign Body in the Rectum. *New York Medical Journal,* September 21, 1921.

The author in reporting this case first draws attention to two unusual features in it, the nature of the foreign body, and the persistent refusal of the patient to aid any of the five physicians who saw him in arriving at a diagnosis although he was intelligent and did not exhibit any real psychotic phenomena.

The case is briefly as follows: The patient, aged twenty-four, was admitted to hospital complaining of severe pain in the mid-lumbar region for two days. He told the doctor he had no idea of the cause of the pain. Examination by a surgeon on the next day revealed the presence of a full-sized drinking glass in the rectum (four inches high, two and three-eighths inches across the bottom, and two and five-eighths inches across the top) which had been introduced inverted. The glass was removed and the patient made an uninterrupted recovery.

When the patient was informed of what had been found he offered no explanation and remained rather sullen. He resented attempts to obtain a complete history. It was discoved, however, that he had introduced the glass five days before its removal, and he admitted he had done it for its erotic effect. He was a painter by occupation and lived with his family. He had been somewhat hypochondriacal during the past few years. He was of the seclusive type, rather inattentive, introverted, selfish, lazy, and had few friends. He always avoided the opposite sex, and denied masturbation as ordinarily practised. He admitted to active rectal eroticism since his fourteenth year. Twice when a boy he permitted rectal coitus. For a long time he introduced ordinary candles into his rectum, then he used medicine bottles of gradually increasing size, until finally the drinking glass.

The author considers this case remarkable from the fact that the man had a dangerous foreign body in the rectum; that it caused intense

pain necessitating the giving of morphine; that though he begged for the relief of pain nevertheless he allowed five physicians to examine him and purposely hid the facts, even going to the operating room stubbornly keeping his story to himself'. In looking at it from the author's point of view we undoubtedly agree with him. However, the psycho-analyst is not astonished at this attitude of the patient. We note that the patient only begged for relief of pain, and not for the removal of the foreign body. We can only deduce from this that the fact of the foreign body in the rectum was exceedingly pleasurable to the patient, and that the pain was an unfortunate and unwished for adjunct to the pleasure; hence he wished to lose the pain and hoped this could be accomplished without being deprived of his source of pleasure.

In his further remarks on the case the author alludes to the anus and rectum as erotogenic zones, and quotes various writers in support of this. He also refers to the anal erotic character traits some of which the patient exhibited as would be expected. However, the important question of homosexuality he does not refer to specifically. There is no doubt that the patient is a passive homosexual who as far as is known did not practice it except on two occasions when a boy; but the use of candles for introduction into the rectum is obviously intended to symbolise the penis. D. B.

Childhood

G. Humphrey. Education and Freudianism. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology,* 1920-21, Vol. XV, p. 350.

This paper consists of two parts, the first being 'The Freudian Mechanisms and The Conditioned Reflex', the second 'The Child's Unconscious Mind'.

These articles are in general a criticism of various Freudian mechanisms which the author considers can be explained on his 'Conditioned Reflex' idea. (The author has written on this idea in the same Journal, February, 1920.)

The author's idea that psycho-analysis has been practised by the Catholic Church for twenty centuries (page 351) leads one to think that his knowledge of psycho-analysis must be of a very rudimentary character. Such a statement also gives the impression that there is an underlying motive in his articles, namely, criticism levelled at the Catholic Church.

In his conclusion of the examination of the Freudian psychology he says, 'That the whole movement will have a far-reaching effect upon the psychology of the future is beyond question, but the effect will come

rather from the suggestiveness of the Freudian system than from its dogma.' This is certainly an admission, if only a feeble one, considering that the author has apparently a very much simpler explanation at hand in his 'Conditioned Reflex'. A little practical experience in psycho-analysis according to the Freudian technique would probably cause the author to modify his views regarding the almost universal application of his method of explanation. D. B.

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H. v. Hug-Hellmuth. Vom wahren Wesen der Kinderseele: Vom 'Mittleren Kinde'. (On the true nature of the child's soul: the 'middle' child.) *Imago*, 1921, Vol. VII, Heft 1, S. 84.

The author, starting with some very clever remarks on the only child and the 'darling' child and their development in later life, goes on to the question of the child who comes in the middle, having older and younger brothers and sisters, and whose problems seem to attract less interest from parents and teachers than those of the eldest child. Psycho-analysts are accustomed to the fact that there is by no means the serene happiness and harmony in the nursery that was supposed to prevail. Much has been written and observed about the conflicts of the eldest child, his feelings at the arrival of an unwelcome newcomer; one knows something about the 'preferred' one who expects all his life to be the 'exception', but what do we know about the 'middle' child, of whom nobody takes special notice. His fate, too, is not altogether rosy. One meets with complaints like those that the older one believes he is grown up and the younger thinks she is the same as the 'middle' one. So the one in the middle has no proper companion. He or she feels inferior to the elder one and superior to the younger, though—to his grief—his superiority is not granted him by the younger. The inconsistency of parents in treating a child as grown-up or as 'tiny', according to their own convenience in the special case, tends to make matters more difficult. The children in question have to be 'sensible' and let the little one have his will and they have to give in to the elder one because they are younger. With girls the question of dress is of great importance and as this is mostly decided by practical and not by sentimental reasons, it can leave much bitterness in the soul of the 'middle' one who only comes in for the cast-off clothes of the elder sister, while the little one gets new clothes. The outsider, mostly the eldest, sees the lot of the younger one from quite a different angle. The very fact that he is neither grown-up nor little seems to him the main advantage because he can make use of that situation, play the grown-up when he likes and the baby at other times. Another child, in the middle of many, tries hard to attract attention so as not to get lost among the others. It prefers scolding to indifference.

The author comes to the depressing conclusion that a large family does not ensure a happy childhood and that the often praised advantages of the large family are mostly illusions. A girl in between two brothers, or a boy in between two sisters have, according to her observations, chosen the best lot, while three children of the same sex have a life full of conflicts. KATHERINE JONES.

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Melanie Klein. Eine Kinderentwicklung. (The development of a child.) *Imago,* 1921, Vol. VII, p. 251.

A very detailed paper based on the close observation of a neighbour's child, whom the author had the opportunity of watching closely for years. It is shewn how a psycho-analytical education, strict adherence to the sexual truth, the avoidance of a too violent repression, further a child's development. The child in question is a normal, rather slow little boy. With the apprehension of sexual phenomena many of his little symptoms disappear and his sense of reality gets stronger. The author discusses the advantages and difficulties of analysing small children who—according to her opinion—mostly want an analytical talking over of their problems. The plan of a Kindergarten directed by teachers trained in psycho-analysis is advocated. KATHERINE JONES.

*

D. Forsyth. The Rudiments of Character. A Study in Infant Behaviour. *Psychoanalytic Review,* 1921, Vol. VIII, p. 117.

An important study which should be read in the original. The first part is a very understanding presentation of the phenomena of birth and of infantile auto-erotism, in which the importance attached to respiratory libido is especially noteworthy. In the second section he terms the stage of psychical equilibrium the vegetative state, discusses sleep, and distinguishes three phases in the development of the infantile mind: (1) The vegetative one, (2) the nutri-excretal one comprising the activity of the erotogenic zones, (3) that in which activity of the skin and special senses are added. The third section deals with love and hate. It is suggested that dementia praecox represents a failure in passing from the second to the third stage indicated above. Distinctions are drawn between oral love and anal love and between oral hate and anal hate. E. J.

Applied Psycho-Analysis

V. H. Mottram. Psycho-Analysis in Life and Art. *University Magazine,* Canada, April 1915.

The author shows considerable knowledge of Freud's work and speaks appreciatively of it. After sketching the fundamental theses of psycho-analysis, he devotes the major portion of his article to applying the principles elucidated by Freud in 'Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens' to characters in literature, particularly some found in the works of George Meredith. While the article holds nothing new for a psycho-analyst, it will serve to spread a knowledge of psycho-analysis among people who seldom come in touch with it. C. R. PAYNE.

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H. E. Barnes. Psychology and History: Some Reasons for Predicting their More Active Cooperation in the Future. *American Journal of Psychology,* 1919, Vol. XXX, p. 337.

An extremely interesting paper which does not lend itself to full abstracting and will repay reading in the original. After describing the main modes of approach to the interpretation of history the author advances the thesis that the psychological one is the most comprehensive of all. He discusses the difficulties and advantages of applying psycho-analytical knowledge for this purpose, being enthusiastic about its future possibilities. The greater part of the paper is taken up with a series of very suggestive hints of the ways in which this could be done, ranging from analytic comments on various American Presidents to the relation between Puritanism and smuggling. Unfortunately the author's knowledge of psycho-analysis, perhaps owing to war conditions, is practically limited to American writers, and not to the best of these.

E. J.

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L. Pierce Clark. Unconscious Motives underlying the Personalities of Great Statesmen and their Relation to Epoch-Making Events. A Psychologic Study of Abraham Lincoln. *Psychoanalytic Review,* 1921, Vol. VIII, p. 1.

Clark here relates the main events of Lincoln's life from a psychological point of view. He considers that Lincoln was dominated by an intense mother-fixation, which was the cause of his repeated depressions and also of his religious—or non-religious—views.

E. J.

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Geza Dukes. Psychoanalytische Gesichtspunkte in der juridischen Auffassung der 'Schuld'. (The psycho-analytical point of view in the legal conception of guilt.) *Imago,* 1921, Vol. VII, S. 225.

The paper shows how deeply legal conceptions are bound up with psychological ones. Guilt in the legal sense deals with the conception

of *willing* a certain act and of *knowing* that its consequences are dangerous. These are psychological conceptions and the paper very ably investigates how far modern law and practice follow the lines shown by Freud and where they adhere to old customs.

KATHERINE JONES.

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Pierre Bovet. Le Sentiment filial et la Religion. *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie,* Lausanne, No. 36, Août-Oct. 20, 1921.

L'auteur de cette petite étude apporte quelques confirmations de l'hypothèse d'après laquelle le sentiment religieux serait le prolongement ou l'altération de l'amour filial infantile. La croyance en l'ubiquité, en la sainteté, en l'omniscience de Dieu le Père aurait son origine dans le rapport affectif tout spécial de l'enfant avec son père. Ce rapport, fait d'admiration surtout, serait exposé a une crise que l'auteur place approximativement entre 4 et 6 ans.

L'auteur ensuite indique la relation qui existe entre le sentiment filial et le sentiment patriotique, entre le sentiment religieux d'une part et le loyalisme d'autre part. "Leur commune origine est de nature à expliquer dans une large mésure leur alliance et leur rivalité dans l'âme humaine".

F. MOREL.

*

P. C. Van der Wolck. Zur Psychoanalyse des Rauchopfers. (Contributions to a psycho-analysis of the offering of incense.) *Imago,* 1921, Vol. VII, S. 131.

An interesting paper on the case of a highly cultured young student who was a fervent collector of censers and found sexual gratification by masturbating into them. He had turned away from normal love because his first experience infected him with the disease he was made greatly afraid of by his education. A recurrent dream—naked young girls gathering his sperma into censers while he masturbated—gave him the idea of his practice. While indulging in this practice he imagined himself having intercourse so that the censer symbolised in fact the vagina. Some deep and far-reaching remarks on the symbolism of this act, on the importance of smell for sexual excitation, and some interesting interpretations of the Song of Songs and Indian religion (coitus as a religious act) conclude the paper.

KATHERINE JONES.

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C. Moxon. Mystical Ecstasy and Hysterical Dream-States. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology,* 1920-21, Vol. XV, p. 329.

In this short article the author seeks to bring mystical ecstasy into line with hysterical dream-states, and considers that the ecstasy cor-

responds to the four stages of the dream-states as given by Dr. Abraham in his article on Dream-states. The writer says that in mystics as well as in hysterics there is a primary auto-erotic or narcissistic activity, a secondary repression, and a final return of the repressed material in the sublimated or spiritualised form of a religious experience or a mystic ecstasy. D. B.

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M. Pierre Bovet. Le sentiment religieux. Etude de psychologie. *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie,* Lausanne, 1919, No. 32.

Le sentiment religieux se retrouve avec toutes ses variétés chez l'enfant déjà. Il est donc un fait original où l'imitation du milieu ambiant ne joue pas de rôle.

L'auteur énumère quelques unes des théories qui ont été proposées pour expliquer ce sentiment:

La théorie "érotogénétique" de Binet-Sanglé et de Schroeder, notoirement hostile au Christianisme, d'après laquelle la volupté sexuelle et l'émotion religieuse sont identiques.

James, dans un chapitre de l'Expérience religieuse (1902), montre l'insuffisance de cette théorie. Mais la solution qu'il propose est, elle aussi, insuffisante.

Stanley Hall constate des concordances entre l'évolution de la religion individuelle et celle des émotions relatives à l'autre sexe.

Flournoy, enfin, et la psychanalyse, renouvellent entièrement le problème avec la notion de la "sublimation".

Mais pour l'auteur la solution n'est pas définitive encore. Par laquelle de ses fonctions — amour filial, amour conjugal, amour parental — l'amour humain s'apparente-t-il à l'amour divin? C'est par l'amour filial, ainsi que celà est condensé dans l'expression courante *piété filiale.*

Dans la phase infantile la toute-science, la toute-puissance, la toute-bonté sont attribuées aux parents. Or vers la cinquième ou sixième année une crise de rationalisme se produit: L'omniscience paternelle s'effondre dans l'esprit de l'enfant; la toute-puissance parentale se trouve entamée, la toute-bonté également, par le fait de la comparaison. L'auteur donne quelques documents intéressants relatifs à cette crise. F. Morel.

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Stanley Hall. Thanatophobia and Immortality. *American Journal of Psychology,* October 1915, p. 550.

This article, 63 pages long, deals with the fear of death and the belief in a future life. The former subject is dealt with not so much as a phobia, strictly speaking, as a fear amongst normal people. Much

of the paper, relating rather to ethical and philosophical considerations, is not of direct psycho-analytical interest, though it would be in any case of value to us on account of the extensive material contained in it, both pedalogical and folkloristic.

Hall first points out how much the psychology of death has in common with that of love, especially from the new psychogenetic standpoint. 'There is a sense in which all fears and phobias are at bottom fears of death or of the abatement or arrest of vitality, and also a sense in which all desires and wishes are for the gratification of love. The one is the great negation, and the other the supreme affirmation of the will to live'. 'The real meaning of death is not understood until puberty, both death and love show fragmentary and generally at first automatic outcrops from early infancy on'. From some 525 replies to questionnaires it appears that the first impression of death is most often a sensation of coldness in touching a dead relative, and the reaction is a nervous start at the contrast with the warmth to which the child is accustomed from contact. Then comes immobility, and the fact of prolonged absence. The accessories of death, trivial matters in connection with the coffin, funeral, etc., are especially apt to remain prominent in the memory. It is noted how often children rejoice in the fact of death, especially in respect of advantages thereby accruing, such as the partial replacement of the dead person, father or mother. 'Even in the most highly evolved emotional lives this is only a question of preponderance, for if our analysis is not mistaken, there never was a death, even of a lover, that did not bring some joy to the survivor, swallowed up though this component be in grief.' It is a pity that Hall does not make any further use of this point, which he merely notes in passing, for he does not appear to realise the bearing it has on many of the problems he raises. The same comment applies to his temporary realisation of the disbelief in one's own mortality, which, nevertheless, he clearly states: 'Death is primarily negative, privative, and, as nature abhors a vacuum, so the soul baulks at the very idea of annihilation.'

Hall, by constant reiteration, appears to lay great stress on the 'disgusting' associations of death (decomposition) as playing an important part in our attitude towards the subject. Though he does not definitely draw any psycho-analytical conclusion from this, one can see that a certain association lies near in his mind. 'The thanatophobia of the race and the repulsiveness of carrion have kept the doors of the tomb effectively locked, so that we know far more of excrement than we do of decaying bodies of men'. 'That necrophilism has its germs in infantile experience as truly as does anal-eroticism there can be little doubt'. 'How can a lover who to-day dotes and gloats upon the eyes, mouth, and every part of the body of his inamorata, next day contemplate her corpse destined to rot through a series of stages, from every one of

which every sense would turn away with horror? To mitigate such a shock, and to save the psyche from disintegrating under it, all these vicariating, easing and defensive mechanisms have been slowly evolved. Their worth is in what they save us from, more than in what they give'. 'I am convinced that an analysis of burial customs makes it plain that many if not most modes of disposal of the dead are motivated in no small part by the impulse to repress or divert from thoughts of putrescence, and that the belief in reanimation and another life, though often evident, is far less prominent that most anthropologists, not to say all theologians, have been wont to assume.'

He does not mention Freud's view of the part played by death-wishes towards loved ones in determining a belief in the soul and after-survival, but discusses this on the conventional lines. 'One of the chief causes that first suggested and then made man cling with such persistence to the belief in souls was the far greater difficulty in grasping death as annihilation. The passing of the body cannot mean the end of all. Something must survive, for the mind, like nature, abhors a vacuum, and hence we have to postulate something in place of the vanished body. Thus belief in the immortality of the soul arose partly as a compensation which man's autistic nature evolved to make up for the realisation of the mortality of the body.' Similarly in connection with the fear of ghosts, he discusses the dread of their retribution 'for neglected or violated duties', without mentioning the much more potent factor of guilty wishes in the unconscious.

For those interested in the topic the article is well worth reading on account of the material therein contained, but it cannot be said that it contributes much that is original to our ideas on the subject.

E. J.

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J. H. Leuba. A Modern Mystic. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 1920, Vol. XV, p. 209.

Although the author states that 'in every conspicuous Christian mystic a connection can be drawn between sex-love and religious ecstasy' he in no way attempts to explain this connection in the mystic, Mlle. Vé, whose case he describes. He seems inclined to lay most stress on a physiological explanation of this mystic's conditions . D. B.

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A. Stocker. Essai psychoanalytique sur la cruche cassée, de Grenze. *L'Encéphale*, 1921, p. 78.

Après une introduction sur les services que peut rendre la psa. à l'art, l'auteur remarque le parallélisme qu'il y a dans le tableau de

Greuze, entre la cruche cassée et le ventre de la jeune fille qui la porte. Elle tient ses mains en formant entre ses doigts un espace vide qui rappelle le trou de la cruche. Est-ce là un pur hazard? Stocker rappelle ensuite que dans l'interprétation des rêves, d'autres auteurs ont trouvé que la cruche symbolisait le ventre de la femme.

Caché derrière la jeune fille, se trouve aussi un lion, et à ce propos l'auteur étudie le symbole du lion.

La rédaction de l'Encéphale s'est crue obligée de faire suivre cet article (p. 96) de la note suivante:

'Cet article montre jusqu'où peut aller le freudisme et il est bien entendu qu'il n'engage que son auteur et que l'orientation de l'Encéphale reste avant tout clinique, anatomopathologique et biologique.'

R. DE SAUSSURE.

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K. J. Karlson. Psychoanalysis and Mythology. *Journal of Religious Psychology,* Nov. 1914, Vol. VII, pp. 137-213.

The title of this paper is rather a misnomer, for the subject of the paper is not so much the relation of psycho-analysis to mythology as the general psychology of myth-formation, and the mention of psycho-analysis occupies less than a fifth of the whole paper. A long general account of mythology, its phenomena and the explanations that have been offered of them, is given, myths being divided into 'nature myths' and 'hero myths'. Then an elementary and not over successful account of Freud's psychological theory follows, this being presented in a sympathetic manner. The author's conclusions are very general in nature, but one gathers that he holds the human explanation of mythology, i. e. that myths do not arise so much from interest in external phenomena as from the projections of internal emotions, of which, as the author admits, the sexual is by far the most important. The article is a very readable account of modern views of mythology, without being in any way startling.

It is perhaps worth while calling attention to a curious mistake in nomenclature committed by the author. He says that the word '*Vorbewußte*' is to be translated in English by 'foreconscious', and '*Unbewußte*' by 'either unconscious or preconscious'. It must be remarked, however, on the contrary, that in English 'foreconscious' and 'preconscious' have exactly the same meaning, of course '*Vorbewußte*', though the second is to be preferred as not being a hybrid. E. J.

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L. Pruette. A Psycho-Analytical Study of Edgar Allan Poe. *American Journal of Psychology,* 1920, Vol. XXXI, p. 370.

A long, but superficial study of Poe. It is not hard to label many of Poe's writings as sadistic, but the only light the author throws on

this feature is the circumstance that Poe, like millions of other people, spent a few years in an English school and therefore was perhaps beaten in childhood. Following Brill, she connects some of his traits, especially the craving for affection, with the fact he was an only child. But for the most part the work is a mere translation of his personal and literary attributes into a mixture of Freudian, Adlerian and Jungian terminology and contributes little to an understanding of their psychogenesis.

E. J.

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Leo Kaplan. The Psychology of Literary Invention. *Psyche and Eros,* 1921, Vol. II, p. 65.

After discussing the comparative method of research into the study of literary invention, Kaplan gives an interesting analysis of the Don Juan legend in literature. E. J.

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W. S. Swisher. A Psychoanalysis of Browning's Pauline. *Psychoanalytic Review,* 1920, Vol. VII, p. 115.

Browning's first poem, which he published anonymously and afterwards owned with reluctance, is thought to be his most autobiographical. Swisher here subjects it to an analysis and comes to the conclusion that it represents the conflict of Browning's adolescent years. It appears to be largely dictated by devoted admiration for Shelley, and ultimately for his own father. E. J.

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J. E. Towne. Scepticism as a Freudian 'Defence-Reaction'. *Psychoanalytic Review,* 1920, Vol. VII, p. 159.

A psycho-analysis of Bazaroff, the hero of Turgenev's most famous novel. It is maintained that the atheism and unbelief so characteristic of Bazaroff represents a powerful defence-reaction against the bonds unconsciously attaching him to his parents. E. J.

BOOK REVIEWS

BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE. By Sigm. Freud. M.D., LL.D. Translated by C. J. M. Hubback. (International Psycho-Analytical Press. 1922. Pp. 83. Price 6s.)

In a series of his later writings, originally planned under the title of 'Introduction to a Metapsychology', Freud proposed to himself the task of a systematic completion of psycho-analysis by 'an elucidation and deepening' of its theoretical premises. The great development of the psycho-analytical movement and the abundance of experimental material already secured were enough to warrant such an undertaking, but no doubt it also had its origin in the justifiable wish to place the work of a life-time in a permanent framework. Owing to the well-known classical method of the author, by which not more than one step forward is ever made from an assured basis of fact into general theory, it came about that while many problems had been advanced and elucidated to some degree others had merely been sketched in the barest outline. In both cases the awakened interest of the reader was led to expect a future continuation of the line of thought taken up. And in fact each new work, as it handled the great problem of the psychic mechanisms from different aspects, extended further or more exactly formulated what had been already stated, and also usually provided a new and hitherto unnoticed problem. This method of advancing a young science, established and derived as it is from the forces innate in the science itself, is satisfactory to all except those who are unwilling to take full account of the situation. Psycho-analysis is in the first instance an empirical science—so far as the description is suitable—approaching psychic phenomena in the first place impartially and letting the facts speak for themselves. Arrangement and structure of the material so afforded was subsequently demanded, when it proved that analytical experience could be employed methodically. What was recognised as conforming to rule bestowed form on the material presented, whereby it could be compared with similar phenomena, and be measured and tested by them again. Observation as such remained of the first importance; so long as the facts were not displaced, the point from which they were reviewed could be chosen according to theoretic considerations.

If such criteria are applied to the development of psycho-analysis up to the present time, it must be admitted that its fundamentals, contained as they are in the material supplied by observations, have not changed,

and that progress has been rendered possible by a theory which, where applicable, is more in the nature of a concise and clear marshalling of the facts than of any direct moulding of them.

The essential complexes, such as the psychic determination of 'functional' forms of disease, the idea of infantile sexuality, dream-making as the work of the unconscious, and the latter as an explanation of symptomatology as a whole—all these now have a nomenclature but depend as always on their content for their validity.

The concept of sexuality has received an extension of the original formula by the introduction of narcissism, and the theory of the instincts by the recognition of separate 'ego-instincts'. To all appearance, however, this last theoretical assumption is not yet conclusively proved. Within the sphere of practice comes the substitution of the 'abreaction' formula as a principle of therapy by the recognition of the unlimited possibilities of transference phenomena. It is unnecessary to emphasise further the good results of this new departure: very substantial progress has thereby been effected. The recently inaugurated 'active therapy' demands no modification of the analytical attitude, its sole intention being to give a more decided impetus to the endless course of the purely explorative work by a utilisation of certain transference forces, and at the same time to serve the purpose of that need for practical measures which indeed predominantly makes an analysis possible.

This brings us to the principal theme of the treatise under consideration, but our attention must not be engaged by the first impression, when what is at issue is a more profound modification of our views concerning mental operations. 'In the psycho-analytical theory of the mind we take it for granted that the course of mental processes is automatically regulated by "the pleasure-principle"; that is to say, we believe that any given process originates in an unpleasant state of tension and thereupon determines for itself such a path that its ultimate issue coincides with a relaxation of this tension, i. e. with avoidance of "pain" or with production of pleasure' (p. 1). In this opening sentence, Freud gives us an exact and precise summary of the part played by pleasure in the chain of psychic events. This part is, as will be shown almost immediately, an economic one; it does not bring about the event—it is important to recognise this—but merely conditions its direction and has besides a definite effect on the time of occurrence. We must openly admit that such an exact formulation differs a little from the earlier ones (cf. 'Formulierungen über die zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens', Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre, III., 1913). Although the function of the pleasure-principle has been long and fully admitted as part of the demonstrative proof of analysis, it has never attained to the status of a law; it was merely a heuristic judgement, that is a partial generalisation with all the characteristics of a preliminary

survey. The proposition of a 'reality-principle' too, regarded as a piece of scientific theory, lacked the necessary unambiguity and clearness: it clung too closely to details, and for that reason ignored important criteria. Fundamentally it is again the time-element (the check to the claim made by instinct for realisation) that is finally decisive in establishing its distinction from the pleasure-principle.

A degree of indeterminateness of this kind in the formulation of a conception can, however, only temporarily obscure the outlook: the fundamental facts remain and themselves provide the explanation. The introduction of the economic point of view led to the recognition that the pleasure-principle remained predominant for the direction taken by the psychic processes, but this did not imply as a necessary corollary that the psychic processes made their appearance as an outcome of the pleasure-principle. The force that releases them may be something quite different. At this point Freud has taken up the novel considerations which emerge from the recognition that something lies 'Beyond the Pleasure-Principle'. The lines along which such a conclusion has been reached can be accurately traced. Psycho-analysis of the so-called traumatic neuroses revealed a psychic fixation of the patient on the trauma, which did not as a rule manifest itself in waking life (in conversion-hysteria symptoms the fixation is clearly present), but which on the other hand is invariably lived over again in dreams. 'This fact has caused less surprise than it merits.'

The wish-fulfilment tendency of dreams would surely be better served by the reflection of images 'from the time of his normal health or of his hoped-for recovery' (p. 10). Since the patient uses no such mode of satisfaction, it would seem that he is under the dominance of a more powerful compulsion. Here Freud breaks off and follows up instead the clue afforded by a child's game. A very striking piece of observation led him to establish the fact that the infantile psyche is able to dispose of painful experiences by repeating the experience as a game. The passive rôle in the child is thereby exchanged for an active part (pp. 13, 14). Freud considers that the observed data of the traumatic neuroses together with those of children's play are not so entirely free from ambiguity as to necessitate a provisional abandonment of the primary significance of the pleasure-principle, but that nevertheless it has become problematic. Approach from a third side then proved itself as the most promising in the way of results. Freud turned to a phenomenon that, in every analysis that is carried down to a certain depth, makes its appearance as regularly as do the transference-phenomena and, moreover, in relation to it: viz. the curious tendency of the patient 'to *repeat* as a current experience what is repressed, instead of, as the physician would prefer to see him do, *recollecting* it as a fragment of the past' (p. 18). This 'repetition-compulsion' 'also revives

experiences of the past . . . which could at no time have been satisfactions, even of impulses since repressed' (p. 20). In a convincing exposition Freud shows that such manifestations are always concerned with the typical situations of infantile sex-life, which has this peculiar compulsive character of tending to be revived as an experience.

The familiar examples are thus brought into a new light. A brief reflection then shows that in ordinary life among people who are not neurotic there also prevails a similar compulsion, which continually leads back into the same situations in life; this is external to analysis and is simply one of the forms taken by human character. Where this 'endless repetition of the same' is passively experienced, there results a profound sense of a daemonic trend in existence. 'In the light of such observations as these, drawn from behaviour during transference and from the fate of human beings, we may venture to make the assumption that there really exists in psychic life a repetition-compulsion, which goes beyond the pleasure-principle. We shall now also feel disposed to relate to this compelling force the dreams of shock-patients and the play-impulse in children. We must of course remind ourselves that only in rare cases can we recognise the workings of this repetition-compulsion in a pure form, without the co-operation of other motives.... There remains enough over to justify the assumption of a repetition-compulsion, and this seems to us more primitive, more elementary, more instinctive than the pleasure-principle which is displaced by it. But if there is such a repetition-compulsion in psychic life, we should naturally like to know with what function it corresponds, under what conditions it may appear, and in what relation it stands to the pleasure-principle, to which we have heretofore ascribed the domination over the course of the processes of excitation in the psychic life' (pp. 24, 25).

The conclusions reached by Freud up to this point are such as readily admit of clinical investigation and confirmation, and depend in the main on observed material of a thoroughly familiar kind. The method alone is a new one, in accordance with which Freud summarises his earlier detailed observations and establishes legitimate conclusions on the basis they afford. Clearly he does not find sufficient warrant for assuming the repetition-compulsion as one of the acknowledged phenomena of the psychic life: observations of the most self-evident kind may still be deceptive and a typical feature is not necessarily a law. Only the scientific co-ordination of the empirical with the fundamental facts of the psychical processes, with the functions of the systems of consciousness and with the manifestations of instinct can ensure validity to the principle. To base his assumption Freud goes far afield, yet not without at the same time giving us an abundance of fresh insight.

He pursues the investigation with a psycho-analytic systematisation of the problem of consciousness. His exposition is in all respects the

logical outcome of the works mentioned in the opening paragraph of this review and the results of these are taken as a basis. As to consciousness we assume that it registers the excitations (stimuli) streaming in from the external world, and also the feelings of pleasure and pain which are derived from within the psychic apparatus (instincts). From this the position in space of the conscious system may be deduced: 'It must lie on the boundary between the outer and inner, must face towards the outer world, and must envelop the other psychic systems' (p. 26). This metapsychological description, as Freud designates it, is in striking agreement with the localisation of cerebral anatomy, according to which consciousness is referred to the superficial layer of the brain. From this position a second, no less important characteristic of the system of consciousness becomes explicable. Psycho-analytic experience has shown 'that all excitation processes in the other systems leave in them permanent traces forming the foundations of memory-records which have nothing to do with the question of becoming conscious. They are often strongest and most enduring when the process that left them behind never reached consciousness at all' (p. 27). On other grounds too, more particularly the economic (in accordance with which consciousness, owing to its exposed position, must remain permanently free to receive new excitations) we must necessarily infer that this system is relieved of the memory records. 'If one reflects how little we know from other sources about the origin of consciousness, the pronouncement that *consciousness arises in the place of the memory-traces* must be conceded at least the importance of a statement which is to some extent definite' (p. 28). With the help of a hypothetical example from the mechanism of evolution Freud seeks to give further precision to his train of thought. In essence these lead to the assumption of a 'protection against stimulation', which is made necessary by the localization of consciousness if it is not to be pressed out of existence by the overpowering energies of the outer world. The connection of the externally-localized sense organs with consciousness furnishes us with an explanation of the way such a protective barrier was gradually formed. Freud gives a very effective description of the functions of the sense organs; according to his exposition of the subject it is characteristic of them 'that they assimilate only very small quantities of the outer stimulus, and take in only samples of the outer world; one might compare them to antennae which touch at the outer world and then constantly withdraw from it again' (pp. 31-2).

When this addition to knowledge has been assimilated a more exact comprehension of the traumatic neuroses becomes possible, in respect to their mode of origin. 'Such external excitations as are strong enough to break through the barrier against stimuli we call traumatic' (p. 34). As soon as the psychic apparatus is flooded with these crowding stimuli

the urgent task of 'binding' the surplus masses instantly arises. In *pain,* a problem which has repeatedly emerged in earlier expositions, Freud recognises as it were a signal from the place of eruption of the stimulus, to meet which 'an immense countercharge'—that is, an extensive draining of other psychic systems—must be set up. The binding of the stimulus, in which lies the true function of the pathological condition, consists in a translation of the energy streaming *into* the psychic apparatus from the free-flowing to the quiescent state. It is in Freud's opinion much to be regretted that our still very defective knowledge of the laws of biology does not allow of our expressing these relations of physiological chemical formulae in any clearer way, because 'the nature of the excitation process in the elements of the psychic systems' is entirely unknown to us (p. 35). From a comparison with the old 'shock' theory Freud succeeds in carrying further and widening the new view of the traumatic neuroses. It is an important fact that in this view the significance of the pleasure-principle is relegated to the background.

The discussions which follow, together with their surprising conclusions, form by far the most interesting part of the treatise. Here numerous avenues for constructive thought are opened and unsuspected bases for research laid bare, promising clear gain to the theory of psycho-analysis; but these will again bring down on it the criticisms of its opponents, whose heavy artillery is not to be silenced even when directed against its most valuable achievements. These critics will certainly not omit to designate Freud's recent pronouncements as speculations which are quite outside discussion. It must be allowed, however, that it is a very different thing to put forward without prejudice the results of observation or to take a tract of accumulated experience and fortify it with a theory. Every distinguished scientific investigator should be allowed the right to relieve the assiduous toil of detailed work with an occasional outlook into the general. The elasticity of a scientific theory is partly dependent on such animating from time to time.

To proceed with the epitome. Freud now makes use of the conditions observed in the traumatic neuroses in an original way, comparing the possible effects of a trauma with the instinctual excitations of living substances. This is, as we shall see, an idea with far-reaching implications. 'The fact that the sensitive cortical layer has no protective barrier against excitations emanating from within will have one inevitable consequence: viz. that these transmissions of stimuli acquire increased economic significance and frequently give rise to economic disturbances comparable to the traumatic neuroses. The most prolific sources of such inner excitations are the so-called instincts of the organism, the representatives of all forces arising within the body and transmitted to the

psychic apparatus—the most important and most obscure element in psychological research' (p. 41). The impulse striving for discharge can approach it only through the unconscious and follows, as does the latter, the lines of the 'primary process'; that is to say, using similar phraseology, it represents an unbound, freely-moving charge, which has to be mastered by the psychic apparatus before it can be accommodated to the pleasure-principle. Its independence of the latter expresses itself precisely in its obedience to the repetition-compulsion. If an attempt is made to comprehend in one principle the relevant clinical experiences especially the earliest childish activities (play) and the reproductions from infantile life that appear in transference, the following important questions arise: 'In what way is the instinctive connected with the compulsion to repetition? At this point the idea is forced upon us that we have stumbled on the trace of a general and hitherto not clearly recognised —or at least not expressly emphasised—characteristic of instinct, perhaps of all organic life. According to this, *an instinct would be a tendency innate in the living organic matter impelling it towards the reinstatement of an earlier condition,* one which it had to abandon under the influence of external disturbing forces—a kind of organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the manifestation of inertia in organic life' (pp. 44-5).

This is a preliminary reply, in which 'the expression of the conservative nature of living beings' seems to be taken as a starting-point. The trend of instincts towards development is only apparent; in reality we must recognise, for example, 'that in the phenomena of heredity and in the facts of embryology we have most impressive proofs of the organic compulsion to repetition' (p. 45). Such arguments should merely justify the direction in which we look for proof. The final conclusion regarding the question raised leads to establishing the *regressive* character of instinct and is given by Freud in the following words: 'If then all organic instincts are conservative, historically acquired, and are directed towards regression, towards reinstatement of something earlier, we are obliged to place all results of an organic development to the credit of external, disturbing and distracting influences. The rudimentary creature would from its very beginning not have wanted to change, would, if circumstances had remained the same, have always merely repeated the same course of existence. But in the last resort it must have been the evolution of our earth, and its relation to the sun, that has left its imprint on the development of organism. The conservative organic instincts have absorbed every one of these enforced alterations in the course of life and have stored them for repetition; they thus present the delusive appearance of forces striving after change and progress, while they are merely endeavouring to reach an old goal by ways both old and new. This final goal of all organic striving can be stated too. It would be counter to the conservative nature of instinct if

the goal of life were a state never hitherto reached. It must rather be an ancient starting-point, which the living being left long ago, and to which it harks back again by all the circuitous paths of development. If we may assume as an experience admitting of no exception that everything living dies from causes within itself, and returns to the inorganic, we can only say "*The goal of all life is death*", and, casting back, "*The inanimate was there before the animate*"' (pp. 46–7).

In all vital phenomena, whatever the intensity with which they are manifested, we are thus able to recognise only a circuitous route to death, which is prepared for step by step and assured by the conservative instincts, as though it were the fulfilment of an immanent law. Fortunately, however, a theoretic conclusion of this kind cannot be regarded as unassailable in the face of the sexual instinct, or rather of the nuclear cells, whose fate depends on the sexual instinct. Biological research has for long supposed them to be the carriers of a potential immortality; which, with the help of 'their inherited and newly-acquired instinctive dispositions', are capable of detachment from the mortal organism and comply with the immanent law of death only after they have again built up a living body. 'Of the highest significance is the fact that the reproductive cell is fortified for this function, or only becomes capable of it, by mingling with another like it and yet different from it' (p. 50). These instincts which ensure and protect the union of the germ-cells are the sexual instincts. 'They are the actual life-instincts; the fact that they run counter to the trend of the other instincts which lead towards death indicates the contradiction between them and the rest, one which the theory of neuroses has recognised as full of significance. There is as it were an oscillating rhythm in the life of organisms: the one group of instincts presses forward to reach the final goal of life as quickly as possible, the other flies back at a certain point on the way only to traverse the same stretch once more from a given spot and thus to prolong the duration of the journey. Although sexuality and the distinction of the sexes certainly did not exist at the dawn of life, nevertheless it remains possible that the instincts which are later described as sexual were active from the very beginning and took up the part of opposition to the rôle of the "ego-instincts" then, and not only at some later time' (p. 51).

We cannot conceal from ourselves that in spite of the persuasive force of this train of ideas an extraordinary difficulty is encountered when we try to identify the actual conditions. Let us recall in this connection that the opposition between sexual instincts and ego-instincts has been gradually obliterated, in spite of the original sharp distinction between the two (especially in the pathology of the psycho-neuroses), since on closer observation a libidinal component had to be admitted even within the so-called ego-instinct. The hypothesis of this opposition

undoubtedly enabled us to obtain a comprehension and grasp of numerous manifestations of mental life; but it was never possible exactly to describe the actual residue of the ego-instinct when the libidinal component had been subtracted, which would justify the continued use of the term. Now, however, the problem of the compulsion to repetition, the existence of which we cannot deny and which we can only explain through the tendency of all organic nature to regress into a state of inanimate being, leads us to a revised assumption concerning the ego-instinct, as guaranteeing death[1] by its very existence, whereas the sexual instincts urge towards the maintenance of life. Such an 'exquisitely dualistic conception' governing instinctual life is a postulate of psychology: its application to the facts of biological research, particularly in reference to the protozoa, Freud is obliged to describe as uncertain.

'At this point the doubt may then occur to us whether any good purpose has been served in looking for the answer to the question as to natural death in the study of the protozoa. The primitive organisation of these forms of life may conceal from us important conditions which are present in them too, but can be recognised only among the higher animals where they have achieved for themselves a morphological expression. If we abandon the morphological point of view for the dynamic, it may be a matter of entire indifference to us whether the natural death of the protozoa can be proved or not. With them the substance later recognised as immortal has not yet separated itself in any way from the part subject to death. The instinctive forces which endeavour to conduct life to death might be active in them too from the beginning and yet their effect might be so obscured by that of the forces tending to preserve life that any direct evidence of their existence becomes hard to establish.... Our expectation that biology would entirely put out of court any recognition of the death-instincts has not been fulfilled. It is open to us to occupy ourselves further with this possibility, if we have other reasons for doing so. The striking resemblance between Weismann's separation of soma and germ-plasm and our distinction between the death and the life-instincts remains unshaken, however, and retains its value' (pp. 61, 62).

In place of strict proofs, which are not forthcoming, we are presented with an efficient psychology equipped with all the accessories required to solve the many pressing problems which lie within this sphere of knowledge. In this section Freud's line of argument takes on an entirely provisional character and ranges freely; it is, however, extraordinarily stimulating in its revelation of a brilliant intellect

[1] In an ingenious article by Georg Simmel this idea has been roughly formulated. Death as an immanent force makes individual development possible and as its framework raises it to its loftiest activity. (Zur Metaphysik des Todes.)

untiringly renewing the attack upon problems which it cannot leave alone. We may quote two suggestive passages which are especially full of significance. In the first the attempt is made 'to transfer the Libido theory yielded by psycho-analysis to the relationship of the cells to one another and to imagine that it is the vital or sexual instincts active in every cell that take the other cells for their "object", partially neutralise their death instincts, i.e. the processes stimulated by these, and to preserve those cells in life, while other cells do the same for them, and still others sacrifice themselves in the exercise of this libidinous function. The germ cells themselves would behave in a completely "narcissistic" fashion, as we are accustomed to describe it in the theory of the neuroses when an individual concentrates his libido on the ego, and gives out none of it for the charging of objects. The germ cells need their libido —the activity of their vital instincts—for themselves as a provision for their later enormous constructive activity.... Thus the Libido of our sexual instincts would coincide with the Eros of poets and philosophers, which holds together all things living' (pp. 63–4).

The other suggestive passage concerns a new departure in regard to the sadistic component-instinct, according to which it may be recognised as a death-instinct which has been expelled from the ego and becomes manifest only in relation to an object (p. 68 et seq.). A confirmation of this brilliant assumption would lie in the fact that the oral instinct, which is undoubtedly the forerunner of the sadistic, is similarly directed to the annihilation of the object.

In spite of all these discussions the actual problem has not yet been reached. The ego instincts which lead towards death betray their descent from the inorganic stage in the repetition-compulsion. It still remains an open question, however, how the origin of sexual propagation —the mingling of two cells—and the source of the sexual instincts which work against the forces of death are to be conceived. Referring to Plato's well-known Eros theory, Freud gives the generally accepted reply. 'Are we to follow the clue of the poet-philosopher and make the daring assumption that living substance was at the time of its animation rent into small particles, which since that time strive for reunion by means of the sexual instincts? That these instincts—in which the chemical affinity of inanimate matter is continued—passing through the realm of the protozoa gradually overcome all hindrances set to their striving by an environment charged with stimuli dangerous to life, and are impelled by it to form a protecting covering layer? And that these dispersed fragments of living substance thus achieve a multicellular organisation, and finally transfer to the germ-cells in a highly concentrated form the instinct for reunion? I think this is the point at which to break off' (pp. 75–6).

The value of speculative conclusion of the work under review is apparent when we reflect that the assumption of a death-instinct existing from the beginning of things is only conceivable along with that of a life-instinct which arose at the same time. It may be possible from some such standpoint to reconcile the contradictions which even a brilliant dialectic has been obliged to leave standing in the course of presentation.

In this brief summary of the course of the argument in the work under review critical remarks have only been inserted at certain points in a cursory manner. It is now perhaps opportune to make up for this deficiency and to pronounce more clearly on the place these ideas take in the structure of psycho-analytical theory, and on their significance in determining the direction along which progress will be made. Here however we receive a check owing to difficulties which cannot be overlooked. In the first place we are obliged to admit that these propositions have an only partly valuable character, in so far as they represent a theoretical superstructure built on assured and tested observations; in many respects however they anticipate these latter and are merely 'points of view' (*Anschauungen*), with which a philosophy seeking to account for the sum of things probably works. There is, as we noted in the introduction, an unmistakable tendency towards finding some comprehensive view of the things which the writer had been occupied with for several decades. Criticism has to take this circumstance into consideration, since it has in consequence to deliver judgement on the different planes of a scientific handling of the subject and a philosophic one. It is not difficult to see where this change of critical standpoint should be made. So long as it is a matter of the ways in which instinctual life finds its expression and of the laws to which it is subject, the author stands on the firm footing of the data given; he collects his facts with a sure grasp, and dissects the material which we have daily to deal with in psycho-analytic work. While we can bring in our experiences to support the evidence, it is an easy matter for us to give the author our full concurrence and agreement. Further on, where the discussion turns on the possible origin of the instincts, the empirical facts prove insufficient, and a wide scope is opened for speculation. Different sides will be taken according to disposition or temperament, but in the end only intuition can enter the lists against intuition. Or should we leave it to the advance of psycho-analysis to make it clear how far the material that further experience may yield will admit of reconciliation with these broadly outlined ideas?

We cannot conclude this appreciation without remarking on the characteristic method of exposition which Freud is accustomed to employ, extending to the shape in which the material he has to present is cast. This makes possible on the one hand a better understanding of the pro-

cesses under discussion, and of the way in which authoritative conclusions are contained in them; on the other hand it excuses criticism, which is not always capable of reproducing this description exactly or of doing complete justice in the reproduction to the theory built on it. It is an essential feature of Freud's literary method, resembling as it does that of art and philosophy, that the principal conclusions are embedded in the material of the exposition, that is to say, in the context and lose much of their pulsating force when defined as isolated conceptions. They can only so to speak be lifted with the clod of earth in which they have grown, and in such a manner be transplanted; psychological truths demand the hand of a cautious gardener, otherwise they wilt and wither beyond hope of rescue in the atmosphere of everyday banalities. If then we have not succeeded in bringing out to the full the leading *motifs* of this contribution, our justification must lie in the peculiarity of the text just described. Considerable space has been devoted to the actual text of the original, and possibly our critical remarks have been in this way unduly extended, but we must hope to have avoided at least partially the errors referred to earlier.

It remains to comment on the numerous suggestive ideas which we find up and down in this latest study of Freud's in addition to the main theme of the discussion. They are treasure-troves in themselves, and offer a wide field of work for analysts. We will confine ourselves here to a brief mention of what we were obliged to omit previously for the sake of clearness. Among the most important is the repeated emphasis on the necessity for analytic testing of our perception of time; we have frequently called attention to the fact that a correct view of this would enable the proper rôle of the pleasure-principle to be established. In the same way, we shall come upon much which admits of elaboration in relation to the psychology of the mental process of projection, and in regard to the sensation of pain. The problem of the repetition-compulsion which has a foremost place throughout is by no means exhausted by what has been already adduced. In the passage relating to the play of children there is a noteworthy hint that this conclusion renders superfluous the theory of a special 'imitation instinct' which is so dear to the psychologists of child nature. The possible operations of the repetition-compulsion extend far beyond psychic life, in accordance with its primitive nature. May not the rhythmic nature of many vital processes be brought into connection with it? (Respiration, pulsation etc.) Its influence on the origin of the psychic processes also remains to be investigated. Our previous analytic knowledge has led us to conjecture that the directions of instinct are always decisive for the transmutation of vital into psychic energy, or put otherwise, that the mind is as it were, entrenched on the directions of instinct. In the repetition-compulsion, as it presents itself for example in analysis, we see a peculiar

twist: the instinct expresses itself as such and not in its psychic, or higher transmutation. But above all in this last work Freud shows himself to be the physician *par excellence,* whose abundant experience has laid a solid foundation for a bold theory. Only such a one wrote these words 'The clinical picture of traumatic neuroses approaches that of hysteria in its wealth of similar motor symptoms, but usually surpasses it in its strongly marked signs of subjective suffering—in this resembling rather hypochondria or melancholia, and in the evidences of a far more comprehensive general weakening and shattering of the mental functions' (p. 8). Anyone who is capable or merely desirous of full comprehension of this saying, spoken by a mature and humane investigator, will gladly also engage on the difficult paths of theory.

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THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC STUDY OF THE FAMILY. By J. C. Flügel. (International Psycho-Analytical Library No. 3. International Psycho-Analytical Press, London. 1921. vii+259. Price 10s. 6d.)

Anybody who reads merely the title of this book will be struck by the immense field the author intends to cover and on second consideration we shall be even more impressed by the importance and scope of the subject. For we might say that the most important result of psycho-analytic research is to have discovered a prehistorical—because repressed—period in the history of the individual and the race, one at which all those relations which we observe between human beings—direct sexual attachment, hate and rivalry, union and social feeling (i.e. indirect sexual attachment)—were being formed in the family circle. The ambitious aim of the author is therefore to give an exposition of the very pith and kernel of psycho-analysis and we can only say that the book is quite admirable from this point of view. Other summaries of the subject are principally written for the medical student; here we have a handbook which divides its attention between neurology, sociology and anthropology in an impartial and illuminating manner.

The author leads us through well-known fields and expounds them in a manner calculated, at least partly, to overcome the natural resistance felt by the student and general reader when he finds himself compelled to face hard facts such as hatred in the family circle, the Oedipus-complex etc. Children express their views openly on these questions: 'Thus a small boy of five known to the writer solemnly assured his mother that now that his father was permanently away, it would be only right for her to marry him, her son, instead' (p. 18). But foolish grown-ups don't know how much they can learn from their wise infants. Flügel always offers interesting and frequently original remarks. He

regards the element of reverence and admiration found in the loves of young persons and adults as derived from the relation of the child to its parents, but we must add that the quantities of libido withdrawn from the ego and transferred to the object of love would also lead to this overestimation of the latter at the expense of the former.[1] Cyril Burt is quoted in connection with the transference of the Father-*imago*. He distinguishes two phases of development: in children between four and nine there is a displacement of erotic aspects to some older person of the opposite sex while the tenderness is still connected with the parent, whereas with children between ten and adolescence the new love objects are in their turn invested with the tender feelings. Perhaps the first phase corresponds to a definite social institution in phylogenesis. This would be the type of marriage in which 'the maternal grandfather and his daughter's daughter are potential consorts'.[2] The ultimate aim of development would seem to be the complete absence of infantile (i.e. incest) motives in the choice of the love-partner (p. 30), but I think we may well doubt the existence of such cases and postulate the latent working of the parent-*imago* in every love relation, although of course the effect may manifest itself either in a positive or a negative direction as a tendency to endo- or exogamic union.

With true scientific impartiality the author finds a grain of truth in the fog of Jungian mysticism, viz. that the incest-complex may contain besides its original, directly sexual, meaning a functional representation of natural inertia of the tendency to shirk the life-task and remain in the original position of dependence on the parents (p. 38). However in this case we ought to say rather that the tendency to shirk the 'life-task' is due to incestuous fixation to the parents and to a strong narcissism which withholds the libido, stores it up in the ego, and refuses to allow it to overflow towards new objects. Chapter V deals with the necessity of gradual emancipation from parental authority. 'The rapidity with which, and the extent to which, a child attains to independence in relation to his family, are to a large extent prophetic of the subsequent attainment of independence towards the world at large' (p. 47). In Chapters VI and VII (Abnormalities and Varieties of Development.—Love and Hate—Dependence Aspects) we have an exposition of the general points of view of psycho-analysis with perhaps somewhat greater stress laid on the sociological and rationalistic (i.e. not purely libidinal) sides of these questions than we should expect from a psycho-analytic author. In Chapters VIII and IX (Ideas of Birth and Pre-Natal Life, The Psychology of Initiation and Initiation Rites) anthropology predominates. We shall have occasion to show,

[1] See Freud: Zur Einführung des Narzissmus. 1914. In Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre. 1918. Vierte Folge. S. 107.

[2] W. H. R. Rivers: The History of Melanesian Society. 1914. Vol. II. p. 47.

in another work, how the general opinion of psycho-analysis on intra-uterine life as the source of belief in a continuance of life after death (pp. 68—9) can be definitely demonstrated from anthropological data. Behind the ideas of spiritual (Jung) and physical rebirth (Frazer) the author regularly expects to find the incestuous aspect of uterine regression (p. 73). Flügel's remarks on initiation are a summary and frequently a more detailed elaboration of Reik's views. (cf. for instance p. 85 on the various forms of, and motives for, castration rites.) The subtle influence exerted by incestuous and narcissistic tendencies in the choice of partners in love-life certainly helps to maintain racial types (p. 105), a phenomenon of great importance which has hitherto not received the attention it deserves in anthropology.[1] The cultural overestimation of chastity is probably due to two factors; according to the masculine point of view it is associated with the resentment felt by the male child at the idea of the mother giving herself away to the father (p. 115), while if considered from the feminine aspect it appears as a narcissistic resistance against object-love.[2]

The immense social importance of the displacement of parent-hatred to the representatives of the father-*imago* as the primary affective motor of revolution (pp. 118, 119) is a subject which the historian of the future will have frequent occasion to meditate on. Indeed it is no exaggeration to regard every revolution as a repetition of 'man's first disobedience' in the Cyclopean Family. The medical practitioner as a parent substitute (p. 120) opens up one of the pathways which lead to an understanding of primitive magical practitioners; we only mention the constant connection between old age and the office of medicine-man.[3] Home, town, the Church and Nature are mother-symbols, the family and school may be ambisexual or represent either parent in a predominant degree. The maternal aspect of the state in democratic communities as contrasted with the importance of the father-*imago* in anti-democratic states (the Kaiser, the Czar) is certainly very striking (p. 127); it is probable that a gradual dissipation of the more repressive features of the father-*imago* and a gradual return of repressed elements will in the future help to maintain a sort of equilibrium in the social fabric, though of course society is impossible without some sort of coercion and authority. Flügel's searching analysis of the customs connected with royalty deserves special attention and approval. He shows the aggressive basis of the taboos with which primitive kings are surrounded under the guise of deep consideration for the king's welfare and

[1] cf., however, R. Thurnwald: Die Gemeinde des Bánaro. 1921, S. 202, 252.

[2] cf. Freud: Das Tabu der Virginität. Sammlung kleiner Schriften. Vierte Folge. 1918. S. 229.

[3] cf. Róheim: Primitive Man and Environment. This JOURNAL 1921. Vol. II. p. 175.

enumerates the chief points which compel us to identify regicide and parricide, viz.: that the murderer is frequently the person who succeeds to the throne, the sacrifice of a king's son to prolong his own life, the connection of real or symbolic regicide with a sexual orgy, the marriage of the successor to the royal widow (frequently his stepmother, in the case of Oedipus his own mother) and the close connection between royal power and sexual activity.[4]

The treatment of the part played by the parent-regarding tendencies in religion is not quite satisfactory; unless we misunderstand the author, he seems to regard it as sufficient to show how the father-*imago* becomes displaced on the deity-concept, but lays no stress on the origin of the latter from contrition as a reaction-formation in the Brother Horde after the murder of the jealous Sire. On the whole, however, the chapter on the part played by the '*imagines*' of the parents in religion is a good summary of our psycho-analytical views on these questions and contains much that is original (cf. p. 136, 'The All-Father', p. 143, 'moral dualism in religion'). The Protestant movement is explained as an effort to eliminate the mother element and revert to a more archaic and repressive religious attitude (p. 145. cf. the well-known connecting links between Protestantism and Judaism). We are tempted to remark in this connection that there seems to be a certain correlation between the attitude adopted towards the earthly and divine representatives of the Father-*imago* in the sense that the Son-Religion will often sublimate large amounts of revolutionary energy by diverting it from the person of the earthly to that of the heavenly father, from the realm of direct action to that of pure imagination and hallucinatory wish-fulfilment. The Jewish masses are disappointed when they find that Jesus of Nazareth refuses to lead them against the Emperor; what really happens is that the chaotic forces of social discontent are being sublimated into a movement which changes the aspect of things from within instead of from without. Although a rule with many exceptions, we may yet say that

[4] The reviewer published a Hungarian paper on this subject in 1917; for a summary of the contents see this JOURNAL, current volume pp. 199-201. Coronation is really an inhibited regicide; the human sacrifices at coronation in Tahiti may be interpreted as substitutes for regicide. The act of coronation is concluded by a dance of naked men and women round the king, they all try to touch him with their genital organs and to soil his person with their urine and excrements. (Moerenhout: 'Voyages aux îles du grand océan'. Paris. 1837. II. p. 27. quoted by Waitz-Gerland: Anthropologie der Naturvölker. 1872. VI. S. 198) Here we have a transference from father to king not only of the aggressive but also of the erotic elements of the Oedipus complex. As for the partial impulses concerned we note that the king throws money among the people at the Hungarian coronation: a reversal and sublimation (money replaces excrements) of the Polynesian custom.

Protestant countries with their tendency to revert to a more exclusive Father-Religion are less likely to endure a tyrannical earthly ruler than Catholic ones, where the filial and mother regarding elements have a free outlet in religious wish-fulfilment. The doctrine of immaculate conception is referred to the desire to remove the father and all other men from the person of the adored mother (p. 146). We can go even further and show that 'no intercourse' means 'incestuous intercourse' and the idea of supernatural birth is always a repression of the incest-wish with a return of repressed elements in the person of the God-Father, Alcheringa Ancestor, etc.

The interpretation of certain well-known features of Greek mythology, Christian doctrine and ritual (Death of Christ, p. 148, Communion, pp. 150, 151) are well worth reading. Besides resuming the accepted views of psycho-analysis on these subjects, the author makes many original remarks on the 'attitude of parents to children' (Ch. XIV) tracing the variations of the Oedipus complex together with its reaction formations, the displacements of love and antagonism through all possible situations in everyday life and custom. Having shown that the tendencies connected with the family are 'reducible upon analysis to a series of displacements of a very few original trends and impulses' (p. 175), he tries to form some theories on the part we must attribute to these tendencies in phylogenesis. One interesting contribution of the author to our speculative theories is his view that there existed an age in which parent-child jealousy was less pronounced than in the age which preceded and in that which succeeded it, when an effort was made by humanity to relax the family tie, reduce its importance in favour of those ties of common interest which unite the individual with the community (p. 179). There is very much to be said in favour of this view and, if we do not forget that he means by 'totemic age' totemic people who have emerged from a state of primitive monogamy and are below the level of the patriarchal family, we may fully accept his position. Only we must remember two things. One is that the 'totemic age' of the Wundtian terminology is something very different from the epoch when totemism must have originated, a confusion apt to occur especially in the mind of the psycho-analyst who is of course more familiar with totemism as presented in psycho-analytic literature than as an institution among living savages. The second qualification we should like to make on the author's opinion is that such a tendency, always based as it must be on a withdrawal of libido from the heterosexual object and a reinforcement of the narcissistic and homosexual trends (in their crude or sublimated aspects), must have occurred several times as one of the two principal directions of the swinging pendulum of human attitudes in the course of phylogenesis. Notably we shall

attempt to show in a subsequent publication that such an effort was first made in the dim prehistoric phase of humanity immediately after the Cyclopean family and that its survivals may still be traced in what is usually called group-marriage among savages. The present clan organisation—the social aspect of totemism being more prominent in this connection than the religious—would represent the second great move in this direction. It is well-known that totemism and initiation ceremonies frequently go together and Reik has already pointed to the tendency to sublimate the Oedipus complex by a reinforcement of the homo-erotic attitude especially in the second phase of initiation ceremonies.

Increase in the repression of intra-family hate manifestations is due rather to the operation of 'moral' factors than to any growth of tenderness between parent and child (p. 183); indeed primitive parents are quite as tender and loving in their way as civilised ones and many cases have been recorded of explorers who have won their way to the hearts of coloured mothers and the tribe in general through the smiles of the future savage cannibals. Taking his instances chiefly from the well-known collections of data supplied by Frazer, Flügel enumerates cases of incest among primitive peoples and explains exogamy as a repression of the formerly prevailing endogamic habits (pp. 195, 197). The problem whether, as the author assumes, there is a general sex-inhibition which reacts on the incest-tendencies (p. 214), or whether sex-inhibition is originally due to the fact that the incestuous impulses of the young males clash upon a powerful outer resistance in the person of the paternal tyrant and after having identified themselves with him make this resistance part and parcel of their own psychic equipment, may be discussed from many points of view. Probably the author is right in assuming an original contrast between Individuation (= narcissism 'storing impulse' as Stärcke calls it) and Genesis (= object-libido);[1] the secondary introjection of the father's personality in the cannibal meal serving to reinforce the narcissistic resistance on a higher level of psychic organisation.

The last chapters deal with the ethical and practical applications to be drawn from psycho-analytic research and are likely to appeal to the general reader. The general tendency of these applications is for gradual displacement of libidinous quantities from the more proximate to more removed objects; a displacement which, however, can never be complete, for resistance to change is the very foundation of human nature and indeed of nature at large. 'We can never root from our

[1] cf. Flügel: 'On the Biological Basis of Sexual Repression and its Sociological Significance', *British Journal of Psychology.* (*Medical Section*) 1921, Vol. I, p. 192; A. Stärcke: 'Psycho-Analysis and Psychiatry', This JOURNAL 1921, Vol. II, p. 399.

mind the tendencies connected with this most intimate and essential of human connections; and this being so, it would only be in accordance with the most fundamental promptings of our nature to permit a certain proportion of the energy involved in these tendencies to continue to flow in its original direction' (p. 239).

As a careful exposition of the results and views of psycho-analysis in general as well as an original contribution to the subject, the book will be welcome both to the general reader and to those who have worked in the same field. GÉZA RÓHE

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THE STORY OF A STYLE. A Psychoanalytic study of Woodrow Wilson. By William Bayard Hale. (B. W. Huebsch, Inc., New York. 1920. Pp. 303. Price 2 dollars.)

This is a remarkable and orginal study, written without any technical aid but with rare psychological insight. Apart from the subject-matter, it is also interesting in developing a fresh method of psychological investigation. It is an attempt to ascertain the psychological characteristics of a man, ex-President Wilson being chosen for the purpose, by a detailed examination of his language, a method which some day will be employed in the study of racial psychology, the differences between the English and American language naturally suggesting itself as a fruitful opportunity.

The material for the study is taken from Dr. Wilson's writings during the past forty years, but some of his speeches are also drawn upon. These have been studied with a minuteness so extraordinary as to presuppose an unusually strong interest as motive. To count the various adjectives employed in thousands of pages must alone have been an immense labour. In spite of all the author's protestations to the contrary it is hard not to believe that the motive was a hostile one, if only for the simple reason that throughout the book every conclusion drawn is an unfavourable one. The author applies an almost impossibly high standard to his material, making no allowances for the licence generally allowed to the utterances of politicians and treating them as though they should have been models of scientific accuracy and close thinking. As this standard is never applied in such spheres it seems a little unfair to expect it of a particular individual. Further, the author is at times distinctly pedantic, as when he maintains that a preposition at the end of a sentence is necessarily a sign of bad grammar.

Nevertheless, in spite of this unmistakable bias, it seems to us that the author has succeeded in proving his general thesis—namely, that it is possible to draw important inferences from a close study of a person's habitual language, and that in the case in question the general conclusions reached are the reverse of flattering. Even apart from the

particular conclusions drawn, however, the book is well worth reading for the psychological acumen displayed throughout and as an example of what can be done with the method here utilised. He rightly says, for instance (p. 15): 'It may be argued that when phrases become habitual, they lose their significance. The truth is they grow doubly significant. If we find that a certain set of phrases has become habitual with a writer, we are shown that the mental attitude or habit which they reveal has come in a noticeable degree to dominate his intellect'. And so, with a tireless energy, no indication of which can be conveyed in a review, he tracks down the characteristics of Dr. Wilson's phraseology, point by point, and pitilessly indicates the only conclusions that can be drawn from them.

The main ones are as follows. The subject is convicted—one can use no other term—of a love of words in its worst sense, as an escape from the facts of real life. He is prone to perseveration and repetition to an extent that indicates a slow-moving or tired brain. He uses inordinately a small stock of words and phrases that are, in most of their contexts, devoid of any meaning. He substitutes vague cloudy expressions for clear definite thoughts. He prefers pompous phrases of a pseudo-scholastic kind. Snobbishness, romanticism and obstinacy are prominent character traits, as are a marked tendency to aloofness and a total inability to understand how there can be any other view except the one he happens himself to hold at the moment.

The author's interpretation of these findings are that Dr. Wilson is a man of a less than mediocre mind, intellectually, and afflicted with a deep inner sense of doubt and inferiority, against which he has protectively developed such reaction-formations as over-emphatic assertiveness and dogmatism.

The sub-title of the book is scarcely justifiable. It is true that the author has evidently heard of psycho-analysis and here and there mentions it. It is also true that much of his mode of thinking is of the psycho-analytic kind and that here and there he shows considerable insight into psycho-analytical points of view: an instance of the latter is where he says, in speaking of the birth act (p. 200): 'Among all the later tragedies of life there is probably none greater than those which crowd the path of the infant's adjustment to the realities of mundane existence.' But, as will be seen from the final interpretations quoted above, his point of view seems to be Adlerian rather than Freudian, and no attempt is made to penetrate through the preconscious layer to the unconscious in the psycho-analytical sense. Otherwise he would surely have pointed out, for instance, the plain indications of a God complex in the evidence he presents. Still we repeat that the study is one of remarkable interest and displays great psychological as well as literary capacity. E. J.

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OUR INVISIBLE SELVES. An Introduction to Psychoanalysis. By Walter M. Gallichan. (Athletic Publications Ltd., London. 1922. Pp. 122. Price 2s.)

One more popular account of psycho-analysis. It is a quite adequate, though not particularly well-ordered account, and written with Mr. Gallichan's known capacity. It contains no serious inaccuracies and will doubtless succeed in its aim of popularising a knowledge of psycho-analysis. We would note one historical slip, on page 48; the case to which the author refers was treated forty-two years ago, not twenty-five years, and by Dr. Breuer alone, not by Freud in collaboration with Breuer. E. J.

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MYSTICISM, FREUDIANISM AND SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY. By Knight Dunlap, Professor of Experimental Psychology in the John Hopkins University, Baltimore. (C. V. Mosby Company. St. Louis. 1920. Pp. 173. Price 1.50 dollars.)

This is truly a *document humain*. For time to come it will serve to illustrate the way in which psycho-analysis was received by Scientific Psychology. We use initials for these holy words, as the author does, to shew him that we share his respect for them. They constitute the slogan with which he thunders and fulminates against the heresies of psycho-analysis. He belongs not to the newer type of critics who term Freud a genius but think he has 'overdone the unconscious'—to use the choice expression of another American professor of psychology—but to the good old school who see no merit whatever in psycho-analysis and would extirpate it root and branch as an evil thing.

A note of fear is struck at the outset. '(It) makes its immediate attack on the methods and results of scientific psychology . . . . The antagonism of spiritualism to science is more open and undisguised. Psychoanalysis, which attempts to creep in wearing the uniform of science, and to strangle it from the inside, is the more immediate danger, and spiritualism can wait' (p. 8). 'It is becoming as strongly entrenched as its several rivals in the field and bids fair to be a formidable obstacle in the pathway of science for some years to come' (p. 46).

Feeling strongly on the matter, the author sets out to rescue the Scientific Psychology so sore beset and with every device at his disposal appeals to his readers' prejudices, 'logical', professional, moral, and so on; when all else fails he stoops to vituperation. He alludes to psycho-analysis as 'the whole poisonous vine, with its tendrils threatening to grasp and choke all forms of learning' (p. 162); to psycho-analysts by implication as 'charlatans and teachers of superstition' (p. 173) or as people 'who do not understand the requirements of scientific reasoning and do not know the empirical basis of mental science' (p. 165).

Its effect on society 'is a part of the general problem of the circulations of pornographic literature, complicated, however, by the circumstance that a bolder front is put upon the salacious propaganda by the label of "psychology" or "science" . . . . Certainly the inculcation of Freudian principles should not be permitted to reach the very young, or the ignorant [!], any more than should obscene prints' (p. 105). He quotes an account of paranoiac delusions of reference as being 'perhaps the best description of the psychoanalytic method which has yet appeared' and courteously adds: 'In this connection, the delusions of grandeur and persecution, with inordinate jealousy, naively revealed in Freud's *History of Psychoanalysis,* are striking' (p. 84).

It would perhaps be kinder to leave such a book, which might well be entitled 'The Ravings of a Scientific Psychologist', to the oblivion it deserves, and Professor Dunlap may rest assured that there is no danger of a psycho-analyst requiting him in kind; contortions of the kind he displays are to them phenomena like any other, having, it is true, their own special interest. As, however, the arguments attempted elsewhere in the book also possess a certain interest we shall examine them with attention.

The book consists of three parts. In the first one a very readable, though brief, account is given of mysticism, its history and characteristics. The most salient of these, according to the author, is the view that there exists a third kind of knowledge, over and above the two recognised by science (perceptual and inferential), and higher in value than these. The acquirement of phenomenal knowledge by supernatural means, such as learning of someone's death through a vision, he terms 'pseudo-mysticism'. He considers that the typical mystical experience, with its ardent sense of union and its ecstasy which 'in many cases would pass equally well as a description of the sexual orgasm', is probably due to physiological conditions of a distinctly sexual nature (p. 40).

The fallacy known to logicians as the 'ambiguous middle term' is 'the characteristic logical mark of mysticism, and wherever employed in a fundamental way, it marks as mystical the scheme in which it functions' (p. 43).

The second, and largest, selection is devoted to psycho-analysis. In the first place, as usual, the conclusions of psycho-analysis are either not true or not new. 'Conscious activity in the past has its effects in both conscious and unconscious activity of the present, and non-conscious activity of the past may also have left an influence on conscious activity of the present. This is not a modern innovation or development, but has been the working basis of psychology for centuries' (p. 163). One has only to refer to pre-Freudian text-books of psychology to see how unblushingly false this statement is. Here and there, as rare exceptions, surmises may be found in them about the probable influence

of unconscious factors, but as to the nature of these factors, the way in which they operate, and the effects they produce our knowledge was of the slightest until psycho-analysis provided a technique for rendering them accessible to investigation. Again, 'the sex factor is, *as has long been acknowledged,*[1] one of the determining factors *in all conscious life.*[1] In the production of neuroses, it may perhaps be the most important factor of all' (p. 166). One can only wonder whom the author has in mind as acknowledging this estimation of the importance of sex, one going further than any psycho-analyst has ever maintained. The haste with which psychologists are now tumbling over each other to claim that 'they knew it all the time' is becoming positively unseemly, and can only raise surprise about the secrecy with which they previously kept all this knowledge to themselves.

It is more probable, however, that they do not realise the difference between this previous knowledge and the new knowledge they have even yet not acquired. How far Professor Dunlap, for instance, is from any actual knowledge of psycho-analytic work may be seen from one example alone: 'Nor was the situation to which the dream referred an unconscious one although the patient was not easily brought to the point of confessing it. This latter characteristic is true in my opinion of all the cases in which the Freudian analysis "strikes oil". The situation which is discovered through analysis is one which is perfectly well known to the patient' (p. 79). His pathetic ignorance of what happens in psycho-analytic treatment, as shewn in the following passage, needs only a touch of actual experience to reveal it in all its bareness: 'The patient, for example, is convinced that his neurosis is a result of the mother-complex; at first he is astonished at the psycho-analyst's discovery but by the copious use of symbolism, by the perversion of all the patient says and does, with that end in view, he is finally persuaded that the complex originated in him, and not in the psycho-analyst. By constant contemplation of the complex and its magic relationships, all the symptoms of the patient's troubles become closely associated with it. If now the psycho-analyst can exorcise the demon he has raised the patient may be cured. He has followed an ancient prescription and thrown the patient into fits; then cured the fits . . . In many cases, however the demon refuses to be exorcised or if he complacently leaves, returns shortly with 'seven worse than himself', and the latter state of the patient is worse than the first. It is apparently possible to restore by scientific treatment a patient who has been given a mother-complex by psychoanalysis; but the restoration is certainly a difficult process and the prognosis of the patient far less encouraging than for a patient who has not had psycho-analytic "help". It is probable that with the majority of candidates for psychoanalysis the complex is not developed in any serious sense. The

[1] Italics not in the original.

patient craves the personal interest of the psycho-analyst or other practitioner and accepts in a superficial way any suggestion made by the sympathetic listener, provided these suggestions have a certain flavour of profoundity and are vehicles of hope . . . The confessional of the church achieves the same result in a more scientific way' (pp. 102-4). We quote this medley of wholly unsupported mis-statements, which do not need detailed refutation here, only to demonstrate the author's unfamiliarity with the subject he is writing about; to anyone conversant with the facts themselves Professor Dunlap's remoteness from them is manifest.

The main thesis of the book is that psycho-analysis is a form of mysticism. To establish this the author has to relinquish, though not explicitly, his own excellent definition of mysticism, for it is plain that the psycho-analyst does not posit any special subjective experience, as all mystics do, nor does he lay claim to any third form of knowledge over and above the usual avenues of perception and inference. His observations may be erroneous and his inferences faulty, but this does not in itself constitute mysticism; gross examples of both may be found in all branches of science, even in Scientific Psychology, as witness the Parisian 'discovery' some years ago of the so-called *N* rays.

The author is therefore driven to the use of his other, more doubtful criterion, whereby he stigmatises as mystical a particular form of logical fallacy. He maintains that the concept of the unconscious mind 'is almost the exact correspondent of the philosophical mystic's third kind of knowledge' (p. 46); 'Clearly in the Freudian system appears the fundamental anti-scientific postulate of mysticism: a form of knowledge —consciousness—which yet is not consciousness, something which, when it is convenient for the purposes of argument, can be given the attributes and qualities of consciousness, but which when these attributes are inconvenient is entirely divested of them' (p. 89). Psycho-analysts are said to be guilty of the soul-destroying fallacy of the ambiguous middle term, the proof of which is that they use the word 'consciousness' sometimes in the sense of 'a state of awareness' and sometimes to denote 'that of which there is awareness' (pp. 97, 98). The fact is certainly true, though incidentally it may be remarked that in German psycho-analysts try to avoid the possible ambiguity by using the two words 'das Bewußte' and 'das Bewußtsein' respectively, and if need be we could easily do the same in English by speaking of 'the conscious' (i. e. that of which there is awareness) and 'consciousness' (i. e. the state of awareness); we may even make Professor Dunlap a present of the horrifying fact that the word is sometimes used in a further sense, one not dissimilar to 'the ego'. But what of it all? As he himself complains elsewhere (pp. 117, 118), Scientific Psychologists themselves have been guilty of the same procedure not only with this very word, but with

many others, of which 'feeling', 'sensation', 'pain' are flagrant examples, and ambiguity certainly arises at times in connection with them. But it is a far cry from this to assert that a given system of psychology is altogether built on such an ambiguity and we are given no demonstration of it, doubtless for the good reason that no such demonstration exists. Not even the first step is taken—namely of convincing psycho-analysts of the author's particular bogy in logic. To do this it is not enough to point out that a given term has two meanings; before it can be shewn to be an ambiguous middle term the two meanings have first to be shewn to constitute a middle term at all in an argument. We cannot think of any instance of this in psycho-analytical literature, nor does Professor Dunlap provide one. Surely the one function of terms is to convey meaning: if two meanings are conveyed at different times by the same word, the procedure may be an imperfect one, but it is not open to serious criticism until it is shewn that the main object of the procedure—to convey meaning—has failed, i. e. that misunderstanding has thereby arisen.

The real gravamen of the author's criticism surely cannot lie here. It is only discovered when one realises that he himself is guilty of two serious dialectic errors. In the first place, he imposes on psycho-analysts his own particular meaning for a term, and then when this does not make sense in their context he accuses them of being illogical. Thus, mplying that the word consciousness has no other meaning than 'awareness' he is able to say of the 'mystical concept of the unconscious': 'Awareness either is awareness or is nothing. A concept of awareness which at the same time is not awareness is impossible if we avoid the fallacy of the ambiguous middle term' (p. 122). Again, 'this makes it easy for the confused pseudo-psychologist to believe that consciousness may be unconscious, in some profound sense' (p. 125). A simple enough trick. For the criticism it is irrelevant that no psycho-analyst has ever supposed that the tendencies he terms unconscious have any awareness or consciousness of their own. By a twist of a word they can be accused of supposing this, though nothing is further from their plain meaning. It is exactly as though psycho-analysts were imagined to believe that a given process can be at the same time a conscious and an unconscious one, which the author evidently thinks they do.

In the second place, by an extension of the same procedure the author is guilty of a still more elementary error than the one of which he accuses psycho-analysts, namely of that known as *petitio principi*. Throughout the whole book he assumes as a matter of course that 'conscious' and 'mental' are synonymous terms. This he has every right to do if he finds it more convenient; terminology after all is nothing but a matter of expediency. But what he has no right to do is to assume that the two terms are also synonymous for psycho-analysts, when it is

plain enough that they are not. By begging the whole question in this way he finds it easy enough to indicate what to him are self-contradictions in psycho-analytical phraseology. Thus: 'An unconscious wish either is an unconscious physiological process, in which case it is not a wish: or else it really is a wish, in which case it is conscious' (p. 95). Obviously if one makes the grand assumption that any process in the organism of which the person is not aware is therefore physiological in nature, it is easy to arrive at the conclusion that 'the doctrine of unconscious mind becomes absurdly superfluous' (p. 168). For anyone who doubts this assumption, however, even Professor Dunlap must admit that the conclusion does not follow.

To the same misunderstanding is due the curious statement that 'the Freudian doctrine of an unconscious-consciousness is possible on no other basis that that of epistemological dualism' (p. 122). There is not the slightest reason for thinking this. Psycho-analysis is equally compatible with materialism or idealistic monism as with any form of dualism. So far as psycho-analysis is concerned it makes no difference how conscious mental processes are regarded metaphysically, so long as unconscious mental processes are treated in the same way.

This is not the place to repeat the arguments for describing in mental terms certain processes of which the person is not aware, which is what the psycho-analyst means by the term 'unconscious'; this has been most succinctly done by Freud in his *Vierte Sammlung kleiner Schriften*. The all-important matter, however, surely is, not what these processes are called, but what are their qualities and functions. To assert that they must be only physiological is simply nothing but an unsupported *ipse dixit*. The other alternative, which the author uses extensively, is simply to deny their existence. But to do this is to ignore an enormous mass of published material, the observation of which can be repeated and verified by anyone who takes the trouble. To ignore them: *ca n'empêche pas d'exister*.

What the author has to say on the much-debated subject of infantile sexuality is just as beside the point. 'The Freudian hypothesis of infantile sex life is founded on the specific fallacy known to the logicians as the fallacy of *secundum quid*. Reactions which later become a part of the general sex activities are found in the child, and therefore pointed out as evidence of sex activity. It is as if one should claim that the labored breathing produced by running to catch a street car is *sexual* because the same labored breathing may occur during certain stages of sex activity' (p. 60). We have here once more the well-worn device of imputing to an opponent an absurd argument he has never used and then triumphantly pointing out its absurdity. The onus of proof is quite the other way. When a dumb idiot masturbates the presumption is that the act is as much a sexual manifestation as though

he could assure us in so many words that it was, at all events unless there is good reason to come to another conclusion. Similarly, when an infant masturbates and continues the habit until he is old enough to describe it in adult phraseology, the presumption, in the lack of evidence to the contrary, is that it is as 'sexual' in the earlier stages as in the later ones.

To help those engaged in the study of neuropathology Professor Dunlap amiably offers his views on aetiology 'as a suggestion towards a more thoroughgoing understanding of the neuroses' (p. 108). In his opinion neuroses are characteristically due, at least in the male, to abnormal sex activity with its resulting 'emotional antagonism, which amounts in many cases to a definite, although temporary, splitting of personality in its vital emotional foundation'. He adds, in a remark on which we will not comment, that 'such significant factors in the possible etiology of sex neuroses are entirely ignored by psychoanalysis' (p. 111).

Nevertheless, despite all, psycho-analysis has one virtue. 'Psychology has been culpably negligent in regard to the study of the desires, and the one positive service which the Freudians have done is in emphasizing the incompetence of our information (and also of their own information) on this important subject' (p. 159).

The third section of the book is on the Foundations of Scientific Psychology. The author lays down a series of unimpeachable truisms relating to scientific method in general and then seeks to apply them to psychology in particular. This results partly in an elementary textbook of school psychology and partly in an extensive attempt to translate psychology into terms of neurology. Throughout the book much use is made of William James' division of temperaments into the two classes of the 'tough-minded' and the 'tender-minded' respectively, with the object of shewing how psycho-analysts fall into the latter category. Their fallacy of the ambiguous middle term 'gives a specious explanation, comforting to his demand for easy but final knowledge, and relieving him of any tendency to seek for actual scientific explanation' (p. 98), for 'when by mere application of *a priori* principles an emotionally satisfactory explanation of the universe can be obtained without the baffling labor of scientific analysis and experimentation, obviously scientific methods will not be applied'. Whether the practice of psycho-analysis is so much easier and less laborious a method for the study of human motives than that pursued by most writers of textbooks of psychology is a matter on which no judgement can well be passed except by those who have had personal experience of both: it is one on which psycho-analysts certainly need fear no comparison. But the most interesting point in this imputation of James' 'tender-mindedness' to psycho-analysts is that the author quite forgets James'

original application of it to those psychologists who, like Professor Dunlap, are too 'tender-minded' to face the subject-matter of their own science without taking refuge in the soothing practice of indulging in neurologizing tautology. E. J.

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THE MEANING OF DREAMS. By Isador H. Coriat, M.D. (Mind and Health Series. Little Brown & Company, Boston. William Heinemann, London. 1920. Pp. 194. Price 1.75 dollars.)

The theme of this book, and its attempted scope, cannot fail to be of interest, but it is difficult to see how Dr. Coriat reconciles his appreciation of Psycho-Analysis (he goes so far as to say in his Preface: 'This volume is written along purely psycho-analytic lines.... Its aim is to give the general reader an outline of the meaning of dreams as elaborated by the psycho-analytic school'...) with the dream-interpretation he supplies again and again in his book. It is true that he often explains he can only give imperfect descriptions and explanations owing to the limited space, but this hardly accounts for interpretations which are either quite superficial or inaccurate. As an example, Chapter III ('Dreams as the fulfilment of Wishes') may be referred to. We read: 'A young man on a short visit to a congenial household dreamed that the recently planted bulbs in this household had sprouted and bore flowers. The wish in this dream is perfectly clear: it expresses the desire to prolong the visit, and this is expressed by the length of time it takes bulbs to grow' (p. 53). One may remark, in passing, that this sort of 'explanation' cannot possibly be of use to anyone—even if it were in any way correct—since it reveals nothing whatever of the unconscious elements which created the dream nor the mechanisms at work in it. But does Dr. Coriat imagine that here he is writing 'along purely psycho-analytic lines', or indeed doing anything connected even remotely with dream-interpretation? The curious part is that he has a whole chapter of thirty pages devoted to 'The Mechanism of Dreams', in which he writes of Dream-Symbolism, Dream-Displacement, Dream-Condensation, etc. etc., yet in his applications, he behaves mostly as though he were unconscious of such processes. One finds serious confusion in statements made throughout the book, surprising from a writer who claims to have studied his subject seriously. For instance, on page 1 we are told that the dream 'may be symbolic of something deepseated in the personality of the dreamer, *or it may indicate something trivial...*', while on page 3 we read: '*no dream ever deals with trifles,* but only subjects of great personal interest to the dreamer'. (Italics are the Reviewer's).

On page 86 there is so remarkable a statement that one is surely justified in feeling that it proves that whatever may be said about 'The Meaning of Dreams', it can hardly be accused of following the Freudian theory. Here it is: 'This process of Repression is not always voluntary, but may be an involuntary act as well, in order to protect the mind from ideas and feelings which are unpleasant and painful'. And this after extensive quotation from Freud's own work!

BARBARA LOW.

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'ROLAND.' Un Symbole. Par J. Vodoz. (Paris, Edouard Champion, 1920.)

As the psychology of the unconscious slowly penetrates into France, where the reasonable side of human mentality is so much vaunted, the charge of exaggeration and uncertainty is brought against it with perhaps more than usual energy and want of discrimination. There are cases, we know, in which the charge may be only too well grounded; and it is unfortunate that it should be so apposite to the present work, described in its preface as 'une tentative d'appliquer les théories de la psychologie analytique, à l'étude d'un sujet digne d'attirer... toute notre attention', but in reality offering no very reliable support for the conclusions it suggests.

It is at least a merit that the author does not call his work a study in the application of *psycho-analysis* to the criticism of literature. Almost the only scientifically acceptable part of his theory regarding *Le Chanson de Roland* is that which represents the poem as in part a dramatization of the Oedipus complex. In virtue of his love for his mother (symbolized, usually, as France) Roland opposes Ganelon, his step-father, and independently refuses the proffered auxiliary aid of Charlemagne, the King; and a justifiable and interesting article (perhaps not more) might have been written to show in what degree the tragic events that followed were bound up with these psychological factors alone. Instead, much of the dénouement is made to depend on Roland's suddenly realizing (through some mysterious and undefined agency) that his attachment to his mother is a harmful thing and must be sacrificed... 'et ce premier pas fait, ses yeux s'ouvrent: dans le père, il ne voit plus, uniquement, le répresentant de l'autorité, de la force, l'intrus—il reconnaît les autres attributs: la toute-puissance s'exerçant dans la bonté, l'amour se manifestant dans le désir de sauver...' Roland is therefore a symbol of the highly-civilized notion of self-sacrifice, and the poet's moral lesson for his compatriots is 'Renoncez à suivre vos instincts égoistes. Ne recherchez pas dans ce que vous appelez l'amour du sol natal la satisfaction de vos désirs de bien-être et de volupté. Unissez-vous en sujets soumis à votre roi, que veut être votre père.' It is not for nothing,

apparently, that in a footnote on symbols (p. 5-6) Jung heads the list of three authorities given and Freud is not mentioned.

The same arbitrariness of interpretation appears in the treatment of separate incidents, as where the flight of the Saracens is understood to symbolize the victory of Roland, the Christian, over the forces of Paganism. 'Dans son inconscient, le Chrétien avait encore des affinités avec l'islamisme; de là un vague sentiment de culpabilité, l'instinct de son tort'. But this vague sentiment of culpability seems to be in no way distinguished, in respect of its depth and significance, from what psycho-analysis regards as the genuinely fundamental instincts.

When we come, in Chapter III, to Victor Hugo's poem, 'Le Mariage de Roland', which deals with the episodic contest between Roland and Oliver and their final decision to give it up and compound for it in Roland's marriage with 'La belle Aude', we find this interpreted as a symbol of Hugo's feelings towards the Nineteenth Century conflict between Classics and Romantics, which the poet more or less unconsciously recognized as compromising the reputation and dignity of France and French poetry. Much more plausibly, towards the end, reference is made to certain of Hugo's family relationships—especially as regards his father—which would have made it natural for him 'à s'identifier avec celui qui proteste'. But these elements are not given their due prominence and proportion in the conduct of the argument.

M. Vodoz concludes his study with some remarks to the effect that Romanticism might profitably be studied with reference to the psychology of the unconscious, and it appears that he himself is engaged upon such an enquiry. It must be hoped that he will learn to approach the subject in a more scientific and less capricious spirit than he manifests here. He may then produce a work of real value on a subject which is full of interest.

L. C. MARTIN.

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THE LITERATURE OF ECSTASY. By Albert Mordell. (Boni & Liveright. New York. 1921.)

Mr. Mordell does a certain service in publishing from time to time the results of his reading and re-consideration of literature from what is in many ways the psycho-analytic point of view, though in exactness and precision of expression his work leaves a great deal to be desired. Like his earlier volume, 'The Erotic Motive in Literature', the present work covers a large and varied field, surveying literary mankind 'from China to Peru', from Homer to Chekhov, from Beowulf to William Butler Yeats. There are chapters on the psychology of ecstasy, the historical relations of prose to poetry, love-ecstasy in Arabian literature,

etc. Mr. Mordell adopts the term 'ecstasy' for the release of the emotions in artistic activity and appreciation, or rather for the feeling of that release, and the expression is not unjustifiable. But his interpretation of the etymology seems at least questionable: 'Ecstasy is derived from the Greek word which means *to make stand out;* the mind makes sensible things stand out because it is concentrated on particular emotions, and on the ideas associated with and springing from these emotions' (p. 18). The usual interpretation seems much less strained and no less appropriate to Mr. Mordell's thesis: 'ekstasis', a standing out *of oneself,* e.g. in a poetic frenzy.

The leading idea, conferring upon the work such unity as it can claim, is that the distinction between poetry and prose is less valid than is commonly assumed, that verse can be prose and prose can be poetry, and that feeling and imagination (or 'ecstasy') are primary factors in 'poetic' literature. This, although as Mr. Mordell himself shows not a very unfamiliar idea, even among pre-Freudian critics of literature, is an idea that deserves encouragement and in some measure receives it here. But Mr. Mordell seems occasionally to show a somewhat narrow vision when deciding what literature is 'ecstatic' in the highest sense of the word, and his remarks on Keats's sonnet about Chapman's translation of Homer seem to show a radical weakness in his point of view. 'The whole idea of this poem is in the comparing his first discovery of Homer to the feelings of the man who discovers a new planet, and to those of the discoverer of the Pacific Ocean.... But can this poem compare with such other sonnets of his where he lays bare his inmost emotions... etc.' (p. 237). Surely if psycho-analysis teaches anything it is that a poem like the sonnet in question may convey in veiled terms those very 'inmost emotions' which are the stuff of all great poetry, and until we know more about Keats's mentality it is a little arbitrary to decide which of his poems meant most to him, or expressed his deepest aspirations.

Again, in his anxiety to prove his case that rhythm is unessential, Mr. Mordell seems greatly to underestimate the value of rhythm as an emotional stimulus. This appears, for instance, when he takes five lines of *Paradise Lost,* paraphrases them into prose, and then asks us to believe that he has done no harm to the poetry. The lines are the well-known ones:

> What though the field be lost?
> All is not lost; the unconquerable will... etc.

The paraphrase: 'And suppose we lost the battle? We have not lost everything. We still have our unconquerable will... etc.' (p. 68). It is amusing, but it would also be very regrettable if criticism on this level

were to be commonly associated with the application of psycho-analysis to literary interpretation. What is wanted, of course, is a serious discussion of the curiously strong part that rhythm has played in the arts of poetry and music. It would be interesting, for example, to know to what extent the appreciation of rhythm is bound up with the hearing or feeling of regular pulsations during the pre-natal existence. It is not to be lightly disregarded.

It is unfortunate, too, that Mr. Mordell occasionally uses his terms with great looseness,—that he can speak, for example, of 'ecstasy', 'the imagination', 'the unconscious' as if they could be synonymous; that his facts and quotations are not marshalled with more precision and economy; and that he employs a highly reiterative and often an unnecessarily contentious and resentful style. In these ways he is likely to alienate the sympathies of many readers who might profit by a recognition, or at least a consideration, of some of his main principles.

L. C. MARTIN.

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LOVE — MARRIAGE — BIRTH CONTROL. Being a speech delivered at the Church Congress at Birmingham, October 1921. By Lord Dawson of Penn. (Nisbet & Co. London. Pp. 27. Price 1s.)

It is notoriously difficult to elicit any unbiassed information on the subject of sex from physicians of high repute. One can, for instance, conclude with fair precision that if asked any question concerning the relation of abstinence to health, they will answer that the correlation between the two is a positive one, i.e. that the more complete the abstinence the more perfect the state of health, and that there is no connection between enforced abstinence and any form of nervous disorder; it is answer which would surprise one were it given as regards the functioning of any other of the bodily or mental systems. In this brochure Lord Dawson courageously lifts at least a corner of the veil. He admits that at all events during marriage such abstention may be 'harmful to health and happiness' and that it may 'impose a strain hostile to health and happiness'. He further challenges the recent pronouncement of the Church as set forth at the Lambeth Conference and maintains, in opposition to this, that 'Sex love has, apart from parenthood, a purport of its own. It is something to prize and to cherish for its own sake. It is an essential part of health and happiness in marriage'.

E. J.

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THE MECHANISM OF THE BRAIN AND THE FUNCTION OF THE FRONTAL LOBES. By Professor Leonardo Bianchi. Authorized translation by James Macdonald M.B., F.R.F.P.S. (Glasg.). (E. & S. Livingstone, Edinburgh. Pp. 335.)

This work which contains 62 figures of the brain and four diagrams is a closely reasoned argument in favour of the author's views respecting the functions of the frontal lobes.

Two-thirds of the book are devoted to the evolution of the nervous system, the morphology and structure of the frontal lobes, the associative paths between the frontal lobes and the sensory areas of the cortex, a discussion of the results obtained by other physiologists, clinical data and the results of the author's own experiments on dogs, foxes and monkeys.

Professor Bianchi regards the frontal lobes as the 'centre' of all the other 'centres' and agrees with Lugaro that they are 'the organ which registers the story of the acts of all one's life (experience), the organ which feels the most intimate impulses of the organism and elaborates the particular mode of reaction to external stimuli'.

Patients who have suffered damage to their frontal lobes become more impulsive and exhibit alterations of character in other respects. Animals whose frontal lobes have been extirpated do not associate an impression with past experience and are less keen in perception. Their memory is reduced for both recent and remote events, their associative power is diminished and their judgment poor. There is absence of initiative and they cannot see a joke. In other words the author concludes from his many observations during no less than thirty years that the frontal lobes are the physical basis of the highest functions of mentation.

The concluding chapters deal with Intelligence and Language (with an appendix on Logic), Emotions and Sentiments (with an appendix on The Social Sentiment) and Consciousness. These really amount to a brief but excellent text-book on psychology, not—however—from a physiological, but from a psychological point of view; and we find that this great physiologist is also an excellent psycholgist. This combination is, we believe, extremely rare if not unique.

But more! Professor Bianchi accepts the doctrines of psycho-analysis, teaches that thought and action are controlled by feeling, recognizes the existence of the unconscious and attaches importance to it. 'The unconscious is like the depth of the sea as contrasted with the surface where the ship of life sails smoothly on or is tossed among the waves; it is like the bowels of the earth which furnish gold and coal for our existence; or like the immensity of space in which, even with the aid of a telescope, our eyes can see only a comparatively small number of stars, distant millions of miles from one another, yet all influencing each other by physical laws.... What appears on the surface is but a small

part of all that exists'. This is from the pen of a man who was publishing results of his physiological researches at least as far back as 1878; it seems incredible.

In view of these considerations it would be churlish to say one word about the few minor inaccuracies and misunderstandings respecting some psycho-analytical details.

We must confess, however, that we fail to see what contribution this psychological part of the book makes towards the Professor's main thesis—the functions of the frontal lobes—for there does not appear to be any attempt to correlate these mental processes with their physical substratum.

The book is beautifully got up and there are two very complete indexes of subjects and authors. We cannot conclude without congratulating Dr. Macdonald on the excellence of his translation.

W. H. B. STODDART.

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A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF PSYCHOSES WITH ENDOCRINOSES. By Dudley Ward Fay, Ph.D. (Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, Washington 1922. pp. 122.)

This is a record of 22 cases of psychosis in which coincident endocrinosis was diagnosed and treated. Twenty are labelled schizophrenia, while the other two (a maniacal-depressive and an epileptic) presented schizophrenic features. Fourteen of the patients were hypothyroid, five were hyperthyroid and two were diagnosed as hypoadrenia.

From this contribution there appears to be no clear relationship between schizophrenia and any specific endocrine; but glandular therapy appropriate to each case met with some success (mentally) as long as it was continued. The patients returned, however, to their former mental condition when glandular therapy was stopped.

It is clear that the author possesses psycho-analytic knowledge and he attempted to analyze some of these patients—not, however, with much therapeutic success. Fellatio, acknowledged or repressed, seems to have played a conspicuous rôle in about one-third of the cases.

We doubt whether this study has much scientific value. The patients were all psychotic, some for many years, and they were selected because they presented obvious symptoms of some endocrinosis. It would have been of much more scientific value to study the endocrinology of a series of selected patients suffering from some specific psychosis or the psychoses of a series of patients presenting some specific endocrinosis.

W. H. B. STODDART.

*

SEX PROBLEMS IN WOMEN. By A. C. Magian, M.D. (Wm. Heinemann [Medical Books] Ltd., 1922, pp. 219, Price 12s. 6d.)

An author who sets out to write a book on a particular subject should above all make himself acquainted with the most recent literature on the subject, and although he may not agree with the views expressed therein should include them in his book. This condition is certainly not fulfilled in Dr. Magian's book. If he had written it twenty years ago it might have been accepted in the general run of such books, and then relegated to a forgotten corner of the library.

The book is written in a popular style and would be more suited to lay readers than medical men. The author's pretensions are good if only they had been carried out satisfactorily.

No book of this nature is complete in the light of our present knowledge unless it contains an exposition on the development of the sexual instinct, its manifestations from infancy to adult life, and the abnormalities to which it is liable. But in this work we find no reference to these points, yet the works of Freud and his followers have thrown an immense light on these problems. Without this knowledge no one can hope to understand and explain the various problems dealt with in this book. The psychical side of these problems has been left practically untouched by the author.

Many of the statements appearing in the book are quite at variance with what we now know of the sexual life of women, and some of the advice given is positively dangerous. Two examples taken at random will illustrate what we mean.

On p. 7 the author states, 'Homosexuality in women is rare, and when it does occur is usually due to mental disorders'.

On p. 110 the author states regarding the treatment of sexual perversions 'He (the practising physician) can at all events point out the dangers of the habit and purposely draw a *lurid* picture of the disasters which may follow if it be not at once discontinued'.[1] Further comment on the passages is unnecessary.

If the following statement of the author were in any way correct the country would need a great increase in the number of Mental Hospitals. On p. 9 he says, 'Some (methods of preventing conception) are harmless, others react powerfully upon the nervous system and produce well-marked neuroses and *psychoses*.[2] Coitus reservatus and coitus interruptus are particularly harmful to women in the latter respect.'

The authors experience must have been unique when he writes, 'Young unmarried girls not infrequently consult a doctor for the mere purpose of being examined and thereby obtaining a certain amount of sexual excitement and gratification' (p. 2). It is difficult to believe that

[1] The italics are the reviewer's.

young girls would choose this way of endeavouring to obtain sexual gratification when the result is so likely to be a negative one and easier paths are open to them.

The author's chapter on Anatomy and Physiology is satisfactory as far as it goes, but it exhibits the same defect as the rest of the book in that the physiology is lacking in the more recent investigations, and only a passing reference is made to modern endocrinology in relation to the female sex organs.

On the whole there is very little to commend in the book, and what there is is nullified by its inaccuracies and lack of present-day knowledge.

The subject is a very important one, but books of this description do not tend to increase the general practitioner's knowledge of the subject, as the author evidently set out to do from his preface.

D. B.

*

MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. First Report of the Miners' Nystagmus Committee. (His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1922. Pp. 64. Price 1s. 6d.)

This little volume is an important contribution to our knowledge of an industrial disease, popularly known as 'miners' blindness', that incapacitates thousands of workmen, and by which the country loses many millions of pounds a year. The main part of the report is taken up by a masterly study of the condition by Dr. Lister Llewellyn, the foremost authority on the subject. He deals at length with all its aspects, historical, symptomatological, diagnostic and aetiological. He has established beyond doubt that the chief determining factor is the matter of lighting in mines and has made practical suggestions about how this may be remedied.

To readers of this JOURNAL, however, the subject proves to have an unexpected psychological interest. Llewellyn and others have shewn that there is a curiously small correlation observable between the presence or severity of the disease itself, which essentially consists in ocular nystagmus, and the extent to which the men actually suffer. Pronounced quivering of the eyes may co-exist with little subjective discomfort, while a man may be totally incapacitated when his physical signs are quite slight. As the practical effects of the condition depend on the amount of suffering rather than the mere presence of nystagmus, attention therefore becomes directed to the nature of the factor determining the former, especially as that determining the latter is now known. It is agreed that this new factor is a purely mental one and the committee therefore called in a psychologist, Dr. Rivers, to express his views

about the probable nature of this. Unfortunately the matter seems to have been considered without its being thought necessary to make any actual investigations, and the *a priori* conclusions to which Dr. Rivers comes in his report are therefore deprived of the value they might otherwise possess. He points out that the eye is an important organ, that fear of blindness is strong and widespread, that imperfect vision may entail dangers in mines, and on the basis of these considerations puts forward the view that the essential psychical factor concerned is fear due to the threat to the instinct of self-preservation. In doing so he ignores the fact that hundreds of cases of ophthalmic neuroses have now been investigated and not one has been shewn to have any such aetiology. On the other hand he makes no mention of the aetiology actually found in all these cases—namely, that the neurosis (and the fear of blindness) is related to intrapsychical conflicts concerned with (a) the erotogenic function of the eye, and (b) the phallic symbolism constantly involved. We would hazard the guess that if these cases of miners' nystagmus were to be investigated it would be found that the essential cause of the suffering is in a large number of them, possibly in all, a castration fear. This suggestion, unlike Dr. River's, is based on data, but evidently only actual investigation would decide which of the two is correct. E. J.

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NATIONAL WELFARE AND NATIONAL DECAY. By William McDougall, Professor of Psychology in Harvard University. (Methuen & Co., London. 1921. Pp. 214. Price 6s.).

Dr. McDougall is also among the prophets. In this volume he expresses certain alarming conclusions he has come to as the result of his studies, and issues a stirring appeal for immediate action if national disasters on a wide scale are to be prevented.

The main problem with which the book is concerned is the reason for the regularly recurring decline of high civilisations. The author deals only very slightly with the equally interesting question of the rise of such civilisations. He describes the typical course as being that of a parabola and thinks that several Western and Northern nations, more especially England, have passed their climax and are about to enter on a phase of rapid declension. The reason he gives for this prediction is that 'Our civilization, by reason of its increasing complexity, is making constantly increasing demands upon the qualities of its bearers; the qualities of those bearers are diminishing or deteriorating, rather than improving' (p. 170). These qualities are deteriorating because there is a constant selection going on of the more valuable units of the population into those classes which are much the least fertile (one half of the

propagation in England, for instance, is said to be effected by one sixth, and that the least valuable, of the population). There comes a moment, more or less suddenly, when the given race can no longer reproduce valuable members in sufficient numbers to sustain the ever-increasing demands of complex civilisation, and that moment, in Dr. McDougall's opinion, is now upon us.

The reasoning of this argument is impeccable, so that the conclusions must be valid if only the premises are sound. To establish them on a sound basis, however, a good deal has first to be proved. To begin with, to what extent are mental qualities transmissible by inheritance? Much evidence is adduced to indicate the probability of this, and the views of some psycho-analysts as to the inheritance of innate ideas are favourably quoted. Most of the evidence, however, is concerned with only one mental quality, intelligence. Apart from the criticism of this evidence that might be offered on the ground that it too readily postulates the unitary character of 'intelligence', we would remark that Dr. McDougall does not sufficiently discriminate, in our opinion, between the two senses in which he uses the term 'valuable mental qualities'. Sometimes, especially when waxing dithyrambic on the Nordic race, he seems to use the term to indicate those qualities which he personally would most like to see prevailing in a community, whereas at other times he uses it in the only sense in which it is relevant in the present connection, to indicate those qualities of the highest survival-value for a race. It is true that he very often identifies the two: 'This undefined innate basis of moral character is perhaps of all innate qualities the most valuable possession of any human stock. It is the innate basis of a quality which we may best name trustworthiness. This quality is no simple unit; it cannot be ascribed to the operation of any one instinct; and, though it implies intelligence, it is not closely correlated with high intelligence. In respect of this complex and vaguely defined quality, races and people seem to differ widely. Without its presence in a high degree, no people can achieve or sustain a high level of civilization.... It is not too much to claim for this quality that it is more important than any other, intelligence not excepted, for the maintenance of a high level of civilization' (pp. 139, 140). Having done this, he expresses the opinion that these valuable moral qualities are to be correlated with intelligence (p. 141), this having the obvious advantage that one could then assume that they, like it, are inheritable. But it seems to us that before one can leap to this conclusion far more precise investigations are necessary in the way of analytically defining the nature of the qualities to be estimated, and then proceeding to discover to what extent they are capable of inheritance.

That the more well-to-do classes of the community reproduce their kind (even after allowing for their lower death rate) in a lesser degree

than do the rest of the community seems to be definitely established by statistical evidence, therefore it becomes necessary to shew that the members of the community entering the 'better' classes are selected just for the moral qualities in question to the impoverishment of the other classes. The matter is not to be settled by such an ipse dixit as the following: 'the top stratum in England, the upper professional and commercial classes, together with the aristocracy, which is constantly recruited from them (and from America), is probably richer in valuable human qualities than any other large group now existing—or was so before the war; while the lower strata contain a deplorable proportion of human beings of poor quality' (p. 158). For evidence Dr. McDougall has to fall back once more on the investigations of intelligence only, which support his case so far as they go, but which are deplorably insufficient for such a weighty conclusion. The prejudices of the Socialists will be still more offended by another statement according to which the impulse to save or hoard is said to be 'a quality essential to any people that is to build up a civilization based on the accumulation of wealth, on commerce and industry, as every communistic or socialistic has been. Owing to this necessity, every communistic or socialistic scheme which would abolish private property is an empty dream, an unrealizable ideal, a Utopia' (pp. 130, 131).

Various proposals advocated for the supposedly rapid deterioration of our stock are examined and for the most part rejected. Dr. McDougall would of course extend the present practice of birth control to the poorer classes of the community as being at least a partial check on the rate of deterioration and he comments as follows on the present situation in regard to it in America: 'In this all-important matter of birth-control the position of America is remarkable and uniquely disastrous. The educated classes seem to cultivate and practice the principles of birth-control more assiduously than any other class of persons in the civilized world, while, *mirabile dictu*, they maintain laws which forbid the extension of the knowledge of such principles to the mass of the people' (pp. 163, 164). The plan that he most warmly advocates, however, after considering the extent to which legislation on such matters would be tolerated, is the endowment by a private millionaire of University teachers, as representing a selected class of the population, and lest he be charged, as other eugenists have, with not practising what they preach he includes in his book a beautiful photograph of his own five healthy and happy children. It will be seen that Dr. McDougall here departs from the more recent Eugenic schools, which attach more importance to negative selection, i.e. weeding out of the less valuable, than to positive measures such as encouragement of the finest stock.

Dr. McDougall makes some very interesting contributions to the comparative psychology of various races, principally the Nordic and

Mediterranean ones. We trust, however, that the evidence for his conclusions in these respects is better founded and less obviously biassed than the following explanation of psycho-analysis. During his self-analysis at the hands of Dr. Jung he was not convinced of the latter's theory that the racial origins of patients can be discovered by the particular symbolism of their dreams, but he adds: 'One of Jung's arguments weighs with me a good deal in favour of his view. He points out that the famous theory of Freud, which he himself at one time accepted, is a theory of the development and working of the mind which was evolved by a Jew who has studied chiefly Jewish patients; and it seems to appeal very strongly to Jews; many, perhaps the majority, of those physicians who accept it as a new gospel, a new revelation, are Jews. It looks as though this theory, which to me and to most men of my sort seems so strange, bizarre, and fantastic, may be approximately true of the Jewish race' (p. 134). Here Dr. McDougall shews that if he has a pretty hypothesis that pleases him he is quite ready to invent facts in support of it. It doesn't happen to be true that Professor Freud 'has studied chiefly Jewish patients', nor that most of his supporters are Jews; there are local political reasons why this is so in his own country, but not more than one or two per cent of the members of the Psycho-Analytical Societies in Britain, Holland, and Switzerland, to mention countries where these factors do not operate, are Jews. The absurdity of the view on other grounds need not be demonstrated.

Although, therefore, judgement should be reserved on many of the conclusions here propounded, there is no doubt that the book is a valuable and novel presentation of the Eugenic case and contains a number of highly stimulating suggestions. E. J.

*

LITTLE ESSAYS OF LOVE AND VIRTUE. By Havelock Ellis. (A. & C. Black, Ltd., London, 1922. Pp. 187.)

In these days when hatred, malice and all forms of uncharitableness seem to be the dominant forces in public life it is a relief to turn to the writings of such a man as Havelock Ellis, so gentle and soothing, yet brave and hopeful and imbued throughout by a spirit of good will. This volume of essays, the fourth he has published in the last few years, is written for the young and Dr. Ellis says in his Preface: 'I would prefer to leave to their judgment the question as to whether this book is suitable to be placed in the hands of older people. It might only give them pain.' They treat the subjects of love, marriage and the family in the attractive, well-informed and broad-minded fashion so characteristic of the author. For once a publisher's announcement

tells the truth, when it says that this book is 'full of an amazing wisdom, gentleness, and beauty'. It is a book to read and enjoy, not to criticise, and we warmly commend it to all those who are interested—and who is not?—in the artistic and social aspects of love.

E. J.

*

THE STAIRWAY. By Alice A. Chown. (The Cornhill Company, Boston. 1921. Pp. 329.)

The only slight interest which this eccentric book may possess for readers of this Journal is to be found in Chapter XIII. Here the authoress, in the course of her hectic soul-development, which comprises quite a number of re-births, studies under a Freudian doctor, who was a Professor in Toronto University. She expresses her gratitude to Dr. Barnes (the doctor in question) and to Freud, saying: 'Freud and Dr. Barnes gave me a new comprehension of life, of freedom and truth', an appreciation somewhat mitigated by another statement made almost in the same breath: 'I was quite content to accept Freud if I were allowed to take him in my own way'.

One had some suspicions that such was the attitude of many across the Atlantic who profess allegiance to new ideas (in a way familiar enough to us in Europe also), and this volume is a little bit of added evidence.

BARBARA LOW.

OBITUARY

W. H. R. Rivers. M.D., D.Sc., F.R.S., F.R.C.P.

We regret to have to announce the death of Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, who died on June 4, 1922, after a short and painful illness, aged 58. He had become famous in the fields of anthropology, physiology and psychology and his work constituted a valuable nodal point bringing these three sciences into relationship with each other. He was elected an Associate Member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society in 1920 and had recently expressed his intention of being present at the forthcoming International Congress in Berlin.

Of Dr. Rivers' extensive labours in other fields this is not the place to speak. At the close of the War his interest was strongly directed towards psycho-analysis and he at once perceived the relationship existing between the psycho-analytical discoveries and the facts of social anthropology. From this period dates an interesting brochure entitled 'Dreams and Primitive Culture', in which he laid strees on the resemblance between the Freudian mechanisms of dream-formation and similar processes at work in the formation of savage customs. He privately expressed his regret that he had not been trained in psycho-analysis before his visits to Melanesia, where he carried out most of his field work in ethnology. After his return to Cambridge, where he took up an important position as Director of Scientific Studies, he had no further opportunity of pursuing his study of psycho-analysis and his writings that emanate from this period became less sympathetic towards the subject.

Though Dr. Rivers' interest in psycho-analysis appears to have been aroused at a conjuncture in his life that did not favour his undertaking a deep study of it, we deplore in his death the loss of of man who did much to introduce this study to younger workers, who was a distinguished man of science in other fields and who possessed a charming personality that no one who knew him can ever forget.

E. J.

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